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Summary 
In this work we discuss a number of issues in the theory of 
voluntary provision of public goods and income tax evasion under 
the assumption that individuals are ruled by a notion of Kantlan 
morality. Our justification for imposing such an assumption is 
that models incorporating the traditional assumption of rational 
egoism are unable to explain the 
, 
many real world examples of 
successful private provision of public goods, of which compliance 
to tax rules can be taken as an example. In the first part of this 
work, after having reviewed the literature on private provision of 
public goods and justified our alternative approach, we introduce 
and formalize the notion of Kantian behaviour. We investigate 
efficiency of private provision of public goods under Kantian 
behaviour and we also compare Kantian provision with alternative 
models of public goods supply. Precise conditions on the structure 
of individual preferences which would ensure efficiency of private 
provision of a public good under Kantian, behaviour are derived. It 
is also shown that while Kantian supply of a public good is in 
general, still characterized by, underprovision it tends to be more 
efficient than public good provision under a democratic system as 
represented by the Median voter. theorem. Finally, using the notion 
of Lindahl equilibrium, a different way of assessing 'under/over 
provision of a public good under Kantian behaviour is derived. In 
the second part of this work, building upon the analysis on 
Kantian behaviour developed in the previous sections, we address 
the phenomenon of income tax evasion as an example ' of voluntary 
(non) provision of a public good. We present a model where the 
amount of tax that a taxpayer wishes to evade is determined on the 
basis of his perception of the fairness of his fiscal treatment, 
with respect to both governmental supply of public goods and the 
perceived behaviour of the other taxpayers. The coercive powers of 
the state, as well as the taxpayer's attitude toward risk, 
determine only the extent, to which this desired level of tax 
evasion is reached in practice. It is shown that this approach is 
able to produce implications for the relationship between the 
characteristics of public expenditure, the tax rates and tax 
evasion which are more consistent with both intuition, and 
empirical evidence than the results of the conventional model of 
income tax evasion. Furthermore, it also allows one to address 
other important questions such as the effect of government 
X-inefficiency on tax evasion. ,. 
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Chapter I Introduction and Overview 
I, 1, Selfishness, Fairness and Rationality 
Economic theory relies heavily upon the assumption that 
economic agents behave as "rational egoists", where rationality 
refers to the way in which individuals organize their actions and 
selfishness'to the content of these actions. Such an assumption 
has received'severe 'criticisms in; the past and it is still 
submitted to unsympathetic scrutiny, by scholars inside and outside 
the realm of"economics: Nevertheless, the concept of rational 
egoism characterizes most, of the current work in economics. This 
widespread acceptance of the-notion-is due to 'a number of reasons. 
First, history; that is, the-long tradition' that- the notion of 
"economic man" has-in the discipline. Second,, usefulness: that is, 
the fact that the assumption of-rational egoism is a particularly 
good assumption to employ, especially in "formal work, since it 
allows one`°to', 'reduceý-"dramatically the 'complexity of human 
behaviour' whilst'4still'retaining important features of it in the 
market place: The third-: is that the notion of rational egoism is 
associated with some-fundamental results of economic theory --such 
asýthe Pareto"optimality=of competitive equilibria (Sen, 1987). 
Given`this' general -consensus on the notion of rational 
egoism, a work'which-purposes to address some selected economic 
issues' by rrelaxing' this assumption requires at 'least ' two 
justifications'. First`, At-must- show- that the -assumption of 
i 
rational egoism is particularly unsuitable for the issue at hand, 
that is, that it misses some fundamental features of human 
behaviour in the field under analysis. Second, it must show that 
the analytic' complexity added to models by relaxing this 
assumption pays off in terms of results which are more in line 
with observed data than those provided by traditional models. 
In this work we try to show that, in the context of models of 
voluntary provision of public goods and tax evasion, abandoning 
the notion of rational egoism in favour of a notion of ethical 
behaviour can be justified in. the double sense explained above. 
Our basic'- argument will run as follows. In situations 
characterized by- voluntary provision of -public goods, the 
assumption of rational egoism implies that private provision of 
public goodsýis largely suboptimal or even non-existent. This 
strongly clashes with the many real world examples of successful 
private contribution schemes, such- as charities or collective 
organizations (see chapter II). It is also inconsistent with the 
fact that most people pay their taxes even when it would be in. 
their best interest not to do so. a fact which can also be thought 
of as an example of voluntary contribution to a public good (see 
chapter V). A possible explanation for these phenomena, as 
suggested by Sen, (1977) and Johansen (1977), is that human beings 
are sophisticated enough'to understand- that- in a situation of 
voluntary provision of public goods, the adoption' of' a strictly 
selfish strategy by everybody may be detrimental in terms of 
everybody's own selfish objectives. As a consequence, they might 
2 
be stimulated to follow those rules of behaviour that they 
perceive might produce a better outcome if followed by everybody. 
Building upon the seminal work of Laffont (1975) and, 
especially, of Sugden (1984), we will model these rules as ethical 
rules of behaviour. The main idea is simply that there are some 
basic-norms of social behaviour ("practical morality") that, if 
followed by individuals, will tend to promote, in public goods 
situations, a higher- level of, economic efficiency than would 
result'if, everybody behaved selfishly (Phelps, 1975). We will 
assume that people are clever enough to understand. this and that, 
as a consequence, they maybe willing to follow, in some cases at 
least, these social . norms. Thus, differently! from the more 
sociologically oriented work by Akerlof(1980). it is here assumed 
that compliance to social rules is an autonomous choice rather 
than the result of social pressure. This of course does not mean 
to deny that external forces such as group pressures, reputation, 
etc. may also have a role in, enforcing individuals' obedience to 
rules.. 
Following-a quite established tradition in economics, we will 
introduce these ethical rules as a constraint imposed on the 
maximization of a selfish utility function. Less conventionally, 
and following the -seminal. - work of Laffont (1975) and Sugden 
(1984), we will model ethical behaviour by means of a notion of 
Kantian morality: that is, by the idea that an individual would 
consider it morally right to act as he would wish that everybody 
else should act in the same circumstances (see 'chapter III). We 
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adopt this rule of behaviour for a number of reasons. First. the 
Kantian rule is a very simple and well known ethical rule of 
behaviour, so much so that it can be found in slightly different 
forms in, several ethical systems (see chapter III). Thus, it is 
not too unrealistic to assume that people may know and be 
influenced in their behaviour by this rule. Second. In order to 
implement the Kantian rule an-individual need only know his own 
preferences. Thus, Kantian behaviour is realistic even in the 
sense that it does not require individuals to have information 
which goes beyond the amount that we usually assume economic 
agents possess. : Third. -since Kantian 
behaviour-is based only on 
each individual's preferences, some fundamental notions of 
economic theory, ,, such , as Pareto efficiency, can -be still; - used in 
assessing the -results of individual behaviour., under Kantian 
rules 
1. 
r 
In the following we will also consider several different ways 
of modeling-the notion of Kantian morality. - In chapters III and 
IV, for reasons which will be explained below, we will discuss and 
formalize the notion of "pure" Kantian behaviour in the context of 
a model of private provision of a public good. In contrast, in the 
chapters on tax evasion (chapters VI and VII), we, will consider a 
model where Kantian behaviour is- weakened ., by reciprocity 
considerations: that is, where an individual wishes to behave as a 
1This 
would not have been the case if we had followed Sen's (1977) 
suggestion to model morality as the result of an ordering of 
orderings. 
4 
Kantian If and only if he perceives that everybody else does 
likewise. The latter interpretation follows more closely the 
approach advocated by Sugden (1984) and by the present author 
elsewhere (Bordignon, 1987). In order to distinguish-between these 
two' approaches, I shall refer to "pure" Kantian behaviour simply 
as Kantian behaviour, and to Kantian behaviour weakened by 
reciprocity rules as "fair" behaviour. 
1.2 An Overview of; the work 
As argued in the previous section, abandoning the notion of 
rational egoism requires some justifications. "The first and most 
important 'justification for considering an alternative approach to 
individual behaviour in the context of private provision of public 
goods is simply that the conventional theory does not work. This 
is shown in the first part of chapter II, where, building upon 
some previous work by Andreoni (1988a) and Sugden (1982). the 
traditional model of voluntary provision of public 4goods is 
spelled out in detail, its main implications derived analytically, 
and the predictions of the model contrasted with a"large, amount of 
empirical and experimental evidence. The results of this exercise 
! show that the traditional model is falsified by empirical data. We 
then-conclude that the traditional model of private provision of 
public goods is in need of deep revision. ",, 
The most recent literature on private : provision of public 
goods has shown an increasing awarenessýof the 'many "shortcomings 
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of the traditional model and several different approaches have 
been proposed to amend the conventional theory. The second part of 
chapter-II reviews in detail this literature. The conclusions 
which can be drawn by'this survey, are quite disappointing. An 
alternative theory to the Nash contribution model is hardly 
forthcoming and the attempts which have been made so far to build 
up a different theory by relaxing alternatively one of the three 
founding assumptions of, the model --Nash conjectures, purity of 
the public good and individualistic maximizing, behaviour-- all 
suffer from severe drawbacks. However, among these last attempts, 
the research strategy which looks more promising is the 
abandonment of the assumption of rational egoism in favour of a 
notion of Kantian behaviour, as discussed by Laffont "(1978) and 
Sugden, (1984). This approach too is however -open- to some 
criticisms, which are presented and discussed in the last section 
of chapter II., F 11 . 
Some of the points made at the'end of chapter II are taken up 
again in chapter III. 'In this chapter, we-address a basic -issue: 
suppose that individuals are subjected to such a strong ethical 
rule as Kantian behaviour; would 'then private provision of a 
public good be efficient? To answer this question, we consider two 
different ways of' formalizing, Kantian behaviour, the traditional- 
one introduced by Laffont and a second one which takes into 
account "the-ability to pay" of the, different individuals. We 
derive precise conditions on- the, structure of individual 
preferences and on income distribution which would ensure 
6 
efficiency of private provision ofa public good under Kantlan 
behaviour. The performance of Kantian behaviour in efficiency 
terms is also studied for some important classes of individual 
preferences. The results of these exercises show that, in general. 
Kantian provision of-a public good is characterized by Pareto 
inefficiency'and that furthermore there is some tendency toward 
underprovision. Thus, Kantian behaviour is consistent with the 
empirical evidence which suggests that private provision of public 
goods, while strictly. greater than that predicted by the 
conventional model, is still characterized by underprovision (see 
chapter II). -1 
In the tradition of welfare economics, the fact that Kantlan 
behaviour is characterized, by Inefficiency ` would support 
government intervention in order to- reestablish conditions of 
Pareto optimality. But, in the spirit of the new-new welfare 
economics, a market failure is not a, sufficient condition for 
invoking public intervention. It has still to be shown that 
government can in some sense do better than private citizens. -In 
order to cast some light on this issue, in chapter IV private 
provision of a public good under Kantian behaviour is compared 
with public provision under a political process where the results 
of the median voter theorem apply. It is shown that for some 
important classes of preferences Kantian behaviour is always 
strictly more efficient than public provision under a political 
process. This result then suggests that Kantian behaviour, while 
in general Pareto inefficient, may be characterized by a higher 
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level of efficiency than alternative public good provision 
schemes. 
In chapter IV we also discuss the links between Kantian 
provision of a public good and Lindahl equilibria. Using the 
notion of Lindahl equilibrium, a different way of assessing 
under/over provision of a public good is derived. It is shown that 
whenever Kantian behaviour is inefficient it would always be 
possible to find a Lindahl equilibrium which would maintain each 
individual on the same indifference surface but using less total 
income. Furthermore, the extent of the "waste" Introduced by 
Kantian behaviour is an increasing-function of the difference, in 
absolute value, between the summation of the marginal rates of 
substitution and -the marginal rate of- transformation. 'These 
results might also be used, for measuring the amount of 
inefficiency generated by alternative methods of -public good 
provision. Finally, in the last section of chapter IV, " wer offer 
some suggestions for further work on Kantian behaviour and, more 
generally, for private provision of-public goods under unselfish 
behaviour. 
In the second part of this-work we try to add some flesh to 
the notion of private-provision of public goods -under ethical 
behaviour by showing that-} this approach is -x suitable for 
application to a larger class of economic-phenomena. The example 
chosen is income tax-evasion. The theoretical literature-on income 
tax evasion is surveyed-, in chapter- V, which also introduces 
intuitively our alternative approach to the problem. The basic 
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argument'of chapter V is as follows. The conventional literature 
on tax evasion, in the tradition of "selfish", economics, looks at 
the phenomenon of non-compliance to tax rules simply as the result 
of an individualistic calculus of expected costs and benefits. 
Taxpayers wish to evade entirely their income tax, and the only 
reason why they-might not do so is because there is some non-zero 
probability, of being caught evading. Detection usually leads to 
punishment by government in the form of pecuniary penalties 
(surcharge rates) imposed, on detected evaded tax or detected 
evaded income. 'The relationship between government and taxpayers 
is, in this approach. simply one of, coercion. 1 
The main problem with this literature-', is that it produces 
unpalatable results in terms ý of both intuition and--empirical 
evidence. First, estimated'complianceýto tax ; rules in 'the ', real 
world is much larger than is predicted -by, this -literature (see 
chapter V). Second, the portfolio choice approach to income tax 
evasion predicts, under the conventional assumption of decreasing 
absolute risk aversion, a'negatlve relationship between evaded tax 
and the tax rate. This-implication too Is clearly rejected"by both 
empirical and experimental literature.,, - 'x%, 
Building upon some'previous sociological` work on tax evasion, 
we suggest an alternative approach to the phenomenon. In this 
approach, taxpayers see'their relationship with government-also as 
a. relationship of exchange, where they exchange purchasing: power 
in return for governmental goods and services. It is assumed that 
taxpayers have a-perception of what 'should be' "fair" terms of 
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trade between their private consumption and. government provision 
of public goods. If taxpayers perceive their tax burden as 
"unfair", both in terms of governmental supply of public goods and 
in terms of the perceived tax treatment of the "other" taxpayers, 
we assume that they will wish to evade taxes in order to 
reestablish fairness in their-relationship with the other actors 
of the fiscal system. Thus, the decision to evade by a single 
taxpayer is taken on the basis- of an ethical judgment on the 
fairness of the. fiscal system. The coercive-powers of the state 
and the individual attitude toward risk determine only the extent 
. to which this 
desired level, of tax evasion is reached in practice. 
Chapter VI formalizes these ideas in the context of a model 
with two types of consumers and two goods. -private consumption and 
a public good supplied by the state. We use the work on Kantian 
behaviour developed-in chapter III, weakened. by reciprocity rules, 
to determine the amount of tax that an individual would consider 
it fair to evade. In. chapter VI we analyze the model in a short 
run perspective, where tax revenue and public expenditure can be 
considered as independent phenomena. In chapter VII we extend the 
model to the case where-government budget always balances so that, 
given the tax rate and the tax behaviour of taxpayers, public 
expenditure is also determined. " 
The comparative-statics. results of chapter VI imply zero tax 
evasion for low values of the tax rate and, tax evasion increasing 
in the tax rate for at least some medium range of values of the 
tax rate. Thus, our approach is consistent- with the empirical 
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literature on this issue. Furthermore, a number of interesting and 
testable implications are derived for the relationship between the 
amount of tax evaded by the different social classes, the 
distributional characteristics of public expenditure and income 
distribution. 
Chapter VII reproduces the comparative statics exercises of 
chapter VI for the case of endogenous public expenditure. A larger 
amount of ambiguity characterizes this case but it is shown that 
whenever the comparative statics derivatives can be signed. the 
same results of the previous chapter emerge. In the last section 
of chapter VII, in the context of a simpler economy with identical 
individuals, we address another important issue which has, so far, 
escaped scrutiny in the literature: the effect on tax evasion of 
X-inefficiency in public production of public goods. It is shown 
that, for any level of public good supply, tax evasion 
unambiguously falls as the amount of X-inefficiency in the public 
sector decreases. The result is instead ambiguous and depends on a 
crucial parameter if it is the tax rate to be kept constant during 
the exercise. Finally, in the conclusions to chapter VII we 
advance some suggestions for further work which could be done. in 
the area of tax evasion, by using our model. 
Chapter VIII concludes this work by pointing out a main 
caveat of the analysis of the previous chapters and by proposing a 
tentative list of other related fields in economics where the 
ethical approach to voluntary provision of public goods could be 
successfully applied. It Is in fact a conviction of the writer 
11 
that, upon reformulation, the voluntary contribution model could 
offer interesting insights in other fields beyond those in which 
it is usually applied. 
} 
- -»' _*. _ 
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Part I- Voluntary Contribution of Public Goods 
Chapter II The Nash Contribution Model: Theoretical Results, 
Empirical Tests and Proposed Solutions 
II. 1 Introduction 
Economists, political scientists, sociologists, scholars of 
industrial relations etc'., -all found their intuition of individual 
behaviour in collective organizations-on the basis of the results 
of the standard Nash contribution model. In this "chapter, we argue 
that this model is in need of deep revision. None- of the 
predictions of. the model findsýn. more than -weak 'support in the 
empirical literature and most of the- results of the model are 
clearly falsified by observed data. This does not imply that the 
main result of the traditional model, free-riding behaviour and 
the consequent undersupply of public goods by the private sector; 
is not a real phenomenon. But it does imply that this phenomenon 
requires a different explanation from that-provided by the Nash 
contribution model. In this chapter we also argue that among the 
many alternatives proposed in the literature the one which looks 
more promising Is the abandonment of the assumption of 
individualistic maximizing behaviour in favour of a notion of 
ethical behaviour. 
In order to make our point clear we will proceed as follows. 
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In sections 11.2 to II. 4 the basic Nash contribution model is 
spelled out in'detail and its implications for the inefficiency of 
private sector supply of a public good and its main comparative 
statics results'are derived analytically. Thus, the effects on 
private provision of a public good of changes in the size of the 
economy. in governmental provision and in income distribution are 
considered. In section 11.5 these predictions of the Nash 
contribution model are contrasted against a large amount of 
empirical and experimental evidence. It will be shown that the 
Nash contribution model does not survive the test. Consequently, 
the rest of the chapter is dedicated to an examination of the main 
alternatives to the traditional model proposed in the literature. 
Section 11.7 discusses miscellaneous different analysis which 
share the characteristics of implying a quite clear departure from 
the structure of the Nash contribution model. While most of this 
work provides interesting insights for the working of private 
contribution schemes in particular cases, it will be argued that 
none of it is general enough to be applied to the many real world 
instances of private provision of public goods. In sections 11.8.1 
to 11.8.3 we then turn to the analysis of the literature which has 
attempted to supply a general'theory of voluntary provision of 
public'goods by questioning the three basic'assumptions on which 
the Nash contribution model is built: Nash conjectures, purity of 
the public good, `and individualistic 'maximizing behaviour. In 
section'II. 8.1"it is shown 'that non-Nash '-behaviour cannot solve 
the problems of''the'traditional model and indeed it can only make 
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them worse. In section 11.8.2 it is shown that models which 
consider impure public goods can only work at the price of 
unpalatable assumptions on individual behaviour. We are then left 
with the assumption of individualistic maximizing behaviour. In 
section 11.8.3 we discuss three different models of "unselfish" 
behaviour:,,. -altruism, social norms of behaviour and ethical 
behaviour. It is argued that only the latter is able to provide a 
satisfactory theory of voluntary provision of public goods and we 
offer a number of suggestions for further research, -In this area, 
some of.. which are taken, up in the next two chapters. The 
conclusions close the chapter. 
11.2 The Nash Contribution Model 
In: order to aid understanding, let us start by describing the 
economy. where, we-will place our discussion. In the following we 
will consider a simple, two-good economy, with a pure public good 
Q, and a pure. private, good yti i-1,.. n, where the suffix 
indicates the individual who consumes it. We will further assume 
that the production function of the public good is simply additive 
in individual contributions and we will set the unit of measure of 
private contributions. so. as to make the (constant) marginal rate 
of transformation between the private and the. public good equal to 
one: that is, we assume Zq-Q where q, is individual i's 
contribution. Neither the assumption on the number of goods nor 
the assumption on the production function for the public good is 
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essential for the results to follow-and -we will later indicate 
where they may be of some importance-The three assumptions which 
instead lie at the heart of: the traditional model of voluntary 
provision of public goods1 (Sugden,. 1982) are as follows: 1) 
individualistic maximizing behaviour; 2) "purity" of public good; 
3) Nash conjectures on the part of the individual agents. 
The assumption of individualistic maximizing behaviour is 
imposed without justification since, as discussed in the previous 
chapter,, it is the usual hypothesis employed in economics. In a 
formal model, such an hypothesis is introduced by assuming that 
each individual i maximizes an utility function, Uti(. ), defined on 
the two goods. Conventionally, we will assume such a function to 
be strictly quasi-concave. 
The second. hypothesis, the "purity" assumption, requires the 
public good to be characterized- by complete non-rivalness and 
complete non-excludability in consumption across individuals -- or 
inside the particular group of individuals under consideration. In 
contrast with the previous one, this second hypothesis Is instead 
explicitly' introduced as a simplifying assumption. In our context, 
as we shall see in more detail below (see 11.8.2), the assumption 
of purity hinges especially on the fact that each contributor 
gains utility only from the total supply of the public good and 
not from his own individual contribution. This will be captured in 
1-- Also known as "equilibrium with-subscriptions" (Malinvaud, 1969) 
and "independent adjustment model" (Buchanan, 1968). 
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our model by writing the utility function of each individual as 
depending, -in addition to private consumption, only on the total 
amount of public good supply; i. e. (yt, Q). 
The third assumption, the assumption of Nash conjectures, 
implies that each individual, when making his own decision, takes 
the total contribution of the other individuals as given. This is 
usually justified by referring to the relative "smallness" of the 
single individual with respect to the number of individuals 
composing the group. In large economies, where the model is 
supposed to apply, each individual is too small to appreciate the 
Influence that his contribution may exert on other individuals' 
behaviour. Thus, he takes the latter as given. In our-model, this 
will be captured by assuming that for each individual i the total 
provision of the , public, good 
by the other individuals, that we 
will indicate with Q_ . is a known,. given amount. 
These three-assumptions, --. together.. with the hypothesis on the 
production function for., the public good, allow us to write 
individual i's problem as : 
(1) max U' (Yt, Qt+Q-t) 
vt 
' 
qtr 
s. t. yt+gi=Itt qL? U 
where. I. Is individual i's lump sum income. Following 
Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Andreoni (1988a), let us now note that 
the Nash assumption also implies that when an , 
individual chooses 
17 
q 
ti . 
he is really choosing Q; we can stress-this fact by adding and 
subtracting Q. from the LHS of the budget constraint in eq. (1) 
and by rewriting individual i's problem as: 
(lb) max Uti(YL. Q) 
Yti, Q 
s. t. Y. +Q -I +Q- L -w ; Q? Q_ LLL 
Note that the purity assumption implies that other 
individuals' behaviour affects i's choice'of Q also through an 
income effect on the budget constraint. This will be of the 
greatest importance in the results to follow. Leaving aside the 
inequality constraint, the problem in eq. (1b) is akin to 'a 
standard consumer choice problem. The assumption of' strict 
convexity of preferences implies that problem (1b) has a unique 
solution which in turn is a function of individual i's Income; let 
us then write the demand function for the public good of 
individual i as f? (I). For simplicity we will assume f) to be a 
differentiable function. Taking into account the inequality 
constraint total provision of the public good will then be equal 
to Q-max{ft(It+Q_L). Q_L}. We can then write individual i's 
contribution as: 
(2% qt - max(ft(IL+Q-L)-Q_tr0) 
The three assumptions together, and of course especially the 
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latter, lead the theorist to_employ in the context of the model 
above a concept of Nash equilibrium. That is, an equilibrium is a 
vector of individual contributions (q such that {Gi, y*} solves 
problem (1) for all I. The standard assumption of convexity of 
preferences, by implying continuity of the individual reaction 
function in eq. (2) to other individuals' contributions, guarantees 
the existence of a Nash equilibrium in this model. Of course, such 
an equilibrium may be neither unique nor stable. But, as can be 
easily shown, if the income derivative of each individual demand 
function is everywhere positive but smaller than unity --i. e. If 
0<f<1 di-- the Nash equilibrium in the model above is both unique 
(Bergstrom et al., 1986) and, under a simple adjustment mechanism, 
locally stable (Cornes and Sandler, 1986)2.0<fi<1 simply implies 
that the marginal propensity to consume out of income for both the 
private and the public good is'strictly positive: that is, that 
both goods are normal goods. As the -assumption of normality is 
entirely intuitive in this context and as, furthermore, it is 
largely confirmed by available empirical studies3, the model works 
very neatly and allows one to perform with ease the usual 
---- 
22 To get an intuition for this result. simply note that from 
eq. (2). o<fi<1 implies that each individual reaction function is a 
contraction in Q-,. As is well known from game theory, this 
condition is sufficient to ensure both uniqueness and stability of 
Nash equilibria in non cooperative games (see Friedman, 1986). 
3Empirical 
studies on charitable giving indicate the income effect 
alone to be around 0.03-0.04. while most studies indicate that the 
income elasticity lies between 0.4 and 0.8. Data quoted by Sugden 
(1982) and Andreoni (1988a). 
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comparative statics exercises. 
Given its simplicity. the subscription model above has been 
applied, 'with only slight modifications, to the positive analysis 
of several economic phenomena. For instance, charities and 
philanthropic institutions (Becker, 1974, Young, 1982, Collard, 
1978), voting behavior (Margolis, 1982), saving behaviour across 
generations (Sen, 1967, Marglin, 1963), collective organizations 
and` pressure groups (Olson, 1965), military expenditure in 
alliances (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966). strike behaviour (Naylor, 
1989), ' federal government expenditures and many others. In 
normative terms, by*'explolting its main qualitative result, 
free-riding behaviour (see below), the model has been applied to a 
much larger class of economic situations, becoming one of the main 
arguments in support of government intervention in such fields as 
redistributive transfer policy (Hochman and Rodgers, 1970), health 
care (Arrow, ' 1963), education (Stiglitz. 1974). national defense 
(Sandler'and Forbes, 1980). saving (Dasgupta et al., 1972), 
licenses, ` collective bargaining (Tarantelli, 1986) and so on. 
Indeed. in a Hobbesian tradition, the same existence of the State 
has been justified as the result of an attempt by rational agents 
to cope with'the free-riding problem (Orbell and Wilson, 1977). 
Given"the"'central role that'free-riding behaviour exerts in the 
literature on-public goods; "it deserves'special attention. 
II. 3 Free-ridine Behavior, 
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Loosely speaking, with the term "free-riding" the literature 
indicates a number of reasons why we should expect the equilibrium 
allocation in the model above to be Pareto inefficient and 
furthermore, to be characterized by underprovision of the public 
good. This definition- is -deliberately loose, because the 
free-riding problem is really characterized by three different and 
quite separate phenomena, sometimes confused, in the literature 
(McMillan, 1979). - 
The first feature, that we could call here, following Cornes 
and Sandler (1986: 80), -. -: systemic free-riding, depends on the fact 
that each individual fails to appreciate the effect that his 
contribution-exerts on the utilities-of-his- fellows. Since each 
utility function is dependent on the same quantity.: of the -public 
good (purity assumption), each individual contribution affects 
simultaneously the level of welfare of everybody else.. There are 
therefore spillover- effects which are -not=-internalized by the 
private sector and as usual, this leads to inefficient equilibria. 
Thus, "in this respect, the free-riding problem is nothing but a 
special case. of the larger class of market failures associated 
with externalities. - . )' -.; -- -1 
The result of Pareto inefficiency of, the Nash, -equilibrium can 
be immediately derived by simply, noting, from the first-order 
conditions for the solution of problem (1), that in a Nash 
equilibrium Uh/Uy(yh. Q*)-1 for all individuals-h,, such that qh>0 
and o<UQ/Uy(Ik, Q*)51 for all-individuals k such that qk-0.. Then, 
summing over the two groups of individuals: 
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(3) EU`/u` (y*. Q*)' z Uh/Uh(Y*, Q*) +i Uk/Uk (I . Q*) H 2: 1 ay ti hayhkayk 
where H is the subset-of individuals whose contributions are 
strictly positive and where the two inequalities in eq. (3) cannot 
both hold as equalities at the same time. Hence, by recalling the 
Samuelson condition for optimality in public good production, we 
conclude that the public good, in a Nash 'equilibrium, is not 
supplied at the optimal level. 
Showing that the Nash-equilibrium is not only inefficient but 
also characterized by underprovision of the public good, or even 
more, quantifying the extent of systemic -free-riding is, instead 
more tricky. This is so because, unless individual preferences 
have some very special structure (Bergstrom and Cornes, 1983), the 
optimal level of public good supply is not independent of-the 
distribution of income. It then follows that by changing the 
contribution of the single individual, one would also change the 
optimal level itself. Thus, in this literature, scholars usually 
content themselves with showing that the Nash equilibrium is 
characterized by local underprovision of a public 'good. To see 
this, suppose that we increase by c the contribution of each 
individual h such that qh>O, while keeping the'allocation of each 
non-contributor constant. Evaluating the utility function of an 
individual jEH at the new allocation, we get UJ-Uj(yj-c, Z[gh+E]). 
By differentiating the utility function so obtained with respect 
to c and evaluating it at z-0, we get: 
22 
(3b) a&/0C1 - UQ[H-1J? 0 Vj, jEH 
E=Q 
Since the utility of each non contributor is increasing in Q 
at unchanged private good consumption, we then conclude that in a 
Nash equilibrium, if there are at least two contributors, the 
utility of everybody would increase following a small increase in 
the contribution of all contributors: - hence, in a Nash 
equilibrium, the public good is locally underprovided. 
Similar results of undersupply of the public good in a Nash 
equilibrium, but which hold globally and not only locally, can be 
reached by using. other devices. --as-for example by comparing the 
optimal and the actual-contribution at unchanged individual shares 
(Cornes and. Sandler, 1986). We will use some of these devices in 
the next two chapters when we evaluate the efficiency of Kantian 
provision4. -1- 
The second feature-of-the- free-riding problem, that again 
following iCornes and Sandler (1986) we can: term microlevel 
free-riding, has to do with the slope of each individual reaction 
function with respect to other individual contributions. If both 
the public good and the private good are normal goods, an increase 
in the contribution to the public good by another individual (or 
--------- --------- 
4See 
chapter III section 4, and chapter IV section 3. 
rr 
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public agency) will certainly reduce each individual contribution. 
Moreover, this reduction will be less than the increase in the 
contribution of the other individual. To see this, let us 
differentiate q. in eq. (2) above with respect to Q^4: 
(a)° aq/äQ 
-ti' -1+f= 
Clearly, the normality assumption implies -1<dq t 
/dQ-L 
, <0. 
The 
intuition behind=this result is quite- straightforward. A change in 
the'contribution of another individual has both an income and a 
substitution effect. The first element on the RHS of eq. (4) 
represents the pure substitution effect: since the public good 
enters in the same amount in the- utility, function of each 
individual an increase in the contribution of an other Indivldual 
leads each individual to reduce his 'contribution to the public 
good by exactly the same amount of, the, perceived -increase in 
public good supply. However there is also an-income effect which 
is captured by the' second element° In the RHS of eq. (4). An 
exogenous increase in public-good supply is equivalent for the 
individual under' consideration to an exogenous increase in his 
income endowment. Such an increase, in turn, induces the 
individual to buy more of the public "good if the latter is a 
normal good'thus 'partially-'offsetting' the'- substitution effect 
above. , i'` 1. 
Note that, while the exact magnitude of the income effect on 
the demand for the--public good is clearly an empirical issue, the 
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reaction function of an individual could become positively sloped 
In other contributions only if we assumed that the public good is 
a superior good. In our two good economy this would have the 
unpalatable effect of making the private good, representing 
private consumption, an inferior good. The latter is clearly an 
implication that most economists would find hard to accept. 
Therefore, if`the assumption of non-superiority of the public good 
is taken as reasonable, the predictions of the standard model of 
voluntary provision of a public good are clear cut. Each 
individual-should reduce his contribution --i. e. should take a 
free-ride=- in the face of a perceived " increase in the 
contributions4of other individuals, or more generally, in the face 
of-an, exogenous increase In public good supply. The extent of this 
"crowding'out" phenomenon in turn is negatively' related to the 
size of the-income effects on the demand for the public good. In 
the-next paragraph, we will discuss in detail the striking 
implications that this argument imposes on the comparative statics 
properties'of the model, in terms of 1) changes in the number of 
contributors; 2) changes in the exogenous supply of public good by 
government; and 3) changes in the distribution of income across 
contributors: 
Finally. the last but probably best known feature of the 
free-rider problem is represented by the lack of incentives for 
each individual to reveal his true preferences for the public 
good. 'In' private good economies'. the larger the number of 
individuals the lower are the incentives for each individual to 
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misrepresent his preferences (Hurwicz, 1972). In public good 
economies quite the opposite is true. Not only does it pay for 
each individual to dissemble his preferences but the scope for 
profitable dissembling increases with the size of the economy 
(Cornes and Sandler ,, 1986; 102- 103). For obvious reason this 
last feature of. free-rider behaviour has. been termed informational 
free-riding (McMillan. 1979). 
_ 
This last feature of free riding behaviour. however important 
and. widely discussed in the literature, is really extraneous to 
the present. discussion and has been quoted here only for the sake 
of completeness. This is so, because informational free-riding 
raises problems of eliciting truthful-. revelation of preferences 
for public provision of the public good while we concentrate here 
only on,, voluntary, provision from the private sector. Furthermore. 
informational free-riding is better addressed in models which 
consider a type of strategic, behaviour on-, the part of the 
individual, agents which goes beyond the simple Nash conjectures 
that we assumed from, the outset (see. Laffont, 1987). For a 
discussion of the problem and some solutions proposed in, the 
literature see McMillan (1979) and the excellent survey by Laffont 
(1987). In the following, we will , concentrate, only upon 
the two 
previous features of free-rider behaviour, systemic and microlevel 
free-riding. 
II. 4 The traditional model: other implications. 
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The basic predictions of the model discussed so far are, of 
course, part-of'the standard background-of any economist. However, 
there are other important implications of the traditional 
subscription, model which are less well known, but worth 
considering in order to assess the validity of the model. All of 
them crucially'depend on the magnitude of the income effects and, 
at a deeper level, on the assumed purity of the public good. All 
of them, 'in different ways, cast doubts on the-empirical relevance 
of'the model, at least for -"reasonable" assumptions on the 
magnitude of the income effects. 
11.4.1: Changes in the number-of contributors 
Since the seminal work by Olson (1965), there has been a 
presumption in public good theory that increasing the number of 
contributors-would reduce' the level-of efficiency reached by the 
simple contribution model discussed above. Olson's argument was 
threefold. First, he-argued that moving from small to large groups 
would induce individuals to shift away from some more complex 
strategic behaviour to simple Nash conjectures, thus reducing the 
incentive to individually contribute to the public good (see also 
Buchanan, 1967 and, II. 8.1, below). Second, he argued that in a Nash 
equilibrium, increasing the number of, the individuals would 
increase-the optimal level of public good, supply and third, that, 
on the contrary, the actual level of public good provision would 
fall as the. size of the group of contributors increases. 
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While the first argument is usually accepted in the 
literature and the second is true if the public good is a normal 
good (Cornes and Sandler, 1986: 83-85), the third argument has not 
gone unchallenged. Both McGuire (1974) and Chamberlin (1974) 
showed that in a two good economy with identical individuals, as 
long as the-'public good is a normal'good, increasing the number of 
individuals would increase-the private supply'of the public good. 
To see this, let us rewrite eq. (2) for an economy with identical 
individuals where everybody is a contributor. Evaluating eq. (2) at 
the equilibrium allocation we get: 
(5) q- f(I+[n-1]q*) - [n-1]q* 
Totally differentiating eq. (5) with respect to n: 
[s} öq /än - -[i-f ]q /([i-f ]n+f } 
which is unambiguously negative. From (6) it follows: 
(7) dQ/dn - q* + nag /an - flq /{[1-fi]n+f=} 
which is instead unambiguously positive as long as the public 
good is a normal good. The rationale for' this result is' 
straightforward. If the public good is a normal good, adding an 
extra individual who contributes an extra unit to the public good 
would induce the other individuals, in equilibrium, to reduce 
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their total contribution by less than unity. Hence, actual total 
contribution-must increase. However, while total contribution 
increases, each individual contribution must fall since, as we saw 
in the previous paragraph, each reaction function is negatively 
sloped in the contributions of the other individuals. Also note 
that the RHS of eq. (7) is decreasing in n and for n=ao dQ/dn*0; 
that is, in, large economies the. total supply of the public good 
would tend to converge to a finite amount. 
Chamberlin and McGuire 's results were extended by Andreoni 
(1988a) to an economy with different types of individuals. In 
doing this Andreoni (1988a) also proved another important result 
(see also Bergstrom-et al., 1986), that I quote here for future 
reference. Suppose that individuals are characterized by identical 
tastes and different incomes. Then: (1) only individuals with 
income above a given threshold will contribute in equilibrium and 
(2) each contributor will consume exactly the same quantity of the 
private good in equilibrium. To see this, recall that in 
equilibrium, for each i such that q. >0, Q=f(IL+Q_ti). Since by 
assumption f=>0 everywhere, f(. ) can be inverted. It then follows; 
($) f-1(Q )' Ii, +Q-i 
Adding Q to both sides of eq. (8) and rearranging we get: 
ý9) qti- IL+ Q-f 1(Q) 
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Let now I be the level of It such that I*=f 
1(Q)-Q. It is 
then clear that q 
ti 
>0 as Iw >I* and qti, -0 if I<_I*. This proves (1). 
Second note that y. -I. -q.. Hence, from (9), for Vi such that qt>0: 
(10) yti_ f 
1(Q) 
-Q 'I*" 
which proves (2). Extending Chamberlin and McGuire 's result, 
Andreoni (1988a) proved that for n-ao , Im: *Im" , where Im" is the 
income of the richest individual in the society. From this it 
follows that as the number of contributors tend to infinity 1) 
average contribution tends to zero; 2) only the very richest 
members of the community contribute; 3) total contribution 
converges to a finite value. By considering different "types"' of 
individuals Andreoni (1988a) managed to extend the result above 
even to an economy with heterogeneous preferences. The result 
still holds, with the only difference that as n== it is now the 
most "generous" type -in terms of both income and preferences- to 
pay for the public good. 
Summing up, the results reached in this section imply that in 
a large economy, total private provision of the public good does 
not depend on the size of the population and that we should 
observe only the rich contributing` to the public good. 
11.4.2 Changes In'government supply of public goods 
The Nash contribution model can be easily extended to include 
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a public sector as well. It is sufficient to assume that a share 
of the public good is exogenously supplied by government and 
compute the equilibrium allocation of private contributions under 
the assumption that each individual observes government provision. 
Of interest here" is the question: what would happen to private 
provision if government exogenously increased its supply of the 
public good ? 
Suppose first that government increases its contribution 
without raising extra revenue from the set of contributors. For 
example. government may run a public deficit or it may raise extra 
revenue from non contributors (see below). We can' study this 
effect in our simple model by assuming that'a share of the public 
good say C. is supplied exogenously by the 'state. Assuming an 
economy with identical individuals for simplicity, we can write 
the individual contribution in equilibrium as: 
(11) q f(I+[n-1]gti +d- [n-1]q* -c 
Then by differentiating with respect to { and setting dC>0 we 
get: 
(12) 'dq, - -[1-f1]dr/{f1+ n[1-f1]) <0 
Since dQ - dC + ndqti., eq. (12) implies: 
(13) dQ -9 f1/{f1+ n[1-f=]} >0 
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The rationale for the results in eq. (12) and (13) is of 
course the same that we saw above. An exogenous increase in public 
good provision has both a substitution and an. income effect: and 
government provision of the public good does not crowd out 
completely private provision due to the presence of positive 
income effects on the, demand for the public good. However, note 
from eq. (13) above that if the economy, is "large" --i. e. If n 
tends to infinity-- the crowding out effect will be approximately 
complete even if the income effects are very strong 
s. 
Needless to 
say the results above can be easily extended to an economy with 
different individuals (Andreoni. 1988a). Therefore, if the economy 
is large the predictions of the model are clear cut: an exogenous 
increase. in public good supply by government should reduce private 
supply to the public good dollar for dollar, or approximately so. 
Let us then ask what would happen if government increased 
public good supply with a balanced budget, that is by raising 
extra revenue. Suppose first that each individual is a contributor 
to the public good (i. e. each individual contribution is strictly 
positive) and that the extra revenue is raised through a system of 
lump sum taxes. Also assume that for each individual his'lump sum 
tax is smaller in absolute value than his contribution to' the 
------------------ 
5 S 
This was originally argued by Margolis (1982) and subsequently 
proved formally by Sugden (1982) and Andreoni (1988a). 
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public'good. Then, as Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984) showed the 
crowding out effect is again complete. Each individual simply 
reduces hi's contribution by the amount of'the increased lump' sum 
tax, thus completely offsetting government behaviour. 
In order to see this result let Q be the private supply of 
the public good in the original Nash equilibrium, before 
government intervention, and'let q and Q*y"'be the individual 
contributions in this equilibrium, so that3Q*-q*+Q*L, Let T. be 
the lump sum tax imposed on each individual 1, where ITI<q,, and 
let q* and Q_ be the equilibrium contributions after government 
intervention. By definition of Nash equilibrium and from problem 
(1b) above it follows that {y*, Q*} are the equilibrium choices of 
individual i when his total exogenous income is W4*-[It+QAfter 
government intervention, individual i's exogenous income shifts to 
W*=[I"-T, +Q**+ET ]. Suppose now that, after government 
intervention, each individual other than individual. i changes his 
contribution in the opposite direction and by the same amount as 
" 
the change in his lump sum tax: that is, suppose 
Q*t-Qt j#iTj 
Ej#i(qj-=j)" Then by substituting in the expression 
above, we obtain W. -W. ., The budget constraint of consumer I Is 
therefore unchanged: it, then follows that ; 
(y,, Q ) Is still optimal 
"{yý, 
Q } consumer i must after government intervention. To, achieve 
simply set his contribution so as to offset his lump,. tax --i. e. he 
must -set q 
*=q 
_T. -- which is possible since by assumption 
lrti. l<q*. Therefore if q* Vi are the equilibrium choices before 
government intervention q =qti-T VI are the equilibrium choices 
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after government intervention. 
Note that, differently from the previous case, where 
individuals reversed their increased endowment on the purchase of 
private goods, in the latter case not only the total quantity of 
the public good supplied but also the allocation of private goods 
across individuals remains unchanged. That is, government action 
is completely neutral to private sector allocations. Note that 
this remarkable. result, while strictly depending on the assumption 
of purity of the public good, does not require either an additive 
production function for the public good or for that matter. the 
Nash assumption itself (see Bergstrom et al., 1986 and 11.8.1 
below). 
It could be thought that the, neutrality result above, however 
depends, on, the existence of a single public good, and on the fact 
that government uses lump sum taxes. But, in a path breaking paper 
Bernheim (1986) claimed a much stronger result. He showed. that in 
a model with many public goods and different individuals. as long 
as, each individual contributes to at least a, public good, any 
distortional tax and transfer, (for example, labour taxes), leaves 
the total supply of public goods and each individual demand for 
the private goods completely unaltered.. Crowding-out is now 
complete in the even stronger sense that any government; action and 
not only. lump sum financed increases in public good. supply is 
completely neutral to private sector allocations. However, 
differently from Warr's results, as was later clarified by 
Andreoni (1988a) and Boadway et al.., (1987), Bernheim's findings 
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require stronger informational assumptions than usually made in 
the Nash contribution model. Bernheim requires each individual to 
"see through" the government budget (i. e. realizing that the 
government budget is binding) and also to correctly conjecture the 
behaviour of the other agents in the economy. Whether these 
assumptions are realistic enough, or if myopic Nash behaviour is a 
more convincing hypothesis is still -an open question in the 
literature, --as we shall see below (see 11.8.1). 
The above criticisms do not; apply of. 'course to Warr's 
results. The latter can instead be 'rightly, criticized on the 
ground that they require interior solutions (i. e. "eachý individual 
is a contributor) and that-Warr considers only-marginal-changes in 
taxes and public good-supply. In the. '"real world". -contributors, to 
a single-public good-are only a, subset of, the collectivity of the 
taxpayers and huge changes in'taxes and public expenditure- are 
also sometimes made. -If, as. an effect of government changes, the 
set'of contributors also changes government policy can still be 
effective. Building upon such intuition. Bergstrom et 'al. -(1986) 
presented a . number of'comparative statics results, which somewhat 
weaken Warr's neutrality results. ' If., --for- example, - as we saw 
previously, government finances its increased supply of, the 
public good by collecting extra revenue from the set of non 
contributors, or, alternatively if some contributor is taxed by 
more than his original contribution then total public, good supply 
will increase. Thus, In these cases the neutrality results are 
correspondingly weakened and government policy 1s'still effective 
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- at least to a degree. 
I used the word "weakened" above on purpose. In fact, I would 
like to argue, Bergstrom et al. 's findings qualify but do not 
drastically alter the above crowding out results. The force of 
their argument lies in the fact that the set of contributors to a 
single public good is usually much smaller than the overall set of 
taxpayers. However. as their own theorem 7 shows (Bergstrom et 
al., 1986: 44-47), if 'there are many public goods and each 
individual is a contributor'to at least one public good --which is 
of course a much 'weaker assumption to impose: see Bernheim 
(1986)-- the same "neutrality results emerge, under some 
qualifications6. ' Furthermore, and this is the real issue here, if 
attention is restricted to an economy where everybody' contributes, 
it is clear that government can increase total supply of the 
public good only by completely crowding out some contributors. 
That is, ' there cannot be real joint provision, public and private. 
of the public good. In Andreoni's (1988a) own words: ' "joint 
provision is a veil". I believe that' it is the intuitive and 
empirical relevance of this extremely strong result which- is at 
issue here, rather than the problem of the adjustment of the 
"extensive" versus the "Intensive" margin, as in Bergstrom et 
------------------ - ------- ------ 
goods, show 
6Bergstrom 
et al (1986), in a model with two public' 
that if the sets of contributors are disjoint, any income 
redistribution inside each group of donors would leave the total 
supply of each public good unchanged. If the two groups are not 
disjoint, it is required that the income distribution leaves the 
aggregate income of each group of contributors unchanged for the 
Warr's neutrality results to go through. 
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al. 's paper. 
11.4.3 Changes in income distribution 
In a paper related, to the one quoted above-, Warr (1983) 
showed that total provision of a public good is also, in a Nash 
equilibrium, Independent of income distribution across 
contributors. As'a moment's thought can show, this is really 'a 
simple extension of the previous argument. Suppose that in a Nash 
equilibrium where everybody strictly contributes to a public good, 
government' redistributes income `across contributors through a 
series of neutral tax increases and tax' decreases'. -`Again'. as in 
the previous case; if the extra income'added or subtracted from 
each individual is less than, - in absolute value, his original 
contribution to the public good, each individual can simply offset 
this change by varying his contribution in the opposite `direction 
and by the same amount as the change in his income 'endowment. In 
our'model, this can be immediately seen by writing T'-. &I,, where t 16 
ZT, =0, in section 11.4.2 above and by repeating' our "previous 
argument. ' 
Therefore, in`a Nash equilibrium private provision of a 
public good (and private"good' allocation) is unaffected by income 
(re)distribution. As in the previous case, this result must be 
qualified. If the set of contributors does not coincide with the 
whole collectivity and/or if the change in the income endowment of 
an individual exceeds in absolute value his original contribution, 
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the neutrality results may not wholly occur (see Bergstrom et al., 
1986). However, as in the previous case, this qualification must 
also be qualified in the sense that: 1) the neutrality results 
will -still in general occur, at least as, an approximation 
(Andreoni, 1988a); and 2) leaving aside the adjustment on the 
"extensive" , margin,; it, is, the independence of private provision 
from income distribution inside the group of contributors which is 
the real -result to be checked for intuitive and empirical 
relevance. 
_, In conclusion,. we can summarize the results of the 
traditional model of, voluntary provision-, of- a public, good as 
follows. Because- of- the-. existence of systemic free-riding 
behaviour, private provision will in general-, be characterized by 
a) inefficiency and b) underprovision of the public good. Because 
of the-existence of microlevel free-riding -behaviour, c) -the 
reaction function of each-individual will be negatively sloped in 
the contribution of everybody else (if the public good is not a 
superior-good). Because of (c), the-equilibrium allocation of the 
subscription model will be-characterized by a-general invariance 
property-(Andreoni, 1988a). In equilibrium, private supply of a 
public goodwill be invariant, or approximately so, with, respect 
to changes in, a) government supply, of the public good, b) income 
distribution, c)-=subsidies. to giving, and. d) size- of the 
population. 
How do these results fare with respect to empirical and 
experimental evidence ? 
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II. 5.1ýChecking the traditional model: empirical evidence 
The first fact which casts some doubts on the general 
philosophy of the model above is the casual observation that we 
are surrounded by quite a large number of privately supplied 
public goods. Large organizations such as trade unions; political 
parties, cooperatives, pressure groups, each of which produce an 
output which can be thought of as-a public good for their members, 
seem to be able to cope quite well with the free-rider problem. In 
most 'countries, philanthropic organizations, 'churches and 
religious' foundations, theaters, ' concerts,, health, research 
campaigns, natural parks, political movements; etc. rely heavily 
and happily enough on' the voluntary°contribution of private 
citizens. Large sums of money are'freely donated In-many countries 
to charities and' philanthropic institutions. Just'to give an idea 
of the order of magnitude of these donations, `in '1981 total 
donations to charity' amounted to 2-3% of the GNP in USA (Kurz, 
1984, Andreoni, 1988a), and'in the United 'Kingdom private gifts 'to 
the biggest five charities exceeded £60 m'in'-19807 . 
And money Is not of course the only thing to be donated. In 
most countries, private organizations, religious or not, 
supplementing governmental agencies in such fields as education, 
--------- --------- --------- 
7Quoted by Sugden (1982): data from Charities Aid Foundation, 
1981. 
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health, social services, general charities. are organized only on 
the bases of volunteer labor supply., Again just to offer some 
quantitative indications: in USA , 5% of the entire stock of USA 
labor force is donated freely each year (Menchik and Weisbrod, 
1987); in Italy, a citizen over eight spends over one third of his 
spare time working for some voluntary organization. 
All the above makes one feel a bit uneasy with a theory which 
predicts that an individual will always take a free-ride when he 
can. But stronger doubts arise when one looks more carefully at 
the comparative static results ((z) to (d) above. First, data on 
charitable giving show that most organizations are "large" in the 
double sense that they collect very large sums of money (see 
above) from the small contributions of a, very large number of 
individuals (more than 85% of all households make donations to 
charities in the USA; see Andreoni,, 1988a). Furthermore, the total 
sum of money collected is usually much larger than the income of 
each individual contributor taken alone. These three facts 
together clash with result (d) above which, on the contrary, would 
require that as the number of givers becomes very large only very 
few individuals. the richest, would contribute a practically 
8 
unchanged amount of public good. 
8The incapacity of the traditional model to account for some 
basic facts of the empirical literature on charities is also 
confirmed by a simulation experiment attempted by Andreoni (1988.41 
The latter simulates the working of the subscription model, using 
actual data from USA income distribution and actual estimates of 
the income elasticity of giving. The purpose of. the exercise is to 
calculate the expected value of free-riding, total giving, and 
40 
Secord, as for result (a) above, several authors have tried 
to detect and to estimate, with reference to charitable giving, 
the extent of the "crowding out" phenomenon discussed in the 
previous paragraph. Strictly speaking, the results of the 
different papers are not'comparable because they use different 
sets of data. Nevertheless, the insights offered are remarkable. 
First, there is no evidence of the complete (or approximately so) 
crowding out phenomenon predicted by theory. ' Second, evidence is 
contradictory even on the issue of the existence of a crowding out 
phenomenon. For example, Abrams'and Schatz (1978) find a crowding 
out effect of the order of 28% and' similar" indications are also 
reported by Russel Roberts-'(1984). ' In contrast. Schwartz (1970) 
finds a positive, even if weak, correlation between private and 
public giving. Reece'(1979) finds no evidence of the crowding out 
effect. Schiff (1985) finds mixed' evidence. While public 
expenditure of the type, "cash spending" on the needy is shown to 
reduce private giving, public expenditure 'on "social measures" 
increases private provision. Menchik and Weisbrod (1987), in a 
study which analyses the voluntary supply of labour, also find a 
---------------------------------- ------------------- 
average giving as the number of contributors increases. The 
results are, to say the least, impressive. -. In a community of 25 
members 99% of the individuals should take a free-ride; if the 
number of contributors goes up to two hundred, estimated 
free-riding goes up to 99.998 %: beyond five hundred free-riding 
is virtually complete. Total giving converges very soon to the 
very-small figure of 2,300 dollars. As a consequence, there is 
practically no difference between the total amount of public good 
supplied bya community of 50 members and a community with a 
million members. None of these results is of course in line with 
the empirical facts quoted above. 
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clear positive relationship between local government spending and 
volunteering. A clear indication of complementarity rather than 
substitutability between private and public expenditure on public 
goods, -also emerges from-the=more institutional work of Salamon 
(1986) and-Deans and Ware (1987). 
In conclusion, while-the presence of some amount of -crowding 
out for some items of public expenditure -may be an issue, the 
approximately complete-crowding out of -the type predicted by 
theory is'not an issue at all. None of the studies quoted above 
gets even close toiconfirming this prediction. while- there are 
clear-indications in the literature of a relationship between 
private and public -giving which goes in the opposite direction 
than that predicted by, theory. Clearly. all these results strongly 
clash with predictions (a) and (c) above. -- 
' As for result (b) above, I am' not aware of any-, empirical 
study which has tried'to test if-private provision is 'independent 
of income distribution. ' However the implausibility of the result 
speaks for itself. --' 
11.5.2 Checking the`traditional model: experimental studies 
Another piece of empirical evidence on voluntary provision of 
public goods is represented by the experimental literature. This 
9 
9A third source of evidence on the-free-rider issue is surveys. 
This technique is still in its infancy, but it -has already been 
able to offer considerable insights. Thorsby and Withers (1986), 
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type of empiricalüanalysis'suffers"of course from-'obvlous problems 
concerning'the interpretation and the reliability of the results. 
This is particularly true-in our'case, ''because experimenters do 
not know subjects' preferences"for the public good. Thus the best 
they can do-is to induce such preferences on the individuals. This 
remark-is''of course rather obvious but it must be ''. realized that 
this fact alone "may introduce 'severe biases in the results, 
particularly when`- one is' trying' to measure the extent of 
free-riding behaviour. `Furthermore, most of the-'studies that we 
are about to'discuss, did not carefully set up the 'theory-that 
they were trying to test, (see below), thus adding'-ambiguity to the 
interpretation'of their'results. 'With; 
these-caveats in mind, we can begin to examine the 
literature. At an'early`stage; most'works'were only interested in 
detecting free-riding behaviour. defined as the percentage of the 
actual level to'the (experimenter 'induced) "optimal" level of 
contribution to the public good. ' Early`,, studies of this' type 
include Bohm (1972), Sweeney (1973) and'Scherr and Babb- (1975). 
Bohm finds no evidence of free-riding behaviour 'while' the other 
two studies detect some amount of "weak" free-riding; None of them 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
for example, by exploiting the interval technique ''developed by 
Bohm (1979) find little evidence of strategic' misrepresentation of 
preferences in a study on the'demand for Arts in Australia. On a 
sample of 625 subjects, 65% turn out to be honest respondents and 
35% free-riders. Of the latter. only ''one-third are "strong" 
free-riders. For a survey of the method employed and of the 
results obtained in previous attempts, see the authors quoted 
above. 
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find support for the "strong" amount of free-riding predicted by 
theory10. These results are however somewhat ill defined due both 
to the simplicity of the experiment (very little variance in the 
laboratory conditions was imposed) and the lack of an explicit 
discussion of the, underlying theory to be tested. 
. Smith's. (1980),. experlments are better conceived. However. he 
attempts to estimate the amount of, -free-riding in a very peculiar 
voluntary contribution scheme. "In such a scheme, the public good 
is provided if. and only if 1) the- actual amount of voluntary 
contributions exceeds the cost. of producing the public good and 2) 
each individual-agrees, ex-post; on the cost share implicit in the 
voluntary= contribution scheme above. Smith finds no support for 
the hypothesis of free-riding behaviour. 
Weaker results, but in the-same direction are presented by 
Marwell . and Ames 
(1980) who report on several experiments 
attempted by Marwell and. his associates at the University of 
Madison. The setting up of the empirical test is fairly robust. 
Twelve different experiments are attempted and the theory 
underlying the experiments is checked by confrontation with 
experts in the field11. All the results, with only a significant 
------------------- 
10The distinction between "strong" and "weak" free-riding was 
introduced by Marwell and Ames (1980) and-it has been subsequently 
adopted in the literature. There is, of course, some ambiguity in 
determining the extent of free-riding which falls in the two 
categories. See below for some indications of the range of values 
which are commonly accepted in the literature. 
11The twelve different experiments intended to test the effects on 
private provision of changes in the laboratory conditions. The 
following variations were considered: discrete public good, skewed 
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exception12, point toward a clear refutation of the "strong" 
version of free-rider behaviour. While theory would predict a zero 
(or approximately zero) provision, ' individuals voluntarily 
contribute on average between 40% and 60% of their' resources to 
the public good (a 100% contribution to the public good would 
represent the "optimal"'amount of contribution). Marwell and Ames 
conclude that while a "weak" version of the free-rider hypothesis 
can be supported, the "strong" version is rejected by the 
experiment. Similarly, Schneider and Pommerehme (1981) find very 
little support for the hypothesis of free-riding behaviour. Up to 
96% of the "true" marginal willingness to., pay was declared on 
average. by the individuals. -" ,I_- 
All the studies reported so far thus seem to reject the 
hypothesis of strong free-riding behaviour predicted by theory 
while there is support for some weaker-version ofý the- same 
hypothesis. However, as argued above, most of these- studies fail 
to explicitly define the theory they -are, trying to test, -. thus 
introducing', some ambiguity in the interpretation of their 
findings. Building up on such an observation, Kim and Walker 
} 
resources and individual returns from public good investment, 
small and, large groups, non. divisibility, high stakes, experienced 
subjects, experiment with graduate economics students and 
different levels of information about other behaviour. As is 
reported in the text, with one exception, no significant. variation* 
in the results emerged. 
12 The exception is constituted by the group formed' by graduate 
students of Economics. This group showed a much larger amount of 
free-riding than average amount. Marwell and Ames interpret this 
result as an effect of the teaching of Economics on students' 
perception of the fairness of free-riding. 
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(1984) claim that the previous studies'are not really tests for 
the results of the- ' Nash contribution model and that as a 
consequence their findings are invalidated. Their argument is that 
any scientific theory has a domain of applicability which is 
determined by a'set of side assumptions and that a theory cannot 
be tested unless it'is made sure that these-side assumptions are 
also respected. With reference to the studies quoted above Kim and 
Walker (1984) identify nine invalidating factors13 that seem to 
have been present; -at least partially. 'in all the experiments. In 
contrast, Kim'and Walker-set up an experiment'of their own where 
they attempt to control'for'all these factors. Their results show 
a larger'(but note, not complete) amount of"free-riding behaviour 
than that detected by the previous studies. ' 
While the attempt to introduce carefully the theory to be 
tested is'surely praiseworthy, it should however be noted that the 
study by'Kim'and Walker can'be criticized on their own-terms. In 
fact, while'these authors identify several invalidating factors 
(see note 13),, "their main point surely hinges on the -invalidating 
factor number 5: "uncertainty and disequilibrium". The idea is 
simply that public good theory refers to an equilibrium situation 
where there is not uncertainty about other individual 
contributions and where each individual has adjusted his behaviour 
13These factors are as follows impure public good, discrete 
public good, group optimum' unknown, misunderstanding and 
vagueness, uncertainty and disequilibrium, insufficient economic 
motivation, small groups, transitory endowment. Income, lack of 
anonymity. 
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to other' individuals' behaviour. In practical terms; this induces 
Kim and Walker to repeat their experiment several times (eleven) 
in order to "give subjects time to reflect upon their own and the 
others'-previous pledges". Since voluntary contributions show a 
clear tendency to fall as the experiment is repeated, and since 
most previous studies (except Smith and Sweeney) did not allow for 
repetition, Kim and Walker conclude that the results of the 
previous studies' are invalidated because they were really 
referring to a disequilibrium situation. 
It is not entirely clear if this` conclusion is correct. As a- 
matter of fact, there is*something of a paradox here; Public good 
theory' refers to. and makes strong predictions only ` for, 
situations characterized by single period choices' (i. e. public 
good theory is static), and for groups where the identity of the 
participants is not important. Yet, Kim and Walker's experiment 
refers'to a model'which is essentially dynamic (the experiment is 
repeated several times) and where furthermore participants are 
always, the same. It is not altogether clear what should be the 
predictions of public good theory in a dynamic context where 
individuals may play intertemporal strategies14. 
This suggests that we should attempt to allow for learning by 
- ------ -- - -------------- ----- - ----------- 
14 
These issues are discussed in Andreoni (1988b)ß who reports of an 
experiment where he attempts to test. for the two main alternative 
hypotheses which have been put forward to explain the reduction in 
individuals' contributions as the experiment is repeated: learning 
and strategies. Both hypotheses are rejected by the experiment. 
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using some different device from that used by Kim and Walker 
is 
- it 
also shows that Kim and Walker's findings might also be 
invalidated on the ground that public good. -theory -is static and 
not dynamic and that, their interpretation of the effects of 
repetition"(in. terms of learning) is only one of- many possible 
interpretations which could be given. Similar remarks could. also 
be applied to the interesting and more sophisticated work by Isaac 
and his associates (1984.1985.1988), who also consider repeated 
experiments. _Roughly, speaking. -their results are consistent with 
all previous findings, in the sense that . 
in, particular contexts 
they replicate most of the previous results., In general, none of 
the three.. competing_theories16 that they consider, is consistent 
with, all, results. Weak -free-riding, however, wseems ; 
to.., prevail - in 
the-sense of being consistent with a larger set of results. 
Repetition reduces- average contribution. Interestingly enough, 
contrary to predictions (d) above, --increasing the number of 
15For' 
example'instead of repeating the game, an alternative 
strategy, might be to use experienced subjects; i. e. subjects who 
have already participated in the same type of experiment in 
different groups. As we report in a previous note Marwell and Ames 
(1981) do make a similar attempt but their results do not show any 
significant difference with respect to unexperienced subjects. For 
further discussion on this issue see Andreoni (1988b). 
16Their 
model is built up in such a way that the dominant strategy 
for each individual is to provide nothing for the public good 
while the optimal level of contribution would require strictly 
positive individual contributions. Zero contribution is then 
defined as strong free-riding, optimal contribution as Lindahl 
behaviour and any intermediate situation as weak free-riding 
behaviour. 
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individuals involved in the experiment, does not reduce average 
giving as long as each individual's-marginal per capita benefit 
from the-public good does. not fall following the increase in the 
number of contributors (i. e. as long as the-public good is pure). 
Summing up, even taking into account all the caveats we 
mentioned above,, a clear indication seems to emerge from the 
experimental literature quoted so far: free-riding behaviour is a 
real phenomenon but its importance seems to have been greatly 
overemphasized by theory17. Let us also note, for future reference, 
that several researchers have suggested, as a possible explanation 
of their findings, that subjects were not only driven by mere 
selfishness-in, deciding their contribution. For example. most of 
the subjects in Marwell and Ames's experiments declared that they 
were "concerned with-fairness" when deciding upon their own level 
of"provision to the public good. In line with this hypothesis of 
fair behaviour, Smith (1980) notes that in his contribution scheme 
"rich people tend to give more and poor people to give less than 
their Lindahl shares to the public good". Other researchers, such 
as Schneider and Pommerehme (1981), speak generally of altruistic 
preferences as a motivation of subjects' behaviour. Finally, 
Mestelman and Feerny (1987) in an experimental study, find . that 
------ -------- 
170ur 
survey of the experimental literature thus confirms Margolis' 
statement (1982: 6): "the conventional economic model not only 
predicts (correctly) the existence of problems of free-riding, but 
also predicts (incorrectly) such severe problems that no society 
we know could function if its members actually behaved as the 
conventional model implies they will". 
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"ideology" (i. e. people's perception of the fairness of 
free-riding) matters in determining the extent of free-riding 
behaviour. Participants expected to be biased against free-riding, 
did actually free ride less than average people. 
18 
11.6 A first-summing up 
All the empirical literature quoted. -in 
the previous two 
paragraphs indicates that the traditional model of voluntary 
provision of public goods is in-need of drastic revision., None of 
the predictions of the model is really supported by empirical 
evidence. Casual observation and all the bulk of experimental 
analysis tend to suggest that, to some extent at least,, people 
manage to avoid the problem of. (systemic) free-riding. This casts 
serious doubts on predictions (a). and (b) above, that, is on, the 
l9. 
presumed suboptimality of private contribution of public goods 
Similarly, none of the results# summarized by the "invariance" 
- ------- --------- 
18 The subjects of-the experiments were participants in a congress 
against earth pollution. 
19This 
of course does not imply that one could not argue for 
suboptimality of. private provision of public, goods by using other 
arguments. For example, if the public good must be produced and 
individuals cannot be excluded from its consumption, no private 
firm would ever produce the public good because it would be unable 
to charge a price for it. Furthermore, even if some excluding 
mechanism could be found. the latter would never be optimal if the 
public good is pure. In fact. in the latter case, the marginal 
cost to associate another individual to the consumption of the 
public good is zero and therefore it is, never optimal to exclude 
an individual from the consumption of the public good. For a good 
discussion of, this and related themes see Oakland (1987). 
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proposition above finds support in the empirical analysis. The 
comparative static results on the size of the group of 
contributors are decisively falsified by the empirical data on 
large organizations (prediction d); there is weak, if any, 
evidence of a crowding out phenomenon at'work between private and 
public supply of public goods '(prediction a); and the general 
invariance"property of private allocations to any governmental 
distortionary and redistributive policy is simply too strong to be 
taken seriously (predictio, ns b and c). 
The recent literature on public goods has shown an increasing 
awareness of the many shortcomings 'of the traditional model. 
Several attempts have been made either to abandon altogether or to 
change the traditional contribution 'model. In the following, 
without pretense of completeness, we will review and discuss the 
most interesting attempts made in'the literature to date. In so 
doing, we will also offer arguments in support of the alternative 
approach that we will adopt in the following chapters. 
11.7 Alternative models of voluntary provision of public good 
A first attempt which comes naturally to mind is to exploit 
more fully the game theoretical structure implicit in public good 
situations. Several attempts of this sort have been made in the 
literature. Attention has been almost exclusively restricted to 
noncooperative games, because in large economies the ability of 
agents to communicate and make binding agreements is dubious (see 
S1 
however Foley. 1970). The main idea of this literature is that 
concentrating upon simple games and allowing the agents to play 
public good games several times may encourage cooperation, thus 
explaining the'observed low level of free-riding behaviour. To 
date. however, these attempts do not seem to be very satisfactory. 
For one thing, introducing a more-abstract game theoretical 
structure usually imposes a cost in terms of further simplifying 
assumptions to be imposed on the structure of the problem. For 
example, usually very simple games are considered, with binary 
choices (i. e. contribute or not contribute to a publicigood) and a 
limited set of players. This is of course pretty far from, the kind 
of problems usually addressed by public goods theory. Second, a 
game theoretical structure requires one to explicitly define the 
payoff structure of the game and the strategy and information sets 
of the players. As for the former, modeling a public -good 
situation as a "Prisoner's Dilemma" game or as a "Chicken"-game 
-- both roughly compatible with the implicit payoffs of "public 
good situations -- may-entail rather different, solution concepts 
and therefore entirely different results20. 
In-general, it is however difficult to find strong results in 
this literature. It is now known for example that in a Prisoner's 
---------------- ------------------ -------------------------------- 
20As Is well known, in fact, the former game has a dominant 
strategy, the latter has not and different equilibrium concepts 
may be proposed. As an example of the "Chicken" game analyses of 
public goods situation see Bliss and Nalebuff (1984) and Lipnowsky 
and Maital (1983). For a discussion of several public good games 
with different incentive structures, see Palfrey and Rosenthal 
(1988). 
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Dilemma game. repetition and incomplete information may entail 
greater cooperation from the individuals (Taylor, 1976; Friedman, 
1986; Kreps et al., 1982). However, results are in general 
ambiguous and difficult to extend to economies with several agents 
(Taylor, 1976). In contrast, it has instead proved more fruitful 
to consider less abstract and simpler games but which allow one to 
introduce more structure into the problem. 
Examples of this strategy are offered by Hirshleifer -(1983), 
Bagnoli and Lipman (1986.1987) and Guttman 1(1978,1984,1987). 
Hirshleifer (1983) considers cases where the total supply of the 
public good is not additive in the individual contributions but` 
depends on either the smallest (i. e. Q-min(gi, , qn)) or 
alternatively, the largest individual contribution to the public 
good (i. e. Q-max{q1, , qn}). Bagnoll and Lipman (1986), ' building 
upon Hirshlelfer, consider a simple contribution game ' with' 
complete information where the public good is a discrete variable 
--which is provided if and only if the amount of 'resources 
collected reaches a given threshold-- and where if total private 
provision fails to reach the provision point level, individual 
contributions are returned to contributors. Guttman considers a 
sequential two stage Nash contribution model, where in the first 
stage individuals choose a "matching rate" and in the second a 
"flat contribution", where the matching rate represents a 
commitment by individuals to contribute a certain portion of the 
aggregate flat contribution of everybody else and the flat 
contribution is instead an independent decision to contribute to 
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the-public good. 
All these models share the characteristics of implying, at 
least in some special cases. efficiency in private supply of the 
public good and in any case a lower amount of inefficiency than 
that implied by the traditional contribution model discussed 
above21. All these papers provide therefore Interesting insights 
into, the working of the contribution model under different 
assumptions on the production function of public goods and 
individual behaviour. Nevertheless, their results sound somewhat 
artificial, In most of the real world examples of private 
contributions of public goods, none of the distinctive features of 
the papers above is really present. 
The simple summation rule is likely to be a better 
approximation to the "real" production function of public goods 
than either the smallest or the largest contribution rule, when 
attention is restricted to the main real world instances of 
private provision of public goods: collective organizations and 
--------- 
21In Hirshleifer's model the smallest contribution rule is 
certainly more efficient than either the traditional summation 
rule or the greatest contribution rule. Bagnoli and Lipman, using 
as their concept of equilibrium a refinement of the usual Nash 
equilibrium concept, the notion of proper equilibria, reach the 
remarkable result that all proper equilibria in pure strategies of 
their contribution game are Pareto efficient allocations and all 
Pareto efficient allocations can be sustained as proper equilibria 
in pure strategies (see also Bagnoli and Lipman, 1987 for an 
empirical test of their model strongly supportive of their 
theoretical findings). Guttman's model implies efficiency in 
private provision to the public good for identical individuals and 
a higher level of efficiency than in the traditional model for 
heterogeneous individuals. 
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charities. Similarly, the fact that in Bagnoli and Lipman private 
contributions are returned to individual contributors if resources 
collected are not sufficient to pay for the public good surely 
biases the result toward an higher provision than in the normal 
case. It must be realized. however, that very few, if any, real 
world examples of private contribution schemes are organized along 
Bagnoli and Lipman lines. 
Guttman's model is open to both logical and empirical 
criticisms. On logical grounds, while even selfish individuals 
have an Incentive to select in the first game positive matching 
rates --because it encourages higher flat contributions by 
others-- they also have an incentive not to fulfill their 
commitment to match other contributions.. in. the_second game. It-. is 
then not'clear what keeps individuals in' Guttman's model from 
reverting to the usual Nash behaviour of the traditional model 
thus undermining the entire contribution scheme. On empirical 
grounds, Guttman can quote only a' single, and very particular 
example of a real world contribution"scheme which resembles his 
2 2. 
model 
------- ------------------ -------- ------------------ 
22 
The empirical evidence that Guttman quotes in. support for his 
model is the system of matching grants by US Federal government to 
single states' expenditure on public goods. Note that the former 
looks more similar to an external agent with coercive powers than 
to a typical agent of a contribution scheme. This. takes, us back to 
the logical criticism to Guttman's model advanced in the text, 
since it seems that the latter to work requires some external 
agent endowed with coercive powers over players. 
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None of the previous attempts seems-therefore to be able to 
offer a. -satisfactory solution to the many shortcomings of the 
traditional model23. Leaving aside their normative implications 
--which may turn out to be-important'in other contexts-- the main 
result which emerges from the literature reviewed in this section 
is a general indication to> look, more carefully at the 
institutional features of the particular private contribution 
scheme under analysis. before concluding dogmatically that theory 
predicts an inefficient level of private provision of public 
goods. However what these models fail to do is to offer a general 
theory of voluntary contributions to public goods which may be 
applied successfully to the many real world instances of private 
--------- 
23Another 
avenue of research which looks promising"is represented 
by the analysis of private provision of public goods in 
conditions of uncertainty. Austen-Smith (1980,1981) and Shogren 
(1987), for example, have shown that if an individual has only a 
probabilistic knowledge of the total contributions to the public 
good by the other individuals and if he is characterized by 
decreasing absolute risk aversion he will tend to supply more to 
the public good relative to the case where he knows exactly the 
total provision to the public good by the other individuals. The 
comparison, is performed by employing an hypothesis of mean 
preserving spread: that is, by assuming that the expected value of 
other individuals' contributions in the case of uncertainty is 
equal to the actual value of other individuals' contribution in 
the case of certainty. Here however lies also the limit of the 
approach. In fact, if each individual increases his contribution 
to the public good because of uncertainty as argued in this 
approach, we should also expect, at least in the''long run, - that 
the expected value of other individuals' contribution would also 
increase relative to the case of certainty. But this in turn. 
would also imply, under the assumption of income normality of the 
private good. ' a reduction in each individual contribution. 
Considering both the effects it is therefore unclear ' if 
uncertainty should increase total private-provision of the public 
good with respect to the certainty case analyzed in the previous 
sections. 
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provision. It is then time to consider the literature which has 
attempted to build such a theory by questioning the basic tenets 
of the traditional model: that is. by questioning the three 
fundamental assumptions over which the model is built. 
II. 8.1 Modifying the traditional model: non-Nash behaviour 
The first assumption. that one would wish to relax in the 
context of the contribution model above is certainly the 
assumption of Nash behaviour. This is so for a number of reasons. 
First. Nash behaviour is myopic: as we will see below. Nash 
conjectures on the slope of the reaction function of other 
individuals turn out to be generally wrong in equilibrium. Second, 
it seems intuitively clear that if an individual believes that by 
raising his contribution he can induce other individuals to 
increase theirs he will be stimulated to do so. ' If many 
individuals behave likewise, a higher provision of the public good 
may result than in the traditional model. Third, there is an 
established tradition in the public good literature which 
attributes a higher efficiency to private provision of public 
goods in small groups on the basis of the argument that in such 
groups it is easier to maintain expectations of matching behaviour 
(Olson, 1965; Buchanan, 1967). 
This verbal tradition was explicitly modeled by Cornes and 
Sandler (1984b, 1986). To see how their argument works, let us 
consider an economy with Identical individuals and suppose that 
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each individual i believes that the other individuals will react 
to changes in i's own contribution by modifying their choices. 
Following Cornes and Sandler (1984b), we can model this expectation 
by writing Q®, =Q0 (gti. Q-ti, ): where QQ" is i's expectation of the 
total contribution of the other individuals expressed as a 
function of their actual or initial choice, Q-ti ,, and as a 
function 
ofýi's own contribution. q..., For simplicity, let us linearize i's 
expectations on other behaviour by writing OQt/aqt-a , where a is 
some constant. Using these assumptions we can rewrite problem (1) 
as: 
(14) max U(I -qti; q+Qýt) 
qL 
s. t. q,? 0 
Taking into account the inequality constraint. the first 
3. w 
order condition for problem _ (14). including the complementary 
slackness5condition. can be written as: 
(15) (-U 
Y 
+Ua [1+47] } qti = 0' :., ... qL> 0 -Uy +UQ [1 +a ]: 5 0 
Assuming first q, >0 . eq. (15) can be rearranged to give: 
(16) UQ/Uy=1/[l+a] 
. 
where we assume the corresponding second order condition to 
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hold whenever eq. (16) holds. Eq. (16) Illustrates Cornes and 
Sandler's argument: if a>0 (expectations of matching behaviour) 
the implicit price of the public good that an individual faces is 
smaller than one and, under the normality assumption, this will 
certainly stimulate a higher provision to the public good than 
under Nash behaviour (i. e. for a-0). The intuition is also 
straightforward: if individual i expects other individuals to 
match at least partially his contribution. by giving up an unit of 
his private consumption he will gain more than an unit of the 
public good; hence the price that individual i perceives he must 
pay for an unit of the public good is effectively smaller than 
one. 
It would then seem that if expectations of matching behaviour 
can be taken as reasonable, non-Nash behaviour, by implying a 
larger private provision of the public good in equilibrium, could 
represent a possible escape route to the difficulties of the 
traditional Nash contribution model. An obvious way to check the 
reasonableness of expectations of matching behaviour is to verify 
if the latter are consistent in equilibrium, where, following the 
oligopoly literature (Perry, 1982; Bresnahan, 1981), an 
expectation (conjectural variation) is defined as consistent If-it 
is identical to the optimal response of the other agents at the 
equilibrium based upon that expectation. Unfortunately, as Sugden 
(1985) has shown, if the public good is not a superior good 
expectations of matching behaviour cannot be consistent in 
equilibrium. To see this, let us define a consistent equilibrium 
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(Perry, 1982) as a vector of private contributions (q*) such that: 
(17a) U(I-qi . q*+Q' 
(q*. Q*ti))? U(I-qL . qti+Q_(QQ i. 
)) Vi' dqi 
(17b) Qet (q , Q_ )-Q 
_L Yi 
(17c) OQ_ti(q*)/dqL=a Vi. 
Condition (17a) imposes that at the equilibrium no individual 
has an incentive to unilaterally change his" choice; condition 
(17b)-requires each individual to be correct, at the equilibrium, 
about his expectations on the level of other individuals 
contributions, and finally condition (17c) requires each 
individual to be correct, at the equilibrium, also about the slope 
of other individuals' reaction-function. As should be clear, the 
concept of consistent equilibrium is just a refinement of the 
concept of Nash equilibrium that we used so far, a refinement 
-which is obtained by making condition (17b) explicit and by adding 
a condition on the (local) rightness of conjectural variations in 
equilibrium. i. e. by adding condition (17c).. 
In order. to get an explicit solution for condition (17c) 
above, let us evaluate eq. (16) at a symmetric equilibrium 
allocation {q 
(18) -Uy(I-qj; (n-1)qß +q. ) + UQ(I-qý; (n-1)qß +q. )[1+a]'0 Yj 
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where qý=q*>0. By differentiating eq. (18)-with respect to qL 
and qý and solving for dqj/dqt we get the actual response of j's 
contribution to an exogenous change in i's contribution: and since 
all individuals are identical dQ-y(q) /dqy={n-1}dqj /dq`. Condition 
(17c) then imposes 
24 
. 
(19) D-1 [n-1] {-UQQ[I+v]+UyQ}-a 
where- D-(U 
yv +U as 
[n-1][I+a]-U 
y- a 
[n+a]} ý$' and where all v 
derivatives are evaluated at the equilibrium allocation {q }. 
Solving and rearranging, (19) can be rewritten as: 
(20) [n-i](1+a}{-UQQ(1+a)+uya} + a{-vyy+U-, El+a))-o 
To interpret this expression note that the terms in the curly 
parentheses"of eq. (20) capture the effects of income changes on an 
individual demand for the private and the public good. This can be 
easily seen 'by differentiating the first order' condition in 
eq. (18) with respect to I and qj, and by keeping the contributions 
of everybody else constant. Doing this and solving for dqý/dI we 
get dqi /dI-(-U 
yy+UYQ 
[1+a]}/J; where - J--(U 
yy+UaQ(l+a)-Uya(2+a)}>O 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
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read but I am unconvinced by the alternative condition for 
consistency of conjectures derived by Scafuri (1988). Note that, 
differently from what argued by Scafuri, our condition 'does take 
into account the interaction among the contributions of the 
remaining (n-1) agents following from the changes in i's 
contribution. 
B1 
from quasi-concavity of the utility function; Furthermore, as 
dqi+dyj-9dI-from the budget constraint, dye/dI-{-UQQ[1+47]+UyQ}/J. 
Then, by-dividing both sides of eq. (20) by J and rearranging we 
get: 
(21) a --'-[n-1]a/{[n-1]a+[1-a]} 
where I" have simplified the notation" by writing 
dye/dI-dy/dI-a. Clearly, the sign of a depends on"the sign-of the 
income effect. First'note that, F as also argued by Cornes and 
Sandler (1984b), Nash conjectures can be, consistent only if there 
are no income effects on-the demand for the -private good `(i. e. -a-0): 
Second note that, in line with, our previous.: analysis, if 
there are no income effects on-the -demand' for the' public good 
(i. e. (x-1), each individual should predict 'a 'complete offsetting 
behaviour by part of-the other agents (i. e. a--1). Third, note that 
as Sugden (1985) rightly argued, if 'both the private and the 
public good are normal goods (i. e. O<a<1) a<O certainly; and as 
also argued by Sugden a>0" requires' a<o; that is, it 'requires 
private consumption to be an inferior good. The rationale for 
these results is of course the same as' we'-saw in the previous 
sections: if the public good is a normal good, each individual 
reaction function is negatively sloped- in other individuals' 
contributions'. Therefore, if an'individual correctly predicts "the 
reactions of other individuals, he must,, predict offsetting 
behaviour. But this, of course, going back-to eq. (16)°, would also 
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induce each individual', -to contribute even less to the public good 
than in the'Nash contribution model. "thus making the free-rider 
problem more severe. ;' 
While the-above is sufficient to show that abandoning the 
assumption , of Nash behaviour=is unlikely to offer a solution to 
the problems of the traditional-model. other striking implications 
of. eq. (21) should be noted. -First, note that even if a<O, for 
n>[2a-1]/a, a<0 certainly; that is. in large economies, -even if 
private consumption is an inferior good, consistent conjectures 
are negative: i. e. Individuals must predict offsetting behaviour 
on the part of the other agents. This strengthens Sugden's 
argument even further. Second note that, if a*0. as n tends to 
infinity. a, "=tends to -1; that is, in very large economies, 
irrespective of the sign of the income effects, each individual 
should predict complete offsetting behaviour on the part of the 
other individuals. Sugden (1985) noted this and argued that in 
very large economies private provision of the public good should 
approach zero; but our previous formulation of the concept. of 
consistent equilibrium suggests even more striking conclusions, 
To see this, suppose that Sugden is right and that the 
consistent symmetric equilibrium is characterized by zero private 
provision of the public good: i. e. let q, =0, Vi. But If Q-L'0. It. 
would seem reasonable to argue that individual i's consistent 
conjectures about the slope of the reaction function of the other 
individuals can only be non-negative since no individual can 
supply a negative contribution to the public good: that is, 
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whatever the process by which an individual I comes to have 
expectations about other behaviour, for Q_, =0, he cannot expect 
consistently offsetting reactions by the other individuals. 
More generally, even if Q_tP0, It would' seem a natural 
requirement of consistency of conjectures to impose that, if 
individual-i rightly conjectures that the level of the other 
individuals' contribution is Q_L, he cannot 'consistently expect 
the fall in other individuals' contributions` to be larger than 
this initial value. It then follows: 
(21a) Qmm. (q . Q_ ti 
i-Q (Qý . Q_ L) 
? _Q- L 
whenever Q°ti(gti, Q_t)-Q_.. We can then state: 
Proposition I "If UQ/Uy(I, 0)>1, a consistent symmetric equilibrium 
where q. -O, Vi, does not exist. " 11 
Proof "Suppose qL"Q_ti-O is_ a consistent equilibrium. Then from 
condition (17b) above, Q° L 
(0,0)=Q-L, "O. Consider now a small 
increase in i's contribution to qt'>0. The corresponding change in 
the expected contribution of everybody else is then: 
AQeL. Q0 (q! . 0) - Q't(0,0) 20 
by equation (21a) above. Invoking the mean, value theorem we 
can rewrite the above expression as 
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! Q°- taQ®ti(Qy . 0)/dqyW ?0 
for some q. (O. q'). Consider now the expected utility 
differential-Uresulting from the small increase in i's 
contribution: TM 
... GU. U(I -Qt . q'+Qot(Q'. O)) - U(I, 0) 
Letting qti'*0, the previous expression can be-written as 
(21b) dU-{-Uy(i, o) + uQ(i. o)(1 + oQ°ti(Q,, o)/c7q`i)q > io 
since. [-Uy(I, O)+UQ(I. 0)j>0 by assumption. Hence if Q-L-O and 
individual i rightly conjectures both the level of contribution 
and the slope of the reaction function of other individuals, q, -0 
cannot be the optimal choice of individual'' I. This shows that 
qýý0. Vi, cannot be an equilibrium. QED" 
The condition UQ/Uy(I, 0)>1 simply implies that at zero 
provision of the public good, if the individual faced a price for 
the public good equal to one, he would wish to spend some of his 
income on the public good. It Is therefore an entirely innocuous 
assumption which we have been implicitly imposing In all the 
chapter. The rationale for proposition 1 is simple: If Q_, =0 and 
each individual i rightly conjectures that äQ_t/dgti? 0, each I 
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would have an incentive to deviate and to contribute a positive 
quantity to the public good. Condition (17a) is therefore not 
satisfied which implies that a symmetric consistent equilibrium at 
q. 30, bi cannot exist. Note that this result does not depend on 
either the number of individuals or the income effects on the 
demand for the public, -good; it is only a" consequence of our 
hypothesis that at Q_, -0 each individual i. rightly conjectures 
that OQ_ 
L, 
/dq 
t 
?0. 
Thus, proposition 1. shows that aý consistent equilibrium 
characterized by aýzero"contribution from everybody is impossible. 
But would a symmetric -consistent equilibrium where everybody 
provides ,a positive quantity be-possible? Let us start with the 
simpler case of an'economy where there are no income effects on 
the demand for the-public good. We can state: -W 
.ý.. 
Proposition 2 "Suppose that in an economy with identical 
individuals the demand for the public good by each individual is 
everywhere characterized by zero income effects: then a consistent 
symmetric equilibrium with a positive contribution from everybody 
does not exist" 
Proof "Suppose that qt=q>0, Vi, is an equilibrium. From eq. (21) 
above, if individual preferences are such that a-1 everywhere. 
consistent conjectures must entail a--1. Evaluating eq. (15) at 
Q-, -[n-1]q>0 and a--1 we get 
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(21c) [-Uy(I-q., q, +[n-1]q)]<O for any gti? 0; 
which implies that the optimal choice of individual i is to 
set q. =0. This shows that q. =q>0, 'YI is not an equilibrium. QED" 
The rationale for proposition 2 is straightforward. Going 
back to eq. (16) if a'-1 it is as if'each Individual I faced an 
infinitely large price for the public good. In fact, any positive 
contribution by individual i brings about a corresponding 
reduction in the contributions of the., other individuals; therefore 
if individual I reduced his private consumption he would not get 
any extra amount of the public good in exchange. Thus, i's best 
choice is to set his contribution equal to zero. 
Putting together proposition 1 and proposition 2 we find that 
in an economy with zero income effects on the demand for the 
public good a symmetric consistent equilibrium does not exist. But 
as we saw above, the demand for the public good is, usually 
characterized by positive income effects. Thus, in this case, 
consistent symmetric equilibria with positive contributions may 
exist. On the other hand, as we saw in eq. (21) above, if n=oo, 
o -1, even if there are positive income effects on the demand for 
the public good. Would then a consistent symmetric equilibrium 
exist in a large economy with positive income effect on the demand 
for the public good? 
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Proposition 3 "Suppose that in an economy with identical 
individuals the public good is everywhere a normal good and 
suppose further that 3 6,6>1, such that 1<UQ/UY(I, 0)<c5. Then 
there is an, n* such that for n>n* a consistent symmetric 
equilibrium must fail to exist" 
Proof "If the public good is a normal good the private good must 
also". be-a normal good; it follows: 
(21d) UQ/Uy(I. [n-1]q) <_ UQ/Uy(I. 0) <ö 
for any q? O and any n>1. From eq. (21) above, as n increases a 
falls; let then n be such that [1-a] _6. Hence, for any' n>n 
[1-a]1>ö. Consider now an economy with n** identical, individuals, 
where n >n*. From proposition 1 above, qt=0, Vi cannot be an 
equilibrium. Suppose then that qt=q>O, Vi, is an equilibrium. 
Evaluating eq. (15) at QL=[n -1]q>0 and using again the 
assumption of normality of the two goods, we get: 
(21e) UQ/Uy(I-qL'q. +[n -1]q) < [1*aj VqL>_O 
which implies that the optimal choice of individual i is to 
set qti-0. Hence q. -q di, cannot be a consistent equilibrium. QED" 
The condition Ua/Uy(I, O)<6 implies that there exists a price 
for the public good so high that individuals would prefer not to 
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buy any of-the public good and spend all their income in the 
purchase of the private good. The public good is not, in other 
words, an essential good25 .I would like to argue that for many 
public goods the condition of non-essentiality may be considered 
reasonable enough. If this conjecture is correct, proposition 1 to 
3 would then imply that symmetric consistent equilibria in large 
economies may fail to exist. This of course does not imply that 
asymmetrical equilibria cannot exist either as the next 
proposition shows. 
Proposition 4 -Consider an economy with two identical individuals, 
1-1.2 ' and suppose that each 
individual demand for the public 
good is characterized by zero income effects. Also suppose that 
dgj(qý, 0)/dqt-0 , i, j-1.2 and 
i; dj. Then, an allocation where qý-0 
and q.. {qj maxU(I-gti, qti)) i, j-1,2, lid j is a consistent 
equilibrium. "_ 
Proof "To prove the proposition, it is enough to check that 
conditions (17a), to (17c) are satisfied at the allocation above. 
q* satisfies (17a) to (17c) if q(q*, o)-q(q*)-0 and 
dq (q, 0)/dq, -dq(gti)/dq, =0, where g(qti) indicates the reaction 
function of individual J. Suppose now that individual j holds 
consistent conjectural variations about i's behaviour at q*; that 
-------- --------- ----------- 
25For 
a precise definition of essential goods. see chapter IV, 
section 3. 
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Is. since there are no income effects on the demand for the public 
good, suppose äge(O. q*)/dqj=ägti(0)/dqj--1. - By the previous 
argument, the-optimal response of individual j is then to set 
q(q*)=0; furthermore, since . q. =0 is the optimal response of ý 
individual j for any q. >0, qß-0 must also be the optimal response 
of individual j in a small neighborhood of qti This implies 
8q. (q*) /dq. -0. Therefore at qj =0 and q`-qt , each individual 
correctly conjectures both the level and the slope of the reaction 
function of the other individual at that allocation; and each 
individual maximizes his utility with respect to the correct 
conjecture about the other individual's behaviour. Hence yo and 
qt, =q t 
i, j-1,2 i*j is a consistent. equilibrlum. QED" 
Summing up, unless private consumption is an inferior good, 
consistent conjectures must necessarily imply expectations of 
offsetting behaviour by the other individuals; and if the economy 
is large, consistent conjectures must be negative even if the 
private good is an inferior good. Furthermore, the larger the 
number of individuals the smaller the private provision of the 
public good; and if the economy is very large a symmetric 
equilibrium may fail to exist. Going back to sections 11.5 and 
11.6, it is then clear that consistent non-Nash behaviour can only 
make the explanation of the empirical evidence on private 
provision of public goods more difficult. A solution could be to 
impose matching behaviour without requiring it to be consistent; 
but in the selfish framework adopted in the literature this would 
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be difficult to justify. Furthermore, note that even with 
arbitrary conjectures (i. e non-consistent conjectures) the basic 
invariance results that we indicated above would remain unchanged. 
This is-so because even in an arbitrary conjectured equilibrium 
the reaction function of each individual would still be negatively 
sloped in the contribution of the other individuals if both goods 
are normal goods. thus reproducing all the invariance results 
presented above. This can easily be seen by working on the first 
order conditions in eq. (18). 
11.8.2 Modifying the traditional model: impure public goods 
A second attempt is to drop the assumption of "purity" of the 
public good by introducing elements of "privateness"- in an 
individual decision to. provide the public good. This solution has 
also a long tradition in the history of the discipline26 and it has 
by now been proposed by so many-writers that it is threatening to 
become 'a new orthodoxy27. Indeed, the same literature on club goods 
---------- 
26 Olson (1965), for example, suggested that large organizations 
manage to exist despite the free-rider problem because they offer 
"selective incentives" --i. e. private goods and services -- to 
their members. As an example, think of a Union which offers 
together with its membership card price reductions for travel 
expenses. However, as Stigler (1974) was quick to remark, Olson's 
solution is open to the logical objection that in a competitive 
market we should expect private firms to emerge able to offer the 
same services at a lower price than the collective organizations. 
This is so because the private firms would not have to pay for the 
production of the public good itself. 
27For 
a recent survey of the literature on mixed goods see 'Else 
(1988). 
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and local public goods has sprung from the simple observation that 
many so-called public goods have private goods characteristics. As 
is by now well known, this simple fact is able to change 
considerably the traditional results of inefficiency of private 
provision of these goods (see Sandler and Tschirhart. 1980). 
Club goods theory cannot be applied'straightforwardly to the 
empirical facts that we are discussing here because the 
distinctive features-of clubs are not present in. our case (see 
Cornes and Sandler, 1986: 159-160). There are however several 
alternative ways of introducing elements of privateness even in 
the context of large-organizations and philanthropic institutions. 
For instance, in the case of philanthropic giving. a simple way is 
to deny altogether the public good nature of the charity and to 
model individual-decisions to donate simply as the purchase of a 
pure private good. This solution characterizes. -for example, the 
work of Weisbrod and his associates (Weisbrod, 1975; 1977: 
Weisbrod and Dominguez, 1980, Menchik and Welsbrod 1987). In their 
formulation, the donor gets utility only from his own contribution 
to the charity and not from the total contribution by all other 
individuals. Therefore, to all intents and purposes. Individual 
contribution is a pure private good. 
Clearly. such a solution would eliminate at once all the 
problems related to private provision of public goods and indeed 
the same notion of free-riding behaviour would become meaningless. 
However, one cannot help feeling that such a solution is 
equivalent to throwing out the baby with the bath water. On 
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intuitive grounds, it would seem very strange to argue that the 
characteristics of the people benefiting from the donations do not 
affect the decision of. 'an individual to donate. Yet. If an 
individual gets utility. only from his own donation. this is, what 
has been implicitly assumed, Moreover, Weisbrod's solution is also 
open to a logical objection. If two (rich) individuals get utility 
only from the act of donating, they would surely be better off by 
donating to each other part of their income rather than by giving 
it to a third poor person who cannot reciprocate. Yet, as a matter 
of fact., rich people donate to poor people and voluntary 
organizations are characterized by the fact that they attempt to 
help the sick, the poor and the elderly. 
Therefore, assuming that the utility of the donors depends on 
the level of welfare of-the-people benefiting,, from. the charity 
seems to be unavoidable- both on intuitive and on theoretical 
grounds. But this, of course, compels one to introduce an element 
of publicness in the analysis of charitable givijt, g. Similar 
remarks-apply of course even more strongly to large organizations 
other than philanthropic organizations, such as trade unions. 
Probably in order to avoid the theoretical and intuitive 
pitfalls of eliminating tout court the public good features of 
charity donations. several authors have proposed a sort of mid-way 
solution. Bernheim (1986), Andreoni (1988a), Cornes and Sandler 
(1984a), Posnett and Sandler (1986), all argue that private 
provision of public goods should be studied in models where 
individuals gain utility from both their contribution to the 
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public good and the total level of public good supply28. If an 
individual gets utility from both his own contribution and the 
total supply of the public good. each dollar spent on public good 
provision can be thought of as producing jointly two types of 
goods: a pure "private" good (the individual satisfaction deriving 
from his own donation) and the public good itself. Clearly, the 
traditional results of the Nash contribution model may change in 
this case. To see this, let us rewrite the utility function of the 
representative -consumer 'i. as depending upon three goods or 
"characteristics" (Cornes and Sandler, 1984a, 1986): 
(22) Uý'=U 
where y. and Q have the. `interpretation offered above. The 
novelty of the approach comes from the third good" or 
characteristic: zt. The latter is supposed to be a pure private 
good which is produced by-purchasing an unit of'the public good: 
it is. In the "interpretation usually offered, the private 
satisfaction accruing to individual i as a result of the feeling 
of "having done his own duty". For simplicity let us suppose that 
z's production function is a linear function of individual -i's 
contribution: 
28In 
a recent study on collective action, Hirschman (1982) also 
suggests a similar explanation for citizens', involvement in 
political activity. 
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(2 3) zti' z+Y Qti 
where y is some positive constant, z is some exogenous value 
(it might also be set equal to zero) and qti is, as above, 
individual i's contribution. The first order condition for the 
maximization of eq. (22) subject to eq. (23) and the budget 
constraint Iti-q +y. yields: 
(24) UQ/U. (Iti-qL 9q+Q-i, rg+z) + YU=/Uy(Ii-qti 9q+Q-i. 'Yg+z) -1 
where'we'assume an interior solution for qi, and the related 
second order condition to hold at q. In general, at 'least for 
z-0, eq. (24) entails a larger individual provision to the public 
2 
good than in the normal case9. The real novelty of the approach 
------------------ 
29 This can be easily seen by differentiating eq. (24) with respect 
to q` . and y and. evaluating the resulting 
derivative dq. \dy at y-0: 
dqi /dr 
y=0 
(qi, [UQZ-Uyz] + Uz)/D 
where D=-[Ut +U'' -2U' ]>0 from the second order condition and YY Go ya 
where each derivative is evaluated at the optimal choice for q,. 
The equation above shows the effect of introducing a small 
jointness in production on individual contribution, using as 
starting point the contribution in the normal case. Clearly, if we 
evaluate the expression above at z=0, Uz is likely to be very 
large thus implying dqt/dy>O, whatever the sign of the first two 
effects. Hence, jointness in production is likely . to produce, 
ceteris paribus, a larger individual provision to the public good. 
Note however that the conditions for efficiency in public good 
provision also change in the joint production model, implying a 
larger individual contribution with respect to the normal case. It 
is therefore unclear if the joint production model implies a 
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however comes from its implications for the slope of the 
individual reaction function with respect to changes in other 
contributions. To see this let us differentiate eq. (24) with 
respect to qy and Q_,; solving for dqL/dQ_L we get: 
(25) dq. /dQ-i (-uyca + Uaa + YUza I /D 
where Da-[UL +UL +y2Ut -2UL -y2UL +y2UL >0 from the second 
yy as zz yG yz az 
order condition. The first two terms on the RHS of eq. (25) can be 
shown to capture the usual substitution and income effects that we 
derived earlier (see below) and are therefore together negative if 
both the private good y and the public good are normal goods. The 
last term is however uncertain; U'Q measures the effect of a small 
change in Q on the marginal utility for the private good z If 
such effect is positive, i. e. if zt and Q are "complementary" 
goods (Cornes and Sandler, 1984a), the sign of dqL/dQ-, becomes 
uncertain and it might also turn out to be positive. The intuition 
is straightforward. If Q and zL are complementary, an exogenous 
increase in Q will push the individual to "buy" more of the 
private good z., thus inducing him to increase his contribution to 
the public good. Clearly, if such a complementarity effect Is very 
strong, it might overcome the substitution effect Induced by an 
increase in the contribution of the other individuals thus 
higher efficiency in private provision to the public good. 
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generating a positively sloped reaction function. 
The point is of course whether such a complementarity effect 
is likely to arise in practice and'to be strong enough to overcome 
the substitution effect. Intuitively speaking, it is difficult to 
see why this should be the case. If the private benefits of 
donating depend on the satisfaction of-having "done one's bit", it 
is not clear why such a feeling should deepen following an 
increase-in other contributions. Rather, if a sense of ethical 
duty lies behind this feeling, one would expect it to remain 
basically unchanged. In terms of our formalization above this 
would imply UZQ=0 . thus reproducing the typical reaction function 
associated with Nash behaviour. 
On this issue, we are also able to offer a different 
interpretation for eq. (25) above. To see this let us differentiate 
the first order condition in eq. (24) alternatively with respect to 
qti and I., and with respect to qt and to z; doing this and solving 
for dqL/dI. and dqL/dz we get: 
dq`/dIt = [-Ut + UQy + YU=y]/D 
(26) 
dqL/dz - [-U" + Uaz + ? Uzz]/D 
. where D has the interpretation given above. Then by summing 
and subtracting 1 from the RHS of eq. (25) and rearranging, 
dqL/dQ_ti can be rewritten as: 
t 
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(27) dqL/dQ_t= -1 + dqt/dIL -ydq. /dz 
The first two terms on the RHS of eq. (27) are the 
substitution and income effect discussed in the previous 
paragraphs. ` It can now be noted that a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for a positively sloped reaction function is 
dq. /dz'<0; that is, from eq. (23), dz. /dz<1. This in turn has a 
%1 16 
nice Interpretation. ' A small Increase in z will produce both a 
substitution and an "income" effect due to the fact that an 
exogenous increase in z Increases utility and small increases in 
utility are equivalent to small 'increases In' Income. Therefore 
dz. /dz<l if the private good z. is not a superior good; that is. 
16 
if the increase in utility generated by the exogenous increase in 
z does not Induce the individual demand for z to increase so much 
as to'make dq ti , 
/dz positive. 
If this interpretation is correct, it is then clear that the 
sign of the reaction function in eq. (27), above depends upon the 
assumptions made on, the income effects on the demand for the 
private good z.. For example, if the private characteristic z 
behaves as a normal good --i. e. if 0<dz/dz<1-- and if the- income 
effects on the demand for the public good have the, small magnitude 
detected by the empirical studies (see section 11.3), the 
individual reaction function should still be non-positively sloped 
in other individuals' contributions even in a joint production 
model. As should be clear, a positively sloped reaction function 
really requires the private characteristic generated. by the 
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individual contribution to be an inferior good: that is, it 
requires dz 
ti 
/dz<O. 
These considerations show that while the joint production 
formulation'is able to reduce some of the problems associated with 
the-traditional contribution model30, it also requires very 
peculiar assumptions to work. Thus, without wishing to deny the 
important insights offered by the impure public good approach, 
there seems to be room enough for considering alternative 
explanations. -On this-ground, note that the same justification 
offered in the literature for the notion of private benefits 
accruing from public good contributions seems to point more toward 
an explanation of giving as motivated by some feeling of"'ethical 
31 
"duty" rather than by a preference for donating. 
11.8.3 Modifying the traditional model: unselfish behaviour 
3oIn 
particular the assumption of impure public goods, by breaking 
the link between lump-sum income and exogenous changes in public 
good supply, would also eliminate, at least to an extent, the 
invariance results summarized in section 11.3 (see Andreoni, 1988a). 
31Before leaving the section on impure public good, we should 
mention the important paper by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1988). These 
authors call their model an "altruistic" model', but what they 
really do is to introduce private benefits from contributing, 
since "altruism" is modeled as a component of utility which 
depends solely on how much an individual contributes. The 
interesting feature of their model is that while the pecuniary 
pay-offs of the game are common knowledge, "altruism" is assumed 
to be private information. They then get a game of imperfect 
information which is solved by using the notion of Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium, due to Harsanyi. Palfrey and Rosenthal obtain strong 
results which are then tested in several different types of binary 
contribution games. 
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We are then left with the last assumption of the traditional 
contribution model: the assumption of selfish maximizing 
behaviour. To be sure, there has always been debate in the 
literature on the relevance of this assumption for public good 
situations. For example, both Olson and Buchanan, two founding 
fathers of the discipline, have always been very careful in 
limiting the range of applicability of the assumption of 
selfishness in the context of the analysis of private provision of 
public goods32. Both authors are however deeply convinced that 
public good theory is perfectly adequate for the analysis of large 
economic organizations and the subsequent literature has tended to 
forget even the mild caveats that the earlier authors had imposed 
on the theory., On the other hand. as we discussed at length in the 
previous chapter. public good theory is not consistent with the 
empirical facts that we know about private provision of public 
goods in large groups. Moreover, as we showed in the previous 
paragraphs, the attempts proposed so far in the literature to 
amend the traditional model are far from being satisfactory. 
There'seems therefore to be room enough "to explore the 
--------- ------------------------------------------------------ 
32Olson (1965) deliberately excludes "religious and philanthropic" 
organizations from his analysis on the ground that people's 
behaviour in these organizations may not be motivated by strictly 
defined self-interest. Buchanan (1978) restricts the domain of 
applicability of public good theory to "large organizations" 
exactly because, he argues, ethical and social norms of behaviour 
are likely to prevail in smaller groups. 
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implications of dropping the assumption of selfishness even in the 
context of large groups and organizations. Why should then people 
behave unselfishly In these situations? First, because there Is no 
reason why they should not do so. The assumption of selfishness is 
only a useful simplifying hypothesis on human behaviour and not a 
literal description of people's attitudes and behaviour. Thus, 
considering alternative hypotheses to selfishness is an entirely 
legitimate research strategy to follow. The point Is of course if 
such a strategy is fruitful. A hint that this could be the case is 
provided by the experimental evidence on public goods quoted 
above. As we pointed out there, several authors offered 
explanations for their findings in terms of "feelings of 
fairness", altruism or ethical norms. On Intuitive grounds this 
sounds realistic. Basic norms of social behaviour such as "be 
honest, "tell the truth", etc. if followed by Individuals would 
certainly reduce free-riding behaviour. 
There is moreover another reason why we should expect 
unselfish behaviour to be particularly relevant in public good 
situations. As we argued in chapter I, in such situations, 
unselfish behaviour may be perceived by the individuals themselves 
as Instrumental33 to the attainment of selfish objectives. As 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
33 There is a growing economic literature that, in the spirit of 
evolutionary biology, attempts to explain unselfish behaviour as 
instrumental to achieve selfish objectives. An up-to-date 
bibliography is in Frank (1987), who also offers an excellent 
example of this approach by explaining feelings of guilt and 
concern for fairness as pre-commitment devices in Prisoners' 
Dilemma type of situations. For a first attempt to verify 
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Johansen (1977: 148) has put it 
"... everybody would understand that the system would produce very 
bad results and possibly come to a breakdown if everybody 
concealed their preferences for the public goods. Although 
concealment of preferences corresponds to a sort of non 
cooperative equilibrium, and thus to individual rationality in a 
narrow sense, everybody would realize that it generates a very 
inferior solution. The collective might be able to break out of 
this equilibrium and instead establish something more like a 
cooperative equilibrium. based. on a more true representation of 
preferences, out of the joint understanding of the necessity of 
this for the long-run workability of the system". 
The problem is, of course, how to model satisfactorily these 
ideas in the context of a model of voluntary provision of public 
goods. Early writers, such as Becker (1974) and Collard (1978) 
proposed to use the notion of altruistic preferences. But as our 
previous discussion has shown, altruism alone cannot be a 
solution. In fact, if two individuals are altruistic toward a 
third the welfare of the latter represents, in effect, a pure 
public good for the former: and why should then individuals 
contribute toward this public good? 
34 
This remark holds also for the interesting extension of the 
usual altruistic model offered by Margolis (1982). The latter 
assumes that each individual's behaviour can be characterized by 
two utility functions: a first which represents his own 
------- ------------------ 
empirically the importance of fair rules for price and wage 
setting behaviour of firms see Kahneman et al. (1986). 
34For 
a similar argument and related criticisms of the notion of 
altruistic preferences see Sugden (1982,1984). 
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self Interested preferences and a second which represents the 
preferences of the reference group of the individual-- as 
perceived by the individual himself. Postulating a form of 
"participation altruism" --individuals gain utility from donating 
resources to the group-- and an "allocation rule" which 
establishes how the resources of the individual come to be 
allocated between the selfish and the group oriented utility 
function, Margolis's model explains the larger private provision 
of the public good observed in reality. However, as in the 
traditional model' discussed above. Margolis's theory still 
predicts negatively sloped individual reaction functions with 
respect to others' contributions35, thus reproducing the basic 
invariance properties of the traditional model. 
An alternative' line of research, originated by Akerlof 
(1980), explains unselfish behaviour in terms of "social customs". 
The idea is that there are some customs (i. e. rules of behaviour) 
which are followed by individuals in spite of the fact that it 
would be in their self-interest to disobey them. The binding force 
which causes individual obedience to the custom is the social 
------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
35The 
reason is simple: an increase in the contribution to the 
public good by another individual reduces the marginal utility of 
contributing of the group-oriented preferences. Thus the 
individual should divert some of his resources to other 
activities. Another problem with Margolis's theory is that, as 
group-preferences are completely unaffected by selfish 
preferences, the arguments of the group oriented utility function 
are imprecise. Thus, the model is unable to predict to which 
public good an individual should contribute. For these and related 
criticisms see Sugden (1984). 
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sanction imposed by the loss of, reputation from breaking the 
rule73. Akerlof uses his model to explain job discrimination and 
the persistence of higher- wages than market-clearing wages in 
labor. markets but it is. clear that if we identify the social 
custom as saying "pay for, the public good" his model can be used 
successfully even in the context of the empirical cases we are 
concerned with74.. 
But,. however suggestive, Akerlof's theory meets a fundamental 
objection in the context of our problem: the fundamental ad-hoc 
nature of the social custom. Why, in fact, should the social 
custom say . "pay for the public good" and not, -for example. "pay 
for the public good only in such and such situation"? Indeed, as 
the same analysis of Akerlof suggests, any possible equilibrium 
could be sustained as the result of the imposition of some set of 
"social, customs".. Without a theory which would allow one to select 
among-these rules, the results would remain basically 
indeterminate. Now, while there is a growing literature (Schotter, 
1981, Sugden, 1986) which is trying to explain the emergence of 
--------- ------------------------------ 
73Akerlof's 
model is dynamic and provides an intuition on how 
social customs may evolve. The idea is that in any single period 
there will always be some deviant people who nevertheless decide 
to follow their own Interest and break the code. If the number of 
deviants overcomes a given threshold, in the subsequent periods 
there will be fewer and fewer people following the social custom 
until the latter disappears. 
74For 
an example of authors who use Akerlof's model to solve the 
free-rider problem in public good. situations see Naylor (1989) and 
Booth (1985). 
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norms and "institutions" as the result of repeated simple games, 
the results obtained to date are far too weak and ambiguous to 
allow for a theory to be built upon them. Without denying the 
important insights offered by Akerlof's analysis, it does seem 
therefore that a satisfactory theory of private provision of 
public goods must be looked for elsewhere. 
The hypothesis of ethical- behaviour may offer a more 
satisfactory solution. In ,a sense, we could think of morality as 
selecting among all the set of possible social customs or "rules 
of behaviour" which could be, followed by the individuals. 
Furthermore, if attention is restricted to simple basic universal 
moral codes it sounds quite realistic to assume that people may 
know and be 'influenced by these rules in their actual behaviour. 
of course, 'intro. ducing an hypothesis of ethically 'oriented 
behaviour does not mean to deny that'social sanctions have a-role 
in enforcing the obedience to'such rules. 
The work of Laffont (1975) and Sugden (. 1984)' represents a 
first step in this direction. Laffont introduces and formalizes 
the 'notion of Kantian behaviour in a model with identical 
individuals (see next chapter). He shows that in an economy with 
externalities and public goods efficiency will result if everybody 
acts as a Kantian -- i. e. If everybody takes his decisions on the 
basis of the hypothesis that everybody else will do as he 'decides 
to do. Sugden (1984). building upon Laffont, presents a more 
satisfactory theory based on a notion of reciprocity and Kantian 
behaviour. Sugden assumes that each individual in the economy 
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selects, for each group he belongs to, his Kantian contribution to 
the public good, where the latter is computed as in Laffont (that 
is, on the basis of the hypothesis that everybody else in the 
group would contribute the same°absolute-amount that the Kantian 
individual-, --decides to contribute). - The Kantian contribution 
represents the maximum amount that each individual would perceive 
asamorally right to contribute in each group he belongs to. How 
much of this maximum amount an-individual--will actually provide 
depends-on the behaviour'of-the other "individuals composing the 
group through mechanisms of reciprocity. Sugden assumes that in 
each group each individual will feel obligated to contribute 
--i. e. to "reciprocate"-- at least,; the smallest contribution 
provided by any other individual-in'the group. In turn, a "group" 
is defined as any possible coalition which can be formed from the 
original group of contributors, including-the singleton groups 
formed by each individual alone.:, 
'The- argument offered by Sugden 1n- support of his 
formalization is based on-an hypothesis-of "practical morality". 
Assuming that an individual always acts as a Kantian would seem to 
require too much for the"morality of the, typical individual and 
would probably be also 'ethically disputable. However, assuming 
that an individual would-feel obliged to pay for the public good 
if everybody else in the-group-of contributors' did the same is 
certainly a much less stringent requirement. And this is 
particularly true if one assumes, -as Sugden does, that each 
individual feels obliged to provide, in each' single group he 
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belongs to, -only the smallest contribution provided in that group. 
The results that Sugden obtains in his model are indeed 
remarkable. In general, the model will be characterized by 
multiple Nash equilibria. All of them but one, would entail a 
larger provision-of the public good than selfishness. On the other 
hand, unless individuals are identical. each equilibrium will be 
characterized by-undersupply of the public good. Thus, Sugden's 
model is consistent with the empirical evidence which shows a 
positive (even if smaller than predicted by traditional theory) 
amount of free-rider behaviour (see above). Second, his model 
predicts matching behaviour on the part of the- individuals. Thus 
Sugden's model is not affected by most of the invariance 
properties of the Nash contribution model summarized in the 
previous sections. - I 
Sugden's model thus constitutes a very important starting 
point for the elaboration of an alternative theory- of voluntary 
provision of public goods. Despite this, several criticisms could 
be-raised against his formalization' of ethical behaviour. First, 
his interpretation of the Kantian rule, as Laffont's, does not 
take into account the differences in, "ability to pay" of the 
different individuals. This is a serious weakness in a theory 
based on the hypothesis that individuals are ruled by notions of 
fairness. Second, his definition of group is also not convincing 
in the context of his analysis. In the -real world the groups 
toward which an individual may have feelings of belonging or 
reciprocity are likely to be exogenous to the analysis and surely 
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do not coincide with the notion of coalition in game theory. 
Third, his way of modeling reciprocity rules is also open to 
question. In his model, each individual is obliged to provide only 
the smallest contribution provided by everybody else in the group. 
But-this-would imply that if in a group to which individual i 
belongs. one individual provides zero while everybody else 
provides large positive quantities to the public good, individual 
i would feel obligated only to provide zero. This sounds strange; 
it looks more reasonable to assume that the contribution that each 
individual would feel obligated to offer is some function of the 
total, contribution of everybody else in the group75. These and 
other related issues will be taken up in the following chapters. 
Summing up, among the many alternatives that we discussed in 
this chapter. the abandonment of the assumption of individualistic 
maximizing behaviour in favor of a notion of ethical behaviour 
seems to be the one which offers the most promising results in 
terms of both intuition and empirical evidence. Most work remains 
however to be done in this exciting but largely unexplored area. 
In the next two chapters we will attempt to offer a contribution 
to this line of inquiry, building on the work by Laffont (1975) 
and Sugden (1984). 
75 I have considered this issue elsewhere; see Bordignon (1987). 
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II. 9 Conclusions 
In this chapter we reviewed the basic Nash contribution model 
for private provision of. public goods. It was shown that this 
model produces results which are largely at odds with the 
empirical and experimental evidence on voluntary provision of 
public goods. We then-discussed in detail several attempts made in 
the literature to either abandon altogether or to modify 
substantially the traditional model. We concluded that the attempt 
of relaxing the assumption of selfishness in favour of a notion of 
ethical behaviour appears to be the most promising research 
strategy. In the next two chapters we will offer a contribution to 
this line of inquiry. 
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Chapter III 
Was Kant Right? The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods under the 
Principle of Unconditional Commitment 
Table III. 1 List of Symbols used in Chapter III and Chapter IV 
n- number of individuals in the economy indexed by t, 
t-1... n ; 
Q- total quantity of public good; 
y. = private good consumed by individual I; 
I. - exogenous Income of individual i; 
L 
qt = individual i's contribution to the public good; 
Uff' - utility function for individual 1; 
PL- UQ/U' - marginal rate of substitution between private and 
public good for individual I; 
Q'/n - individual i's contribution under the FKR; 
y IL- Q/n - i's private good consumption under the FKR; 
Qm -Z QL/n - total contribution under the FKR; 
I FI. /n - average income; L 
a. = i's preference for the public good; 
a= ia. /n - average preference; o, 
q optimal contribution selected by individual i for 
Individual j when I behaves according to the 
SKR; 
Ziqj - total public good supply selected by individual 
I when he behaves according to the SKR; 
y` = I. -qL = optimal amount of private good consumption selected 
by individual I when he behaves according to the SKR; 
q` - max (O, qt) actual contribution of individual i under the SKR; 
- I--q. = actual consumption of"the private good by individual 
I when he behaves according to the SKR; 
Q-Zq. - total contribution under the SKR; L 
° Q= efficient level of public good supply. 
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Chapter III Was Kant Right? 
III. 1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we critically reviewed the recent 
literature on private provision of public goods. We ended up 
suggesting that abandoning the hypothesis of selfish behaviour in 
favour of a notion of ethical behaviour may offer an important 
starting point for a more adequate formulation of the theory. In 
this and in the next chapter we will attempt to offer a 
contribution to this line of research. 
In this chapter, in particular, we address a question which. 
surprisingly enough, has never been addressed directly in the 
literature. Suppose that people do behave in a context of 
voluntary provision of a public good according to some notion of 
ethical behaviour: would then the public good be 'provided at an 
efficient level? And, if this is not the case, would it tend to be 
over or under provided? And how would this compare with the 
traditional theories put forward to explain public good provision 
such as Cournot-Nash behaviour, Median voter theory, and Lindahl 
equilibrium ? 
As the results could differ under different ethical rules we 
preferred to reformulate the quest1 n as follows. Suppose that 
among the set of all the possible rules of morality that 
individuals could follow in providing a 'public good we consider 
only the subset of "realistic" rules of behaviour, where realism 
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is referred to the amount of information that an individual could 
reasonably possess. Suppose further that among the last subset we 
select the rule which most strongly constrains behaviour in a 
group-concerned way: is this-rule able to guarantee an efficient 
provision of the public good? 
The main 'result which emerges from the analytic work 
developed in-this, chapter is that private provision of the public 
good is in general`. inefficient even if individuals are constrained 
by such a strong ethical rule as Kantian behaviour. Only if 
individual preferences have some very peculiar structure and/or if 
income is equally distributed across the, population is Kantian 
behaviour efficient. -This,, result casts serious doubts on the 
possibility of private-provision of public goods to. be efficient 
without public intervention. However, market failures are not a 
sufficient condition for public provision unless it is'shown that 
governments can do better. The next chapter addresses, this last 
issue more in depth comparing, Kantian'behaviour with -alternative 
models of public good supply. 
The present chapter is organized as follows. - In section 
111.2', we present and try to -justify our choice of Kantian 
behaviour as one of the strongest rules of fairness individuals 
could reasonably follow in providing a public good. In section 
111.3, we offer two different interpretations of the Kantian rule, 
according, to whether such a rule is interpreted in a'absolute" or 
in'a "relative" sense. In section III. 4, the likelihood of the 
first Kantian rule to produce the public- good efficiently is 
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studied in the general case and by means of particular 
parameterizations of individual preferences. In section 111.5, we 
perform the same analysis for the second Kantian rule and we also 
investigate the links between the performance of the two rules. A 
number of interesting results are obtained which are summarized 
and discussed further in section III. 6. Finally, in the Appendix 
we compare Kantian and selfish contribution by an individual by 
means of a simple parameterization. 
III2 2 The-Principle of Unconditional Commitment 
As stressed in the previous chapter, casual observation and 
empirical results suggest that people-do not, behave, "in a context 
of voluntary provision of' public goods, (henceforth VPPG), 
according to the naive, conception -of, rational egoism that 
economists employ: This observation. however, begs the question: 
ifspeople do°not behave according to selfishness how do they 
behave? In the final section, of the previous chapter, ' commenting 
on Sugden (1984), we suggested that a notion of Kantian behaviour. 
weakened by reciprocity rules; ' may represent an useful 
approximation to individual behaviour, In this chapter, ' however, 
we want to restrict our attention to a , rule of behaviour which'is. 
on'°one hand. realistic enough to 'be actually followed by 
Individuals, at least in some (admittedly extreme) circumstances, 
and, on the other hand, strong enough to be considered a benchmark 
of group oriented behaviour. We wish to suggest that the Kantian 
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rule, or categorical imperative, has much to be said for it as 
such a rule. 
In his "Fundamental Principles of the Methaphysic of Morals". 
Kant states the "supreme" principle of morality-as follows: "Act 
as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a 
Universal Lawof Nature". In modern words. an act is morally good 
if and only if the agent who performs it could will its maxim to 
have the same necessity of a Law of Nature i. e. if the agent could 
will that everybody else in the same circumstances would do the 
same thing on the basis of the same principle. 
For our aim and following the literature quoted in the last 
chapter. we will vulgarize this principle restating It as saying 
"Act always in such a way as you would like everybody else to do 
in the same circumstances". This is a vulgarization. because what 
an agent "could will" in Kant is just what the "rational man could 
will". while in our (and others') formulation an agent would 
always act as he-would prefer everybody else acted in the same 
circumstances. While this formulation is open to Sens' criticism 
on the distinction between choices and preferences (sen, 1973), we 
believe that it is closer to actual'behaviour than the original 
Kantian rule would be, 'especlally"when one consider the difficulty 
of assessing what the "rational man could will". Furthermore, this 
vulgarization has the additional advantage in limiting the level 
of Information-needed, to- implement- the, Kantian rule for each 
individual to the knowledge of his own preferences (see below). 
t 
Thus, in our formulation, the Kantian rule is a very simple 
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and general rule of behaviour, so much that it can be found, in 
slightly different forms, in many different ethical systems But 
it is also a very strong rule and it is hard to believe that 
people, actually follow it In day-by-day life. However, as 
suggested in chapter I. in the context of VPPG, where the 
interaction among agents is public information, people may at 
least think according to it --in the sense that this is how they 
feel they ought to behave-- and they may also act according to 
it. if they perceive that everybody else is doing likewise2. In 
what fo'llows we will instead assume that people always act 
according to the Kantian principle, regardless what everybody else 
is, doing. In this sense, the Kantian principle imposes more 
constraint on individual behaviour than other notions of 
"fairness" with a more distinct sociological flavour (such as for 
example concepts of fairness based on notions of "reciprocity" or 
"reputation"; see the references quoted in the previous chapter) 
in so much as its validity is independent (unconditional) of other 
behaviour. This is unlikely to be realistic but it strengthens our 
previous point that Kantian behaviour represents aw benchmark of 
group oriented behaviour. This is also confirmed by the fact that, 
as is well known in the literature (see Collard, 1978), and as we 
1 Consider, for example, the Bible: "All things whatsoever ye 
would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for 
this is the law and the prophets"; Matthew, 7: 12 and the more 
prudential Confucius: "What you do not want done to yourself, 
do not do to others" Anaclets . 
2This is indeed the interpretation suggested by'Sugden (1984). See 
previous chapter. 
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will also show in the next section, in the interpretation given 
above Kantian behaviour is formally, if not logically, equivalent 
to an extreme form of altruism. 
Thus, the Kantian rule seems to have the characteristics that 
we indicated as desirable for our exercise. It is simple and 
realistic' enough to be considered as actually influencing 
behaviour, at least in some circumstances, and it is strong enough 
to subsume other` conceivable rules of fairness and altruism. 
Therefore, we feel authorized to perform our exercise on its 
basis. 
The problem is how to translate it into a norm of action for 
1ndividuals°'sharing the, -benefits of. a public good. Clearly. 
everything depends on how we interpret the word "action" in our 
previous statement of the rule. If we take it as meaning the 
"absolute" level of contribution, the Kantian rule simply becomes 
"provide as much as you would like everybody else to provide to 
the public good". This interpretation, relatively straightforward, 
is indeed the' one chosen by Laffont (1975) in his seminal 
contribution on Kantian behaviour. However, as we argued in 
chapter'II, this interpretation overlooks the differences in the 
ability'to pay of the different individuals. It seems rather 
unlikely to suppose that in performing the mental exercise that he 
needs in order to'compute his Kantian contribution, an individual 
would not take in account his relative position in the income 
distribution. Thus-, a second interpretation of the -word "action" 
could'be in terms of "the relative amount of contribution" and the 
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rule could become "provide -always as much as you would like 
everybody else to do relative to their income capabilities". 
Note, however, that an analysis of the second interpretation 
of the rule does not rule out the interest of analyzing the first 
rule as well, since there may be cases where income differences 
are either not relevant or are not considered as such by 
individuals in-determining-their level of contribution. Examples 
of the latter case maybe in terms of voluntary provision of time, 
or. blood, -in, contrast with money, to charities (see Titmuss, 
1971). 
111.3 A formal approach to the principle of unconditional 
commitment: first and second Kantian rule 
In order to formalize our Kantian rules we have first to 
describe the economy where we wish to carry on our analysis. For 
simplicity, we will work with the simplified economy which is 
customary to analyze in the public. good. literature and that we 
already-discussed in. the previous chapter. This will also allow us 
to compare our results with the traditional, results presented in 
the literature. , 
Thus., consider an economy with only two goods, y,, a private 
good. where i indicates the individual who consumes it, and a 
(pure) public . good,. Q. Let n be the number of 
individuals 
composing the society, where i=1... n. Again only for simplicity 
suppose further,. that the public good. is only privately supplied 
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and let the production function of the public good be linear and 
additive in individual contributions: 
i 
where q. is the contribution of individual 1. We impose the 
obvious constraint that q. 0, VI. Also, let the preferences of 
individual i be represented by. a'strictly quasi-concave-and three 
times differentiable utility function. -Ut. 
(2) U't' - U''(Y., Q) 
11 and let the budget constraint for each individual i be given 
by 
(3ý IL ° YL + QL 
where i., the income, is exogenously given and where the unit 
of measurement of the individual contribution is selected sous to 
make the (constant) marginal rate of transformation between the 
two goods equal-to unity. We are then ready to introduce our two 
Kantian rules. 
111.3.1 First Kantian Rule - 
The first Kantian rule (henceforth FKR) is easily formalized 
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once it is recognized that the statement "provide the absolute 
amount of contribution that you 'would like everybody else to 
provide" is equivalent to the statement "select an amount of 
contribution on the basis of the hypothesis that everybody 'else 
will provide what you decide to provide". In the context of our 
model this would imply that individual i'solves his optimization 
problem by assuming that Q-nq. Substituting the latter expression 
in (3). substituting for"the budget constraint in the utility 
function, and indicating with Qt the total amount of the public 
good that individual 'i would -like everybody to enjoy, i's 
optimization problem can be written as 
(4) max Ut (I. - i/n Q. ' . Q. ) 
QL 
Equation (4) then'shows that under the FKR each individual 
behaves as if he faced an implicit price for the public-good equal 
to s/n. This is , so because- when acting `as a Kant'ian each 
individual acts as if he 'expected everybody else to match 
completely his contribution. As a consequence the amount of 
private good'that each individual must give up for an extra `unit 
of the public good is simply'sin. 
The assumption of strict - quasi-concavity of the utility 
function entails that Q, the optimal choice of Qt in (4). is 
unique. The principle of unconditional commitment then imposes 
upon individual i the obligation to supply Qt /n, regardless of 
what everybody else is doing. If everybody acts according to the 
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FKR. total provision of the public good is then Q*= ZQ*/n. For 
future reference (see chapter IV) note that the FKR introduces a 
wedge between the price used "by individuals to reach their 
decision and the price that they actually pay for. the public good. 
While ex-ante each individual selects his contribution as if he 
faced a price of sin, ex-post the price that he pays is Q*L/ZQL . 
111.3.2 Second Kantian Rule 
According to the second Interpretation of the principle of 
unconditional commitment. individual I selects his contribution on 
the basis of the hypothesis that everybody else provides what i 
would like them to provide, taking into account the differences in 
income across individuals. The most natural way to formalize this 
idea is by"assuming that Individual 1 maximizes a function of 
utility functions by selecting a different amount of contribution 
for each individual, according to the---income endowment of°, the 
latter. The fact that individual I assumes that everybody, else 
provides what i himself would like them to provide- can be 
formalized by supposing-that individual I lends his preferences to 
everybody else: that is, - by assuming=; that in performing his 
optimizing exercise i acts as if everybody else had i's own 
preferences but their true income. This also answers our 
requirement of informational realistic rules of behaviour. In 
fact, while income differences can be observed or more or less 
correctly inferred, the preferences of the other individuals are 
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0 
in-general unknown-and it is hard to see how our individual. 
however ethically motivated. could come to get this information. 
In the following we assume instead that income distribution is 
costlessly-and correctly observable by each individual composing 
the society. 
Let us therefore model individual is behaviour under the 
second Kantian-rule (henceforth SKR), as if he maximized a sort of 
personal "welfare function" where each individual has i's own 
preferences but their true income;. selecting the . utilitarian 
3 
formulation for simplicity. Individual i solves 
(5) max Ej Uff' (Iý- qý" . Zq 
g1.. qn 
Let us call q the amount of contribution by individual j 
which solves (5), where j-s... n. 
Note that we have. not allowed in (5), individual i to consider 
the, non-negativity constraint imposed on each individual 
contribution. This is so because in (5) individual I is involved 
in an ethical choice and it seems natural to allow him the maximum 
freedom (i. e. the possibility of income transfers across 
individuals) in deciding what ought to be a fair contribution from 
---------------- --------- -- 
3As is easy to check any other welfare function would produce- the 
same result as long as the social weight imposed on each 
individual were the'same'. This last condition is clearly implicit 
in the symmetry of the principle of the categorical imperative. 
Also note that,, as we argued above, In the formalization of eq. 5 
Kantian behaviour coincides with an extreme form of paternalistic 
altruism, where each individual treats everybody else as he treats 
himself. 
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qý 0, for some each individual. As a result it may happen that 
j'(see below). However, even if in solving (5) i selects a 
contribution for each individual composing the community, it 
should'be recalled that this is just a mental exercise used by i 
to compute his Kantian contribution. qt; and the latter 'is the 
only one which is relevant for our discourse. Thus we may have a 
problem only if qt Is negative. '"Since"Individual i has no way, in 
a market economy, to enforce a transfer in his favor we assume 
that in this case his actual contribution to the public good would 
be simply zero. We can then write the actual contribution of 
individual i to the public good under the SKR, let us call it q., 
as qt'=max(q'', O). Clearly, If everybody behaves according to the 
second Kantian rule, total public good supply will be Q-Eq 
Since our rationale for considering two different Kantian 
rules is only based on the existence of income differences across 
individuals it would be very convenientYif the two rules coincided 
in absence of income differences. This is indeed the case. 
Result 1 "Let Iti= I 'Y i. Then qL = Q/n 
Proof. See below. 
t 
Result 1 then shows that the SKR is really 'a generalization 
of the FKR. If income were equally distributed, each individual 
would provide exactly the same amount under both the rules. 
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III. 4-Voluntary provision of public goods under the principle of 
unconditional commitment 
Suppose now that in an economy like the one described above 
all, individuals acted according to the first or alternatively the 
second Kantian rule. Would public good provision be efficient? Let 
us. consider the, two rules in turn. Commence with the first rule. 
111.4.1 FKR and public good provision: 
According to the FKR, each individual i selects Q on the 
basis of the following formula: 
(5) Pt (IL- Q'/n . Q*) 1/n 
where Pt UQ/Uy Is the marginal, rate of substitution, 
Assessment of efficiency or-inefficlency of public good provision 
requires one to evaluate the summation of the, marginal rates of 
substitution 'across. all individuals, - each evaluated at 
(I--'Q/n ;Q) for each 1, and compare it with the marginal rate 
of transformation between the two goods. Calling the Pareto 
efficient level of public good provision Q° and using (5) we can 
then write the condition for efficiency as follows': 
(6) Q0 -Qiff EP` (I Q /n . Q. ) EPA' (Iti- Qý /n Q* ) 
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There are two trivial cases where (6) must necessarily hold. 
The first is when each individual is characterized by the same 
income and preferences. In this case, as it is easy to verify 
Q*-Q* di and the RHS and the LHS of (6) coincide for each element 
of the summation. Of course, this'case is'of no interest because 
in general individuals differ 'both in terms of income and 
preferences. The second case where (6) must necessarily hold is 
when each individual's demand for the private good is 
characterized by zero income elasticity. In this case in fact. 
each marginal rate of substitution is independent of the amount of 
public good supplied and again the RHS and the LHS of (6) 
coincide for each element in the summation. Clearly, the empirical 
relevance of this second case depends on the interpretation that 
we give to the private good in our model. If we attribute it the 
natural interpretation of representing private consumption, the 
case of zero income elasticity for the private good is clearly 
very unrealistic (see chapter II). 
Beyond the special cases above it is clearly unlikely that 
condition (6) holds for unspecified utility functions. This fact 
alone shows-that Kantian behaviour will in general be inefficient. 
However, we would like to be able to say something more about 
Kantian provision. in particular, we would like to know if Kantian 
behaviour will tend to bring about over or under provision of the 
public--. good and to-identify the conditions under which this will 
occur. This, would require us to be able to infer something about 
over or under provision of the public good when'the summation of 
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the marginal rates of substitution differs from the marginal rate 
of transformation. As we noted in chapter II. strictly speaking, 
this is not generally possible because Q° itself is in general a 
function of the income distribution across individuals. Therefore 
if we move from QQ0 will also change in a direction which will 
depend on how we share the extra burden of the public good across 
individuals. 
There are, however special senses in which we can dare express 
assessments on optimal quantities by examination of the optimality 
conditions. Inthe next chapter, (see section 3) we offer a novel 
way to infer over/under provision of the public good by 
examination of the, sum of the marginal. rates of substitution. In 
this chapter we content ourselves with noting the following. 
Suppose that. each Pt(. )_is characterized by the propriety that a 
small increase in the contribution to the public good by any 
individual --including individual i-- would make each Pt (. ) fall. 
Then If ZP' (I Qti/n. Q )>1, (<1) and' if we . 
increase (decrease) 
slightly the contribution of each individual the sum of the 
marginal rates of substitution will get closer to the marginal 
rate of transformation thus reducing the extent of inefficiency. 
Indeed, if each marginal rate of substitution is everywhere 
characterized by, the propriety above and we keep increasing 
(decreasing) the contribution of each individual we must 
eventually end up with an efficient level of public good supply, 
Q°, where Q0 >Q* (Q°<Q*) . Therefore. If' each P' (. ) has the 
property discussed above, we can talk of Q* as over provided if 
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EP (I, - Q, /n. Q*)d and of Qe as under provided if 
EPL(I 
tii- 
Q. /n, Qm)>14 
As can be easily verified by considering a small change in 
the contribution of an individual 1, a sufficient but not 
necessary condition for Pti(. ) to be 'decreasing in qL is that PQ <0 
and P>0 , Vi. This condition is strictly tied up with the income Y 
derivative of the demands for the two goods; in particular, if 
P>0 everywhere the demand for the public good by individual i 
Y 
will be everywhere an increasing function of income and similarly, 
if PQ<O the demand for the private good will be everywhere an 
increasing function, of income. Thus our condition of decreasing 
marginal rates of substitution really requires only income 
normality of both goods and for the reasons stressed in the 
chapter II this is quite a mild assumption to impose. Unless 
otherwise stated, we will then always assume in what follows that 
both goods are normal goods. 
Let us now enquire into the issue of over/under provision of 
the public good under the FKR. We begin with 'a very general case 
and subsequently we will consider some simple parameterizations of 
the utility functions. 
111.4.2; a general case 
.0 
4It 
must be noted however that we are here talking of over or 
under provision only in a very special sense. In particular If we 
actually performed such an increase the change would not be In 
general Pareto improving: some individuals would be made worse off 
as a consequence of the change. 
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In : -this section we will address the problem of 
efficiency/inefficiency of Kantian provision in a very general 
setting. This will allow us to identify the factors which are 
likely to be important in determining the direction and the extent 
of-inefficiency in public good provision under the FKR. In later 
sections we will provide some economic intuition for the results 
obtained in this section. To this purpose suppose that each 
individual utility function can be written as 
(7) Ut(Y.. Q) -- U(ai. Yt. Q) , 
where a. is azparameter which captures the difference in 
preferences for the public good across the individuals. We assume 
that the parameter a is distributed continuously and that the 
utility function; is differentiable. at any required order in a. As 
in the previous section, income is given exogenously and is 
allowed to vary across individuals. In general terms, we can then 
write the marginal rate of substitution as a function of the three 
parameters a, I, Q 
(8) P= P(a . I. Q) 
We assume that Pa>0 -- i. e. that the larger is a the stronger 
are the preferences for the public good-- and following our 
previous discussion that Pa<0. Note that if we keep the total 
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supply of the public'good constant a small increase in income is 
equivalent to a small increase in the private good. Thus, by 
assuming normality of the public good we can also sign the last 
-partial derivative in (8), as PI>0. 
If each individual i behaves according to the FKR he will 
'select'his-`optimal contribution Q/, n by equalizing PL to iin. It 
must'therefore be identically true that 
iinQ(I.. ai). Q(It*cz )) ° sin 
where Qi-Q(IL. (xti). Consider now the individual characterized 
by average income I and average preference a and let Q represent 
.... his optimal choice. Using (9) and (6) we can then state : Q° Quas 
X>0 where 
c 
(10) X EP(a,. IL0Q*) - nP(a, I. Q) 
Suppose now that the differences (a. -(%) and (II) are for 
each i sufficiently small. We can then approximate the differences 
P(at, IL, Q*)-P(a, I. Q) as'a second order Taylor expansion around the 
point (a, I, Q). Doing this and using the fact that 
i(a. -a)-Z(It-I)-0 we can rewrite (10) as 
(11) X. nPQ(Q*-Q)+iizP i(a. -a)z+1izPZ1E(I-I)z+sizPQQ(Q*-Q)z+ 
PiaZ(ati-a)(It-I) 
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Equation (11) then indicates, --to the second order of 
approximation-- the factors which are likely to matter in 
determining over/under provision, of the-public good. The sign of 
the first term in the approximation depends on the 
-concavity/convexity, of the demand for the public good in income 
and preferences which in turn depends on the concavity/convexity 
of the marginal. rate of. substitution in the three parameters 
above (see below).. The second term in the expansion captures both 
the concavity/convexity of the marginal rate of substitution and 
the variance and the covariance of the distribution of income and 
preferences across the population. For example, if richer people 
have also stronger preferences for the public good the term 
E(ati-a)(IL-I) will be positive; negative in the opposite case. 
Some important cases can be obtained as special cases of (11). For 
example, the case of identical preferences can be easily obtained 
by imposing (aL-ä)-0 in (11). 
However, (11) also shows that very little can be said on 
public good provision under the FKR in the general case. Some 
extra structure on preferences must be imposed if we want to 
derive interesting results. This is what we are going to do in the 
next sections. For future reference let us however state: 
Result 2 "At the first order of approximation the public good 
under the FKR will be under provided (over provided) if P(. ) is 
concave (convex) in (a, I, Q)" 
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Proof "Suppose P is concave in (a, I, Q): then 
P(a, I, Q*) ? sinZP(c. , IL, Q) - P(a, I, Q) 
which Implies by normality of the private good Q*_< Q. QED" 
III. 4.3 Additive Utility Function 
In this section we assume that each individual utility 
function has the form: 
'' Q 
s-(3 
(12) ü-fy (yti )+ aý 
--- 
t-- 
-- 
s-(3 
where I only impose the conditions that fy >0 and fyy < 0. 
V. and (b0. These conditions guarantee normality of both goods for 
each individual. The parameterization in (12) implies that each 
individual has the same constant elasticity of marginal utility of 
the public good. However, note that the presence of a parameter a 
and the possibility allowed to the function f() to vary across 
individuals, allows quite a large amount of differences in 
individual preferences. 
Computing the first order conditions for choice of Q* by an 
individual i we get 
Q 
(13) 
ay--t 
-- 
1-- di 
n 
fy (Y1 ) 
where yy- Iti - iinQ.. We are interested in the value of 
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a Q lw-p 
(14) EPL(Y*. Ql) E --L------ 
fy ýY; ) 
Solving (13) for fy(yL), substituting in (14) and rearranging 
we get 
(15) ZPt (Y*. Q*) >1 as sin F(QWQ 
O M! Q 9k 
Thus Q >Q if (bi and Q <Q if (3<1. Usual estimations for the 
parameter 13 (for private goods) gives values between 1 and 2 (see 
Stern, 1973). If these results could be extended to public goods 
they would then imply a clear tendency toward under provision of 
the public good. 
111.4.4 Identical and Homothetic Preferences 
Assume that each indlvidual`l is characterized by identical 
and homothetic preferences. Then it has to be true that for each i 
sinQ. 
L (16) ----------- k 
QL 
I. e. the ratio of the two goods selected by each individual 
must be equal to the same constant k. Hence substituting for the 
budget constraint and solving for iinQ. 
ti 
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F 7-7- 
1- 
C, AR C. JrRA 
I QL. 
n nk +s 
Summing over the n individuals 
EIS 
(18) Q ---- - 
nk +1 
Now. consider the individual with the average income and call 
with Q the total amount of public good provision selected by this 
individual according to the FKR. From (16) 
ý19ý Qn 
EI Ei 
Q 
------- ---t- 
m 
----tom 
_ 
nk +sn nk +i 
i. e. the average individual is decisive in the sense that the 
amount of public good that he would choose for the collectivity 
is the amount which is actually supplied by the collectivity. For 
future reference we can then state 
Result 3 "Suppose that each individual is characterized by the 
same homothetic preferences and that everybody acts according to 
the FKR. Then the total amount of public good supplied equals the 
amount of public good selected by the individual endowed with 
average income" 
Using (19) and the budget constraint for each individual, we 
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can write the first order condition for the average individual as 
(20) P(_s E(Iý-_1_QL), Q) 
-1- nnn 
Efficiency in public good provision would then require 
(21) '7 EP(Iti-_1_Qti . Q) 
nnn 
i. e. if-the marginal rate of substitution of the average 
individual. evaluated at Q, is equal to the average of the 
marginal rates of substitution, evaluated at Q, public good 
provision under-the FKR is efficient. As the sharp reader will 
have surely recognized, this is just a special case of Bowen's 
theorem where the "average voter" takes the place of the "median 
voter" (see Bergstrom, 1979). In the next chapter we will discuss 
in details the links between Kantian provision and the median 
voter theorem. For the moment note that from (21) we can write 
(22) Q> Q° as P(_1 EYt . Q) > EP(Yt PQ)A 
T 
where as above yt (Iý-_i_QL). Then if the marginal rate of 
n 
substitution is concave/convex in the private good, Kantian 
behäviour will be characterized by over/under provision of the 
public good. As is easy to check this is exactly the result that 
we should have expected from (11), evaluating it at Q-Q and at 
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a a. However, there are important differences between (11) and 
ti 
(22). First, (11) is only valid for very small differences in 
income distribution while (22) holds everywhere. Second, 
differently from (11), (22) does not require the marginal rate of 
substitution to be differentiable. Third, and more importantly, 
(22) allows us an easy interpretation of the economic conditions 
lying behind over/under provision of the public good. 
In fact, if we assume a constant elasticity of substitution 
between the two goods, the marginal rate of substitution, for some 
admissible transformation of the utility function, must take the 
p-1 
form (Q/y) , where p is the parameter in the utility function. 
It 'is then clear that Q> Q°as p>0 or equivalently Q Q° as 
> 1, where c indicates the elasticity of substitution between 
the two goods. This result would also suggest, as the previous 
one, that the public good would tend to be under provided under 
the FKR. This is so because we would expect quite a low elasticity 
of substitution between the public good and private goods taken as 
a whole. since they are typically quite different types of goods. 
This concludes our analysis of the FKR. Summarizing we saw 
that Kantian behaviour will in general tend to produce the public 
good at an inefficient level, at least as long as both goods are 
normal goods. It is unfortunately difficult to obtain general 
results. on the direction of the inefficiency but the examples 
that we considered seem to suggest that the public good will tend 
to be under provided under the FKR. Let us then move to the SKR. 
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111.5 Public Good Provision under the Second Kantian Rule 
Suppose that in an economy as the one described above each 
individual behaves according to the , second 
Kantian rule. Would 
then the public good be provided at an efficient level? The key 
result needed to answer this question is summarized in the next 
theorem. 
Result 4. "Let Q`- ýq represent the total amount of public good 
that individual i would select for the community if he acted 
according to the SKR. Then: 
max Q) 
Q 
4. b qj= Qt/n + (Iý-I) 
,ý 
Proof "Consider the first order conditions for the solution of 
problem (5). Written in-full and evaluated at the optimal choices. 
ZUG`(Q`, I- Qý)=U'(Q;, Ii-4i) 
(23) 
Q 
Since'the LHS in (23) is the same for each of the n rows It 
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follows that 
``sqg)-Uy(Q`. It-qt) d s. t. e n, which entails 
(Is- qs) a (It- qt) - yti ds, t en 
where yt represents the common level of the private good 
selected by individual i for each member of the community. Using 
(1) and (3). 
(24) Q`- EIL-nyi, 
dividing (24) by n and rearranging 
(25) 
Selecting the iah row in (23) and evaluating it at the 
optimal choices 
nu (Qt, -sýnQt) =Uý (Qt ,I -sinQý' ) 
which are the first order conditions for the problem 
max U (I - sinQ, Q) 
Q 
This proves 4. a. Now note that each individual contribution 
must be such that 
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(26) Q Vj . j-l... n 
Substituting (26) in (25)and solving for qj 
qt - iinQ+ (I. - I). "QED. 
Result (4) then shows that Kantlan behaviour under the second 
Kantian rule can really be thought as a two stage maximizing 
process. At the first stage each individual I selects an optimal 
level'of public good supply and a single level of private good 
consumption as if he were endowed with average income and as if he 
were facing a price for the public good equal to sin. In the 
second step individual I 'selects a different contribution for each 
individual, including himself, so as to equalize the consumption 
of the private good across'the individuals. 
The extreme form of "egalitarism" implied by the SKR may seem 
excessive even for an ethical rule of behaviour. Few of us, I 
suppose, however ethically motivated, would consider as "just" a 
resource distribution perfectly egalitarian across individuals. It 
should however be realized that we are here considering a very 
special type of economy, a timeless economy where income is not 
produced but is, so to say, obtained as a gift from heaven. 
Without of course willing to defend the realism of the Kantian 
rules, it is my opinion that In such an economy a perfect 
egalitarian distribution of resources has some claim for being 
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considered as the just distribution. 
From a normative viewpoint, the only serious objections to 
income equalization derive from those conceptions of distributive 
justice which: insist on the fact that income is produced by 
individuals through effort and pain and that an individual should 
have a special right to command power over those resources that he 
himself has contributed to creating. Similarly, in other 
conceptions, such as the procedural approach to justice (see 
Nozick, 1973). the ethical claim to complete resource equalization 
is rejected because it does not take in account the fact that the 
present income distribution is the result of an historical process 
where- resources have been exchanged and transferred among 
individuals following commonly agreed.. rules of property and 
exchange. This is not of course the place to discuss these 
concepts of distributive justice. I do however believe that 
similar arguments,.., more or less consciously formulated, lie at the 
bottom of the instinctive repulse that, many people feel for a 
complete equalization of resources. This raises the issue of, a 
convincing formulation of ethical rules of behaviour for more 
realistic economies (see next chapter) but it also strengthens our 
point that for the economy that we are considering in this paper 
5 
our way of formalizing Kantlan behaviour is quite adequate. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Also note that the SKR produces from this point of view results 
similar to the traditional Nash contribution model. As is shown in 
the previous chapter, individuals characterized by identical 
preferences and different incomes would contribute to the public 
good so as to equalize private consumption across 
individuals. 
118 
Result 4 allows us to clarify the links existing between the 
first and the second Xantian rule. For example, the economic 
rationale behind result1 becomes immediately obvious. If income 
is equally distributed. each individual really faces the same 
problem when acting according to the first or the second rule and 
this explains the identity of choices in the two cases. However, 
when income- is not equally- distributed there are important 
differences between the two rules in terms of efficiency in public 
good provision as-the next result illustrates. 
Result 5 "Suppose that each individual is characterized -by the 
same preferences. -Then if q? 0 Vi, public good provision under the 
SKR is efficient. If q`<O some i, public good under -the' SKR !s 
over provided. " ` 
Proof "If everybody has'the same preferences the problem in (23) 
is the`same for each Individual. ' This entails `-qL Yi, j which 
also Implies- QL. Q and yL'y VI' j. Then if quo Yi, 
qt-max(O, gL)=q' which entails Q-Zqt and yt-lti-qt-y -y Vi. 
Selecting any row in (23) and evaluating it at the optimal choices 
(Q. y)" 
Zp(Q. y)=nP(Q. y)al 
and public good provision is efficient. If q''<O some i, q, -0; i. e. LL 
individual i will provide more than it would be optimal for him to 
provide while everybody else will provide exactly the optimal 
quantity; then public good is over provided. "QED 
: 29 
Thus, in contrast with the FKR, identity of preferences is 
sufficient to. guarantee efficiency under the SKR if the 
non-negativity constraint on individual contributions is not 
binding. The result is in a way obvious. Under the SKR each 
individual behaves. as if he had average income and, if the 
non-negativity constraint does not bind, with identical 
preferences we, really-have a community of identical individuals 
each, of-whom faces a price of, sin , for the public good. The 
efficiency result is then immediate. 
The crucial condition is ofýcourse that the . non-negativity 
constraint must be non-binding for each individual. The likelihood 
of this condition to occur depends mainly on- the. extent of the 
inequality in income distribution-across individuals. If such an 
inequality is very small we should expect it to hold while it will 
surely not hold if this inequality- is large. It would be 
interesting to enquire into the size of inequality In income 
distribution which is just compatible with a q`>O for each I. But 
it, isýalso clear that we should not expect general results on this 
ground since qti is also a function of the preferences 'for the 
public good. In order to get an intuition about the size of the 
inequality in income distribution which is compatible with a q"? 0 
for each I we have then preferred to address this question by 
means-of a simple parameterization-of the utility function. The 
results are -presented in the appendix to this chapter. 
Anticipating the latter here, our simple parameterization suggests 
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that for realistic values in income inequality the poorest members 
in the society would surely not pay voluntarily for the public 
good. This is in a way interesting because it shows that the 
decision not to pay for the public good may well be the result of 
an ethical -choice rather than the result of mere selfish 
preferences. Indeed, as we also show in the appendix, a poor 
individual who acted on the basis of the SKR might well decide to 
provide less towards the public good than he would do if he acted 
on the basis of mere, selfishness. This simple result, that I 
believe to be. interesting in its own, is at the basis of the 
fairness approach to income tax evasion which is presented in the 
second part of the present work. 
Let us consider result 5 again. It seems to suggest a better 
performance of the SKR in efficiency terms than the FKR, exactly 
because the former introduces a redistribution of the burden of 
. the public good across 
individuals in proportion to their ability 
to"pay. This is clearly illustrated by the next result. 
Result 6"Suppose each individual is characterized by the same 
homothetic preferences and suppose that qL? 0. Then the total 
provision of the public good under the two rules is the same" 
Proof "Let qa be the optimal 
average income under the SKR 
for the same individual unde 
By result 3. Q#=Q. By result 
provision for the individual with 
and let Qin be the optimal provision 
r the'FKR. Then by result 1, qa-Q/n. 
5, identity of preferences and qLý O 
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Vi implies Q`-Q each I. Then for the individual with average 
income qa=Q/n +( I-I)=Q/n. It then follows Q*-Q=nqa=Q=Zgti. QED 
Then. if individuals are characterized by the same homothetic 
preferences` they would provide the same total amount of public 
good under both rules. Yet, as we saw above, public good provision 
is in general inefficient under the FKR, even if individuals have 
the same homothetic indifference map, while it is always efficient 
under the'SKR if preferences are identical and 'qt ?: 0. We are 
therefore compelled to conclude that the same amount of public 
good, supplied by the same community. is efficient under one rule 
and inefficient under the other! This (apparent) paradox is easily 
solved once it is realized that the efficient level of public good 
provision is not independent of income' distribution. What'the SKR 
does, in the presence of identical and homothetic preferences, is 
to redistribute income across the population (trough the equality 
of private good consumption) so as to make the chosen level of 
public good efficient. In some loose sense, we could therefore say 
that, in the case of the FKR, it is not the -provision of the 
public good which is inefficient but is the distribution of income 
which is non optimal. -, 
So far we have only considered the case where preferences are 
identical and we have seen that the SKR is undoubtedly better than 
the FKR, at least as long as the non-negativity constraint is not 
binding. How would the two rules fare when preferences are not 
identical? 
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Result 7-"Suppose that the structure of preferences is such that 
the public 
'good is under/over provided under the FKR. Then 
L 
providing that qy? 0 Vi the public good is also under/over provided 
under the SKR" 
Proof "We only prove the result for underprovision because exactly 
the same argument can be used for overprovision., For the FKR to be 
always'characterized by under provision it must be true, that for 
any income distribution, 
(27)' PYý, Q )' -n- entails ZPt(Y . Q*»1 ' 
Consider now the SKR. Selecting the"`ith row in '(23) and 
evaluating, it'-at the optimal choices, -` 
(28) Pt(YyºQ%) . -n' 
If gti? o' Vi , qti= qL. -Q- +(II). 
It then follows Iti-qti-y''and 
Q-EqL-ZQL /n. Assessment of efficiency or inefficiency of public 
good provision under the SKR requires us to evaluate 
(29) 7- PL(YL. ZQ; /^) 
But from (27) and (28), x>1. QED" 
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Again the rationale behind this result is obvious. If the 
structure of preferences is such that, for any income 
distribution. the FKR is characterized by under/over provision of 
the public- good this. must also hold if income is equally 
distributed. Now. if the, non-negativity constraint is not binding, 
each individual in acting according to-the SKR, behaves as if he 
had average income and he faced an implicit price for the public 
good equal to sin; that is. he behaves as if he were subjected to 
the FKR but he had average income. The result then follows 
naturally. 
An implication, of°result 7, as would be very easy to check. 
is that if we chose the same parameterizations of preferences for 
the SKR that we used for the FKR in the previous sections the same 
results in terms of-over/under provision of the public good would 
emerge. Then we can conclude that the same tendency toward under 
provision that we saw emerging for the FKR would characterize the 
SKR as well. Of course, this conclusion must be qualified in the 
sense that it only holds if the non negativity constraint is not 
binding for each individual. If this is not the case, as we saw in 
result 5. the fact that some individual with income below average 
may decide to supply zero to the public good under the SKR may 
offer a corrective to the tendency toward under provision. 
Also note that result 7 holds even if public good provision 
under the FKR is efficient. That is, if Kantian behaviour under 
the FKR is efficient so must be Kantlan behaviour under the SKR. 
This indeed shows that the SKR is in a precise sense more 
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efficient than the FKR. In fact. while the SKR is always efficient 
when the FKR is efficient the opposite, as result 6 shows, does 
not hold. 
This general remark on the greater efficiency of the SKR 
should not however be overstressed. Results 5 to 7 were obtained 
on the-basis of the hypothesis that the non-negativity condition 
on each individual contribution was not binding. But as we 
remarked above. this is unlikely to hold unless income 
distribution is close to egalitarian. On the other hand, if the 
income distribution is close to egalitarian the comparative 
advantage of the SKR over the FKR is lost. 
So far we'have compared the two rules only in terms of their 
relative performance in approximating efficiency in public good 
provision. But it may also be interesting to ask about the 
difference in quantity provision under the two rules, both 
individually and at a social level. The next result summarizes 
what can be said. 
Result 8 "Suppose that the public good is everywhere a normal good 
for each individual. Then people with income below (above) average 
will certainly provide less (more) under the SKR than under the 
FKR" 
Proof "From eq. 4 and result 4 we can write 
Q. -$' (I, , sin) and QL4L(I, i, n) I. I. 
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where ¢ay(. ) Is individual i's demand function for the , public 
good. 'Then, 
Q*/nsin)/n and q. - max(0. ýý(I. sin)/n + (IL-I)) 
Clearly'if the non-negativity constraint is binding (which 
requires I>Iy) qy-0 and Qti/n>0-q If the non-negativity 
constraint is not binding we must compare 
(30) Q. /n - q` - s/n(¢t(Iy. 1/n) - ¢L(I. 1in)) 
Applying a first order Taylor approximation at the first term 
in the RHS of (30) and rearranging : 
(31) Qt/n - qt= (ý=i/n - 1) (Ii - I) 
where represent the partial income derivative of the 
demand function for the public good, evaluated at 
Normality of the public good requires ((Piiin) <1 which Implies 
Qi /n 
< 
qt, as It > I. " QED. 
Summing (31) over the individuals we can also get --at the 
first order of approximation and assuming that the non-negativity 
constraint is not binding for each individual-- the difference in 
total provision under the two rules as follows: 
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(32) Q*- Q ='iýitin(IL-I) 
Quite Intuitively (32) implies that total public good 
provision under'the'FKR will'tend to be larger (smaller) than 
total provision under the SKR if poor people are characterized by 
lower (higher) preferences for the public good. 
"} . .. r 
III: 6 Conclusions 
In this- chapter we addressed the question: is ethical 
behaviour able to enforce an efficient provision of a public good? 
The answer is'in general negative. Even if all individuals" were 
subjected to as extreme a form of morality as the categorical 
imperative they would not in general supply the public good 
efficiently. Furthermore. the examples that we considered in the 
paper would also suggest that both the Kantian rules tend toward 
an under provision of the public good-- even if such a tendency is 
partially counteracted for the SKR by the presence of a 
non-negative constraint on individual contributions. Thus, it 
would seem, . a'reasonable conjecture to suppose that under some more 
realistic behavioural rules --rules that so to say lie in between 
the extreme form' of morality embodied in the categorical 
imperative and the pure selfishness of the traditional model-- the 
public good would tend to be seriously under provided. This of 
127 
course opens the way to state provision of the public good as 
supplementing private provision. 
-- This conclusion is however open to many caveats. First, we 
have not modeled explicitly state provision of the public good in 
our model. How a community of Kantian individuals would or should 
react to increased government provision is an open issue. This is 
of course even more true if we considered some more realistic rule 
of behaviour, where we could not escape the, issue --that we 
avoided in this paper by invoking the principle of the 
unconditional commitment implicit in the categorical imperative-- 
of the interdependence among individual behaviour. 
Second. -there is a subtle issue which has not been considered 
in this paper. In all our discussion so far we have implicitly 
assumed that efficiency in'public good provision is a desirable 
outcome. On the other hand, even if efficiency is desirable it is 
not in general a paramount consideration. In particular, with 
different individuals one may well wish other ethical principles 
beyond Pareto optimally to guide one's assessment of the different 
outcomes. Then, if the categorical imperative is considered as a 
reasonable ethical principle, why should the state wish to 
intervene in the economy even if Kantian behaviour is inefficient? 
There is in other words a normative issue that we have, avoided in 
the analysis of this paper. We will come back to this in chapter 
IV and chapter VIII. 
Finally, in the spirit of the "new-new" welfare economics. 
indicating the presence of a market failure is"not a sufficient 
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condition for invoking public intervention. In a second best world 
it has still to be shown that the second best provision of the 
state is in some sense better than the second best provision by 
the market. This issue will also be taken up in the next chapter. 
Appendix: Ethical versus selfish behaviour. 
As we discussed above. ethical behaviour as represented by_ 
the, SKR may dictate to an individual with income below average a 
zero, or even a negative contribution to the public good. As we 
also saw above the likelihood of this to happen will depend, both 
on the inequality in income distribution across individuals and on 
the distribution of preferences for, the public good in the 
population. In order to get an idea of the income differential 
needed to bring about a strictly positive contribution to" the 
public good by all individuals we will consider in this appendix a 
simple example. Thus, suppose that the preferences of each 
individual I can be represented by the utility function 
A. 1 Qai 
where a. Is a parameter which captures the differences in 
preferences for the public good across the population. Using 
result 4 we can identify the optimal, contribution by individual I 
under the SKR by maximizing A. l under the constraint yt+Q/n -I 
and by redistributing the burden for the public good across 
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individuals so. as to equalize private consumption. Doing this and 
rearranging individual i's desired contribution can be written as: 
A_2 qt - IL - I+cz 
where as above I. is individual income and I is average 
income. Clearly q? 0 as (i+a`)I? I. To insure strict concavity of 
the utility function a. must lie in the interval (0,1). If the 
preferences for the public good are very high (a-+1) quo as 
I. 1,7/z; if the preferences for the public good are low (a. O) qt>0 
as It? I. Clearly, this latter condition is bound to fail for some 
I unless income is equally distributed. However, note that even in 
the former case (cx 1) 
, 
the amount of Income inequality allowed to 
keep q'0 Vi is very limited Indeed; for example., in the case of a 
two person economy, the Income of the poorest could not be smaller 
than. 1/3 of the income of the richest. To the extent that these 
results could be. generalized to other cases, we should therefore 
expect quite a large number of individuals at the bottom of the 
income distribution to provide zero to the public good under the 
SKR. 
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Chapter IV: Was Kant Right? Kantian Provision of Public Goods 
and Alternative' Models of Public Good Supply 
IV. 1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we inquired into the efficiency of 
public good provision under Kantian behaviour. In this chapter we 
take a more normative view by discussing the relative performance 
of Kantian behaviour vis a vis other rules of public good 
provision. -This will allow us both to clarify the nature of 
Kantian behaviour and to discuss its desirability. 
In chapter III we saw that public good provision under 
Kantian behaviour is in general characterized by inefficiency and 
that, in particular, there is some tendency toward underprovision. 
As we remarked above this may offer some support for public supply 
of public goods. On the other hand, even if we concentrate only on 
the efficiency issue, for this conclusion to be warranted it 
should still be shown that. under the same informational 
constraints imposed on the Kantian individuals of the previous 
section, government is in some sense able to do better. In order 
to approximate government's behaviour in "realistic" market 
economies characterized by a democratic political system we 
exploit in section IV. 2 a simple model of voting over public good 
levels where the results of the median voter's theorem apply. 
General results are, of course, difficult to reach but the 
indications that we get on the basis of a simple parameterization 
of preferences clearly point toward a better performance, in 
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efficiency terms, of Kantian behaviour with respect to public good 
supply under a , political process. 
This result should of course not be taken as meaning that 
actual private supply of -public goods is more efficient than 
public provision. For one thing there are serious doubts that the 
median voter theory is really able to explain actual public supply 
of public goods. Recent empirical evidence suggests that this is 
not the case even where the institutional environment more closely 
approximates the conditions under which the median voter's model 
applies (Aragon et al., 1988). Besides, for the conclusion above 
to be warranted one should at least require further research on 
more realistic rules than Kantian behaviour in the context of 
models of voluntary supply of a public good. 
In spite of these limitations, the result above is of some 
interest-because it suggests that in a second best world Kantian 
behaviour may approximate efficiency better than alternative rules 
of public good provision. This is also confirmed by the results in 
section, 'IV. 3. In this section the issue of the relative 
performance of Kantian behaviour in efficiency terms is addressed 
from a different point of view, by analyzing the links between 
Kantian provision and Lindahl equilibria. It is shown that 
whenever Kantian provision (under the FKR) is efficient it could 
be sustained as a Lindahl equilibrium for some lump-sum 
redistribution of income. Similarly, it is also shown that 
whenever Kantian behaviour is inefficient it would always be 
possible, if lump sum transfers were available, ýto find a Lindahl 
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equilibrium-which would guarantee to each individual the same 
level of utility but with less total income. These results suggest 
that If we take Pareto-efficiency as our reference standard the 
case for'Kantian behaviour must lie in the inability of government 
to reach a first-best allocation. 
In section IV. 4 we address a side issue which was left 
unasked in the previous chapter, that is the effect of income 
redistribution on Kantian{provision. The results obtained as well 
as some limitations of the present work are further commented upon 
in section IV. 5 which closes the paper. In this final section we 
also offer some suggestions for further research. 
IV. 2 Kantian Behaviour versus public good provision under a 
Democratic System 
In the literature on public supply of public goods it is 
customary to model government behaviour as determined by the 
result of a political process, where the median voter's choice is 
decisive in setting the amount of the public good supplied by the 
state1. The median voter theory seems therefore a natural 
candidate to employ to characterize public supply in our 
---------------- -------------------------- -------- -- 
1The theoretical limitations of such an approach are of course 
well known (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980 and Mueller, 1979) and 
by now there is also some empirical evidence which suggests that 
the median voter's theorem is a poor predictor even where the 
conditions required for its validity are roughly respected (see 
Aragon et al., 1988). This should induce the reader to take the 
results of the next sections with a grain of salt. 
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comparison between private provision of the public good under 
Kantian-behaviour and public good provision by the state. 
A second reason to consider the results of such a model is 
that there seem to be strong similarities between the results that 
we reached in the previous chapter and the results which are 
usually obtained in this literature. For example, Stiglitz (1974) 
and Bergstrom (1979) by using parameterizations of preferences 
similar to the ones that we used in the previous chapter obtain 
results very close to ours in terms of efficiency of public good 
provision under the median voter theory. As we will see such a 
resemblance becomes obvious once the substantial similarity 
between the two approaches is correctly understood. 
Let us then consider in some detail the model by Stiglitz 
(1974) who presents the results that most closely resemble "ours2. 
Stiglitz discusses a model of public good provision through the 
political process where the public good is financed by means of a 
proportional tax on the income of individuals, and where 
individuals spend on a unique private good what is left of their 
income after having paid the tax. The demand for the public good 
by an individual I is then given by the solution to the following 
problem: 
------------- 
22 In Stiglitz's model, under the assumption of identical 
preferences, homothetic preferences show the same phenomena of 
over/under provision of the public good for the same ranges of 
values that we saw determining over/under provision under Kantian 
behaviour. See below. 
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(1)" max U' (Q,. (1- Q`/nI)IL) 
Qt 
where we have reformulated Stiglitz's model using the 
notation introduced in the previous chapter. By comparing eq. (1) 
in the present chapter with eq. (4) In the previous chapter we note 
immediately the similarity with the problem that an individual 
faces when acting according to the FKR. The main difference lies 
in the fact that the price of the public good under a proportional 
tax system is not, as in eq. (4) of the previous chapter, just iin 
but it is 1/n times an augmenting factor given by the ratio 
between individual income and average income. This might suggest 
that we could think of Kantian behaviour as if individuals were 
faced with a "head" tax on public good provision, like the one 
considered for example by Bowen (1943) in his seminal paper on 
public goods. But as we argued above this is true only ex-ante; 
ex-post an individual subjected to the FKR supplies only his 
selected contribution. Therefore, the share of the public good 
that i has to bear, or alternatively the effective price that he 
pays is just Qi/nQ which, unless individuals are identical, is in 
general different from. sin. In other words, as noted above, 
Kantian behaviour drives a wedge between the decision price, the 
price on which basis individuals reach their decision, and the 
effective price that they pay. 
The distinction is of great importance. For example, assume 
that as in our example in section 111.4.4 of the previous 
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chapter, individuals are characterized by identical and homothetic 
preferences, which is also one of the examples considered by 
Stiglitz (1974).,, Then, by simply dividing eq. (16) by eq. (17) of 
the, previous chapter. we obtain: 
(2ý Q It 
ý., nQ nI 
that is, the effective price (i. e. share of total expenditure 
on' public good) that individuals characterized by homothetic and 
identical preferences pay for the public good when acting 
according to the FKR is identical to the price that they would 
face if the public good was financed through a proportional wealth 
tax. However, even if the mechanism for sharing the burden for the 
public good is the same under Kantian'behaviour and a proportional 
tax system, the total supply of the public good under the two 
mechanisms will in general differ. In fact, as we saw above, under 
the FKR it is the individual with average income who is decisive 
if preferences are identical and homothetic, while Stiglitz 
appeals to the median voter theorem to establish that it is the 
amount selected by the individual with median wealth which is 
supplied in a political system based on majority voting. In 
general, there is no reason to suppose that average and median 
wealth coincide and in particular Stiglitz works under the 
hypothesis -- which Is also a well known empirical fact of most 
market economies -- that median income is less than average 
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income. Hence we should not expect total provision of the public 
good to-be the same under the two processes. 
Suppose however that the elasticity of substitution is 
constant and equal to unity: then the amount of public good 
selected by each individual under a proportional tax system is the 
same for each individual. Hence, the amount selected by the 
average individual is equal to the amount selected by the median 
individual. Furthermore. since the price that the average 
individual pays under a proportional tax system is just sin (see 
eq. (1) above) it follows that this individual will select the same 
amount'of public good provision under both a proportional tax 
system and under Kantian behaviour. -It then follows that with 
identical and homothetic preferences and unitary elasticity of 
substitution total public good supply will be the same under both 
Kantlan behaviour and a democratic process characterized by 
majority voting. More than that, as we saw in the previous chapter 
and as Stiglitz also illustrates, it will also be efficient under 
both processes due to the identity of choices across individuals. 
What if the elasticity of substitution is different from one? 
Result I "Assume that individuals are characterized by the same 
homothetic preferences, with constant elasticity of substitution 
between the private and the public good. Also assume that average 
income is greater than median income. Then if the elasticity of 
substitution is greater/smaller than one the amount of public good 
which would be supplied if everybody acted according to the FKR is 
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smaller/larger than the amount which would be provided in a 
democratic system under majority voting and a proportional wealth 
tax system. ". 
Proof ", if. -preferences are characterized by a constant elasticity 
of substitution between-the two goods, the utility function can be 
written. for some admissible transformation, as 
Us. (yp + QP) 
i/p 
By eq. (4) and by result 3 in the previous chapter total 
provision of the public good under the FKR is then given by: 
i i1P 
/P-i 
y 
From eq. (1) the total amount provided under a political 
process., Qm. is instead given by: 
(nI/Im)pýp-ij 
where 1m represents median income. Then, 
> Qm as (I/Im)p/p-s > 
but Im <I by assumption: hence Ocp<1 Implies Qm > Q*and p<O 
implies Qm <Q QED" 
: 38 
Stiglitz (1974) also shows that Q° < Qfi as c1 for 
identical'homothetic utility functions with constant elasticity of 
substitution, where as in the previous chapter, Q° represents the 
Pareto efficient level of public` good supply and a is the 
(constant) elasticity of substitution between the public and the 
private good. Putting together these results with the ones 
obtained in the previous chapter, section 111.4.4, we can state: 
Result 2 "Suppose that individuals are characterized by identical 
homothetic preferences with constant elasticity of substitution. 
Also assume that average income is greater than median income. 
Then public good provision under the FKR is always weakly more 
efficient than government provision under a democratic process 
with majority voting and a proportional wealth tax system". 
Proof "By result 1 above and eq. (22) In the previous chapter it 
follows that : 
if s>l . Qm>Q*>Qý 
if c<l Qm<Q*<Qp QED" 
We say weakly in the statement of result 2 because as we saw 
above if c-1. Kantlan provision and median voter choice coincide 
and they are both efficient (see Stiglitz, 1974). Result 2 -then 
shows that, for an important class of preferences Kantian 
behaviour, if in general still inefficient. I is strictly more 
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efficient than public good provision under'a political process, at 
least to the extent that the latter can be represented by the 
median voter literature. This does not allow us, of course, to 
reach general results on the relative performance of the two 
mechanisms. But. -it seems to suggest that in many cases of 
importance Kantian provision of the public good will tend to be 
closer to efficiency than public good provision under a political 
system. 
This conjecture finds some support in the attempts made in 
the literature to extend Stiglitz's'results to more general cases. 
Bergstrom (1979: Theorem 2. pg. 221) for example shows that if 
individuals are` characterized by utility functions of the form 
Q (3) Uff' =lny. + aL In 
(in our notation), two assumptions are needed to guarantee 
efficiency of public good provision under a democratic system with 
majority voting and a proportional wealth tax system: 1) a 
symmetric distribution of the at's across the population; and 2) 
that the distribution of the QL's is not correlated with the I, 's 
L 
distribution. In contrast, it is immediately apparent by writing 
ft(y, ')- lny, in eq. (12) of the previous chapter. Kantian provision 
Is always efficient if preferences are represented by a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function. Finally note that the similarity of 
results between the median voter literature and Kantian behaviour 
should not be over stressed. Both Stiglitz and Bergstrom have to 
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impose very strong restrictions on individual preferences to get 
meaningful results. while we were able to characterize Kantlan 
behaviour for a much larger-class of preferences. 
IV. 3 Kantian Behaviour and Lindahl Equilibria 
The optimality of Kantian behaviour in the case of 
Cobb-Douglas utility functions would lead one to suspect that, 
somehow, individuals acting according to the FKR turn out by 
selecting the correct tax shares that 'would enforce a Lindahl 
equilibrium. This is indeed the case. Before proving it formally 
let us define a Lindahl equilibrium in our framework. 
Definition "A Lindahl equilibrium is a vector of tax shares 
(ti.... tn)? O where Zt4"l and an allocation vector (f .... yn, Q+) 
Q) maximizes U(yL, Q) subject to such that for each 1, (yL 
` 
yt + ti Q= Iti" 
I 
We can then state: 
Result 
--3 
"Suppose that individuals characterized by the utility 
function in eq. (3) above were asked to pay a tax, t4t on. the 
public good and let tL=Q. A Q, where Qti is the total amount of 
public good selected by individual i when he acts according to the 
FKR and Q*=EQiin. Then, the resulting allocation is a Lindahl 
equilibrium. Furthermore, the public good demanded by each 
individual in the Lindahl equilibrium above coincides with Q. " 
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Proof "From eq. (3) above and eq. (4) of the previous chapter. 
Q*{ /n - a+ awhich implies ti'L- a, LIL . 
/(1 +a 
LLLL 
............ 
Za. I. / (1 + a. LLL 
First-note, Zt, sl. Now suppose that each individual were 
charged with a tax on the purchase'of the public good given by tL; 
then. individual i would solve: 
a, In Max ln(I4- ttiQ) + 
ti 
Q 
Q 
Let QL be the solution to the problem above; then from first 
order conditions on utility maximization: 
L+a, ) QED" 
1+ aý tL 
Analyzing Kantian behaviour we have then implicitly found a 
way for generating Lindahl tax shares if individuals are 
characterized by log-linear utility functions3. That is, if 
individuals were asked to decide their demand for the public good 
on the basis of an head tax - equal contribution--and after were 
instead asked to pay i/n of their chosen amount. the resulting 
provision of public good would be Pareto optimal. 
To result 3 can also be given a different interpretation. Let 
--- --------- 
3In 
reality for a larger class of preferences since as is apparent 
from eq. (12) of the previous chapter, 
1 (yt) may differ across 
individuals and need not take the logarithmic form. 
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P`*=Pti(IL-Q*Indicate the value of the marginal rate of 
substitution'of Individuali evaluated at the final allocation of 
goods that individual i receives as a consequence of Kantian 
behaviour (see previous chapter). Let us call m the minimum 
ti 
amount of income that should be given to Individual i so as to 
support the' allocation' (I. _Q1 /n, Q ) at price P as an utility 
maximizing'choice. 
4 Then it is clear that with log-linear utility 
functions m*=IL. 'This is so because with these utility functions 
P`*-Q*/nQ*; it then follows: 
QL Qý Q* 
n nQ 
Eq. (4) clarifies the economic rationale behind Result 3. It 
shows that in the case of log-linear utility functions government 
could enforce the allocation {IL-QL/n, Q ) as a Lindahl equilibrium 
by simply facing each individual I. with the personalized price 
Pty. Or to put it differently, only correct information about 
individual preferences would be needed while lump sum transfers of 
income across individuals would not be necessary. However with 
other classes of preferences efficiency of Kantian behaviour does 
not imply that m =I, di, and'lump sum income redistribution might 
be needed. The following result illustrates. 
-------------- -- -- ------ -- -- - ---------- 
41f 
preferences are strictly convex we are guaranteed that 
such an income exists; see Neary and Roberts (1980). 
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Result4 "Assume that individual preferences are strictly convex 
and that lump-sum transfers are available. Then If Q* is Pareto 
efficient it could be sustained as a Lindahl equilibrium for some 
lump sum. redistribution of income. " 
Proof "By definition: n: ti 
QL/n +PQ: summing over the n 
individuals: 
f m Z (Ii- Q Jn + Pi*Q* 
ZI. = Q+Q ZP 
since by assumption ZPO ,1. QED" 
. 
That is. -when Kantian 
behaviour is efficient, the resulting 
allocation. is, a Lindahl equilibrium for some lump sum 
redistribution of income.; This is of course not surprising since 
as-is well, known (see Cornes and Sandler,, 1986: 95-98) if 
preferences_ are, strictly" convex and lump sum transfers are 
available each Pareto efficient allocation can be supported as a 
Lindahl equilibrium. The point is however that, when efficient, 
Kantian behaviour can achieve what a government could achieve only 
if it is endowed with perfect information about individual 
preferences and it can use lump sum transfers of income across 
individuals. Since in most cases governments lack both, result 4 
gives in a sense an idea of the best that Kantian behaviour could 
achieve in comparison with public provision, at'least as long as, 
the discussion is limited to the particular ethical principle 
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embodied in the notion of Pareto efficiency 
- While'this is an interesting result, it should not be 
forgotten that as we saw previously Kantian behaviour is in 
general inefficient. Therefore, by definition, by using the same 
amount-of total-resources(-income) In the economy it should be 
possible to find a different allocation of goods across 
individuals which would guarantee to. everybody a higher level of 
welfare than in the Kantian equilibrium. Or. alternatively (see 
Dierker and Lenninghaus, 1988), it should be possible to find a 
different allocation of goods which would guarantee to everybody 
the same level of welfare as In the Kantian equilibrium but using 
less total resources. In-this latter case the difference between 
the total resources'used In the Kantlan allocation and the total 
resources which would be needed to reach the same level of welfare 
for each Individual if. such resources were employed efficiently 
can be thought, as-giving a measure of the waste introduced by 
Kantian behaviour. 
By using the notion of Lindahl equilibrium the next result 
tries to, make this last concept more precise. It also allows one 
to see in a different light the relationship, that we discussed in 
the previous chapter (section 111.4.1), between the value of the 
sum of the marginal rates of substitution and the issue of 
---------------- ------------------ -------- ----- 
5As 
we remarked in. the conclusion of the previous chapter Kantian 
behavior in itself is an ethical principle which could conflict 
with Pareto efficiency. Moreover since Lindahl equilibria are in 
general not unique, one could still inquire on the desirability of 
the particular Lindahl equilibrium that Kantian behaviour selects 
when efficient. 
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over/under provision of the public good. In order to prove this 
result we need, in addition to strict convexity of preferences, to 
impose': the assumption ' that' for each individual the private good is 
an essential good (see Willig, 1978)6. This assumption implies 
that thee indifference curves of each individual i never intersect 
the; yti=0 axis.; Since here yL represents the total amount of 
private consumption for individual i, the assumption of 
essentiality of the private good seems quite reasonable. 
Result 5 "Suppose that preferences are strictly convex and that 
the private,, good is an, essential good for each individual. Then, 
If ZP` (I; -Qt /n. Q*, )all , there exists an allocation (yi , Q') such that 
Q')Q , as 
ZP' (It-Q/n. Q*))I ZPO' (y', Q' )ui1 and 
Uff' (y' Q')-U'' (IQ/n'Qw)'. Furthermore. the total amount. of income 
needed to support the allocation (y', Q') as a Lindahl equilibrium 
Is less than ZI.. "- 
ti 
Proof "Let U -U (y., Q where y`= ICQt/n, and let us rewrite 
the marginal rate of substitution as P`-P`(Ut*, Q), where the 
private good yti is set so as to reach utility level Ut* when 
6The definition of essentiality of a good is as follows. 
Consider an economy with n goods and I consumers, indexed by 
I- who have preferences defined on the space of 
goods. Then good xi is said to be essential to consumer i if 
for any bundle x xi, xZ... xn with xl>0 there does not exist 
a bundle x'-O, x',.. x' such that U"(x)-Uti(x'); I. e. a good is 
essential if any bundle excluding it can not match a bundle 
including it. See Willig (1978) for a more complete 
discussion. 
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public good consumption is Q. Then, strict convexity of 
preferences and essentiality of the private good imply that 
Pt(UL*, Q) is a monotonically 'decreasing function of Q; I. e. 
PQ(U`*, Q)<O everywhere. Hence, If ZP; Q*)>1 (<1) there must 
exist a Q'>Q* (Q'<Q*) such that ZPL(Uti*, Q')a1. This proves the 
first part of the theorem. Now. let Pt'-PL(Ut* Q') and let y be 
such that U(y,, QI)-Ut*. Let E(P, U) indicate the expenditure 
function for individual i; i. e. EL(P, U) is the minimum level of 
income needed to reach utility U when the price of the public good 
. i* is P. Then, by construction. Ei (P ', U ) is the minimum level of 
income needed to support the allocation as an utility 
maximizing choice. By definition of expenditure function it then 
follows: 
Eti (PL' . Ut*) < Yý + PL'Q* 
Summing over the individuals: 
ZEti (I' '. U0 )< ZY: + Q*zP 
<Z It -Q*+Q* 
< ZIL. QED". 
Result 5 shows that if lump sum transfers were available and 
individual preferences known, a benevolent government could 
arrange things so as to ensure to each individual the same level 
of utility reached as a consequence of Kantlan behaviour; 
furthermore since EE`(PL', Ui*) < ZIG, government could 
redistribute the extra resources to the individuals so as to reach 
an allocation which would certainly dominate in the Pareto sense 
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the Kantian allocation. Thus, as we argued in the introduction, if 
we stick to Pareto efficiency as our only standard of reference, 
Kantian behaviour can only be defended in. a second best world, 
where. individual preferences are unknown and lump sum transfers 
not available. 
As one, would have expected, It is also easy to show that the 
extent of "waste" introduced by Kantian behaviour, as measured by 
the expression ZI. - ZE`(P''', UIs a positive function of the 
difference between the sum of the marginal rates of substitution, 
evaluated at the Kantian allocation, and the marginal rate of 
transformation; that is, it is a positive function of 
IZPi(Ui 
'Q )_1ý To see 
this, let us define a constrained 
expenditure function? ELF E'(U. P. Q) as the minimum level of income 
needed to reach utility level U when the price of the public good 
is P and public good supply is fixed at Q. That is. 
E' (U, P, Q)° min y"+ PQ S. t. U(YL, Q)-U 
yL 
Evaluating Et (U, P, Q). at U-Uý*, Q_Q*and P. : Q; /ZQ; we get: 
(5) E (U .ý .Q) Yt(U .Q)*Q Yt + Qt/n ' IL 
Consider now the partial derivative of Eý(Uý*, 0 Q) with 
respect to Q: 
7See Deaton and Muellabauer (1980) and Neary and Roberts (1980) 
for a discussion of the properties of this function. 
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(s) Ea(U . ý`. Q'ý)_ _ayt (Ut*, Q* + 
O` Q ý, ý _ pt+ý 
aQ 
since dy, /8Q, evaluated at (Ut*, Q*) is simply the negative of 
the marginal rate of substitution evaluated at the same allocation 
of goods. Let us now evaluate the constrained expenditure function 
E` at (Uwhere, as above, Q' is such that EPt(U`*, Q')-1: 
+ 0' 
Summing over the individuals we get: 
(8) ZE; (Ut*. OL Q')- ZYt' +Q'' ZEt (Pt I lut*) 
that is. the total income needed to reach the allocation 
as an utility maximization choice for each i when the 
individual price for"the public good is P is the same total 
income needed to reach the same allocation when each individual I 
is constrained to consume Q' at price 
t ¢ and to reach utility 
level Ut*-- which is obvious since ZOt ZP{'=l. From eq. 5 and eq. 8 
it follows that we can write the waste introduced by Kantian 
behaviour as 
(9) L(PLULF) FES'(Ut*. OL. Q*) - EEL (Ui*. Ot. Q 
Using eq. 6. the change in income associated with the discrete 
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change in public good provision from Q* to Q' in the RHS of eq. 
(9) can be represented as a line integral 
0 
(10) EIL- EE' (Pt'. U'*) = Zj - Pt(U''*. Q))dQ 
_, (1 - EPti(Uti*. Q) )dQ 
which is what we wanted to show in the first place. Note that 
from result 5 dQ>O as ZP (U ,Q )<1; thus the expression on the 
LHS of eq. l0 is-always-positive as long as Kantian behaviour is 
inefficient. 
IV. 4 Income Distribution and Kantian Supply ! 2U a Public Good 
In chapter 'II we insisted' on the general invariance 
properties of the Nash contribution model. In particular we saw 
that in a Nash equilibrium where everybody is a contributor 
marginal transfers of income across'contributors would leave the 
total supply of the public good and each individual consumption of 
the private good completely unchanged. It may then be interesting 
to ask if Kantian 'allocations are characterized by the same 
properties. Let us consider the two Kantian rules in turn. 
As for the FKR, in general. Income redistribution should 
affect the total provision of public good as well as the private 
consumption of each individual. Quite trivially, a redistribution 
of income from the rich to the poor will increase/decrease the 
total provision of the public good according to whether poor 
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people have a higher/lower marginal propensity to consume the 
public good than rich individuals. There is however a special case 
where this does not happen. 
8 
Proposition 1 "Suppose that individuals acting according to the 
FKR are characterized by the same homothetic preferences. - Then any 
redistribution of income across individuals would leave the total 
supply of public good unchanged" 
The result is obvious once. -it is recalled that with 
homothetic preferences it is the average Individual who Is 
"decisive" (see result- 3- of chapter III) and any income 
redistribution would leave this average income unchanged. Note, 
however, that both the level of private consumption and the 
contribution of each individual will in general change following 
the redistribution, which will therefore have welfare effects. In 
particular any Income redistribution in an egalitarian direction 
should increase the efficiency of Kantian behaviour under the FKR 
by closing the gap between the LHS and the RHS of eq. (22) in the 
previous chapter. Indeed. as the inequality in Income distribution 
tends to zero, the FKR tends to coincide with the SKR which is 
always efficient with identical preferences as we saw in the 
previous chapter. 
-------- --------- ------------------ 
8Another 
special case is. of course, the case of quasi linear 
utility functions with zero income effects on the demand for 
the public good. 
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The story changes radically if we consider the SKR. Much 
stronger neutrality results can be obtained if the inequality 
constraint is not binding. The next result illustrates. 
Results " Let q indicate individual i's contribution under the 
I. 
SKR. Assume that q. >0, Vi and let Al. indicate the transfer of 
income (positive or negative) accruing to individual I. Then If 
JAILI < q., Yi the total supply of the public good and each 
individual consumption of private good will remain 'completely 
unchanged following the income redistribution. " 
Proof "By result 4 of the previous chapter, if >0 Vi, 
qL-qL=Q 
t /n'+ (It-I). Total provision of the public good is then 
Eq=EQ/n. Consider now a transfer of income to individual i. ' Let 
ti 
qrepresent i's desired contribution after the transfer and 
qt''= max (0, q`') his actual contribution after the transfer. 
Since Q/n depends only on average Income it will not change 
following the transfer; it then follows from result 4 of the 
previous chapter: 
qL' = QL/n + (It-I) + GIL - q. + GI; >0 
by assumption. Then qti' =qy I and Zqi' -i (qt + AIt) -gqL * QED" 
Thus in an economy where everybody acts according to the SKR 
a marginal income redistribution would have the same effects as in 
the Nash contribution model (see chapter II). That is, if each 
individual 'contribution is strictly positive and the income 
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transfer is marginal the effect on the Kantian allocation of a 
slight income redistribution is nil. Impressively enough, the 
effects of a slight income redistribution on the Kantian 
allocation when the inequality constraint is binding also tend to 
replicate the comparative static results of the Nash contribution 
model in the same case (see chapter II and Bergstrom et al, 1986). 
Result 7 "Let qL Indicate the desired contribution of individual i 
under the SKR. Suppose that qti<0, some 1. Then a redistribution of 
income toward greater\smaller equality will reduce\Increase total 
public good provision" 
Proof "For simplicity suppose one redistributes income from 
individual j to individual i while keeping the contribution of 
everybody else constant. By the non-negativity constraint on 
individual contribution qti<0 implies q. -0. Let Qk be the 
contribution of all individuals except i and j, before the 
redistribution. Then the total provision of the public good before 
the transfer, Qb is 
(11) Qb= Qk + Qi 
By result 6, after the redistribution, individual j will 
provide qý - GI., where I. is the income transfer, and individual 
L 
I will provide max(O, qti + AI) while everybody else will keep his 
contribution unchanged. Summing over the individuals we get: 
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(12) 
:, -Qc: 
Qk tQ, - AIL+ max(O, QL + Al. ) 
where Qa represents total public good supply after the income 
transfer. Subtracting (11) from (12): 
(13) Qa - Qb -- AI. + max(0, qt + GIti) 
then Qa < Qb as AIL > 0. QED" 
Summing up. we can then say that Kantian behaviour. at least 
under the SKR formulation, is characterized by the same invariance 
properties of the Nash contribution model (for income 
redistribution). If we take these results as unrealistic, results 
6 and 7 would then suggest that (pure) Kantian behaviour does not 
represent a convincing alternative model of actual individual 
behaviour with respect to the traditional Nash contribution model. 
on the other hand, as we remarked in the previous chapter, this 
was not the reason for 'introducing and discussing Kantian 
behaviour in the first place. 
IV. 5 Kantian behaviour: limitations and suggestions for further 
research 
In the previous chapter we argued that the way we chose to 
formalize Kantian behaviour was quite adequate for the type of 
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economy we were considering, a static economy where individuals do 
not'earn their income. However, if we move to a more realistic 
economy, a 'different approach to Kantian behaviour should be 
chosen if we are to avoid serious logical pitfalls. On the one 
hand, as'we already' remarked in the previous chapter, in an 
economy where individuals earn their income we should consider the 
-fact- that individuals may feel they are entitled to a larger share 
of resources if they have worked harder or risked more than other 
people': "This would suggest that we should reformulate our Kantian 
rules in terms of individual "effort" rather than individual 
contribution. This would probably weaken the extreme 
egalitarianism'of the SKR by imposing a sort of horizontal equity 
constraint on the maximization problem in eq. (5) of the previous 
chapter. 
Similarly, if we introduced a time dimension in our analysis, 
we should'also consider the fact that people may learn about other 
Individuals'' preferences by observing their behaviour. This is a 
crucial point for our discourse because we justified our Kantian 
rules in the first place on the basis of informational constraints 
on other individuals' preferences. 
As an example of the. type of issue which could be addressed 
in", a dynamic economy, suppose that individuals can observe the 
total'supply of public good by the other individuals composing the 
society. Then, if individual i has decided, say by following the 
FKR. 'to contribute Q* /n at time to, by simply observing at time 
t1 that QtoP Qi (where the second suffix indicates the time 
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period) he would realize that not everybody is like him or 
alternatively that not everybody acts according to the Kantlan 
rules. Indeed, a number of different possibilities open up 
according to how we interpret the notion of Kantian behaviour and 
individual i's reaction. For example, if i takes the observation 
above as an indication that the other individuals do not follow 
the. Kantian-rules he may either decide to stick to his previous 
behaviour. (thus strictly following the principle of unconditional 
commitment). or, probably more realistically, to change his 
contribution. This last case would lead one to introduce some sort 
of reciprocity rules of the type considered by Sugden (1984) (see 
chapter II) and that we also discuss in the next chapters. 
Alternatively, if individual I interprets the observation 
above as an indication-that the other Kantian individuals have 
different preferences for. the public good he may decide to change 
his behaviour so as to take this into account. It would seem 
reasonable to argue, for instance, that without contradicting the 
spirit of the principle of the categorical imperative, one 
individual may feel obliged to offer more towards the public good 
if he perceives that his preferences for the latter are greater 
than the preferences of his fellows. For example, we might imagine 
that individual I will revise upward (downward) his contribution 
as long as his marginal willingness to pay for the public good is 
larger (smaller) than the share that he actually pays for it; that 
is, -we-could write individual i's contribution at time t, qit' as 
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14ý Qit iti-1 +a{ 
P` (Ii. Qit-s ' ýQit-s qit-i/ Zq c-s 
) 
'where 0<cL<-i is some constant which measures the speed of 
adjustment, t=0,1,2,... and where q. - Qy/ n, Vi. Note that an 
equilibrium in the system of n non linear difference equations 
above is a Lindahl equilibrium. It would then be interesting to 
. analyze 
the conditions under which such an equilibrium exists, is 
unique and stable. However, this will have to wait for further 
research. 
IV. 6 Conclusions 
In this chapter we discussed and, clarified the links between 
Kantian behaviour and alternative methods of public good provision 
such as provision through a political system (exemplified by the 
median voter theorem) and Lindahl equilibria. Finally we commented 
upon the main limitations of the present work and we offered some 
suggestions for further research. The main result which emerges 
from this chapter is as follows. If we take as our only ethical 
principle the Pareto principle, Kantian behaviour rates quite 
badly. As we illustrated at length in the previous chapter public 
good provision under Kantian behaviour is typically suboptimal. 
Then as is shown in section IV. 4, a perfectly informed government 
which uses lump sum transfers could certainly do better -in terms 
of individuals' own preferences- than a society of Kantian 
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individuals. On the other hand, in a second best world, where 
government lacks both correct information and lump sum tools the 
superiority of government intervention is more dubious. In order 
to get some insights on this last issue we compared in section 
IV. 2 public good provision under a political system with Kantian 
provision. It was shown that for an important class of preferences 
Kantian provision is strictly more efficient than public good 
provision under a political system. While this may not say much on 
the issue of the relative performance between public and actual 
private provision of public goods --since both Kantian behaviour 
and Median voter theory are unlikely to be realistic description 
of private and public provision of public goods-- it suggests that 
in a number of cases Kantian behaviour may be preferable, in a 
second best world, to alternative methods of public good 
provision. 
I 
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Part II: Income Tax Evasion 
Introduction 
In the first part of the present work we considered some 
issues relative to the problem of voluntary provision of public 
goods. In chapter II we surveyed the relevant literature, both 
theoretical and empirical, and we argued that a more general 
approach to humaan motivations and behaviour may be needed in order 
to gain a more complete understanding of the phenomenon. In 
chapters III and'IV we provided an example of this different 
approach by comparing, in an highly abstract setting, private and 
public good provision under the extreme hypothesis that Individual 
behaviour was ruled by the Kantian categorical imperative. We 
showed that. interesting insights can be gained by following this 
approach and that subtle issues, both theoretical and analytical, 
arise which deserve further attention. 
The case of voluntary provision of public goods is not 
however the only situation where considering alternative 
approaches to human behaviour may turn out to be fruitful. Indeed, 
it will be our point in this part of the work to argue that, by 
enlarging the range of phenomena which are traditionally addressed 
by the contribution model outlined above, a number of other 
important economic problems may receive interesting and more 
satisfactory explanations than those provided by selfish models. 
The example that we will be using to illustrate this point is 
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represented by the phenomenon of (income) tax evasion. Here we are 
confronted with a well-formulated, elegant economic theory, based 
on the assumption of rational egoism, which nevertheless produces 
results which are both counter-intuitive and in sharp contrast 
with. available evidence. It will be our task in the following 
chapters to show that integrating the traditional model with an 
approach based on "fairness" allows one to get both more 
convincing explanations of the phenomenon and analytic results 
which are not contradicted by empirical evidence. Furthermore, it 
also allows one to consider questions which, in spite of their 
intuitive relevance, cannot be addressed in the traditional model 
-- as for example the effect of public sector inefficiency on tax 
compliance. In order to model "fairness" we will make use of the 
analytic work on the Kantian rules developed in chapters III and 
IV. In contrast with the strategy followed in those chapters, 
however, we will explicitly consider here rules of reciprocity, 
thus following more closely the approach advocated by Sugden 
(1984) and by the present author elsewhere (Bordignon, 1987). 
Our line of attack is as follows. In chapter V we review the 
most significant theoretical literature on the argument, drawing 
attention to the inconsistencies with empirical evidence generated 
by the conventional model, and we introduce intuitively our 
fairness approach to tax evasion. In chapter VI we set up the 
basic structure of the model and, after having discussed the 
characteristics of the equilibrium, we perform a series of 
comparative static exercises in the case of, wholly exogenous 
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public expenditure. In the same chapter we also try to solve some 
of the ambiguities emerged by imposing a parameterization on the 
preferences of the individuals. In chapter VII we analyze the case 
of wholly endogenous public expenditure. We first replicate the 
comparative static exercises attempted in- the previous chapter. 
Subsequently we consider a case where fairness is violated by the 
State through-inefficiencies in the production of a 
Finally, in the conclusions to this chapter the main 
the analysis are summarized, the principal caveats 
some avenues for further research indicated. 
1 
public good. 
findings of 
discussed and 
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Chapter V: A Fairness Approach to Income Tax Evasion: a Survey of 
the Literature and an Intuitive Presentation of the Approach 
V. 1 Tax Evasion: 'A Quick Review of the Literature 
The conventional economic model of income tax evasion, as 
presented in the seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972)1 
--henceforth, AS, -- and subsequently greatly extended in the 
literature views-the decision of evading simply as the result of a 
portfolio choice. In the original-AS paper, the typical taxpayer 
decides by maximization of an expected utility function how to 
distribute a fixed amount of resources (his pre-tax income) 
between a safe asset (his post tax income if he fully pays the 
tax) and a risky asset (evaded income). Evaded income represents a 
risky asset because it may induce 'both positive and negative 
returns depending on whether the individual is caught cheating the 
tax system. For interior solutions. as one would expect, the 
amount of evaded income turns out to be influenced -- in addition 
to the other parameters of the problem-- negatively for risk 
averse individuals by the parameters set up by government to 
control tax behaviour: the expected- probability of detection. 
supposed to. be given and known to the taxpayer, and the penalty 
1 Another important seminal paper is Srinivasan (1973). 
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rate applied in the case of detection. 
In contrast, the effect of a tax increase on evaded income 
turns out to be, -in the AS model, ambiguous. An increase in the 
tax rate has in fact both a substitution and an income effect and 
under the conventional assumption of decreasing absolute risk 
aversion (henceforth DARA) the net effect on evaded income is 
undecided. The substitution effect derives from the fact that 
increasing the tax rate reduces the relative price of evaded 
income thus'inducing more evasion, while the income effect results 
from the fact that. increasing the tax rate makes the taxpayer, In 
expected terms, poorer in both states of the world thus 
triggering, under the assumption of DARA, a reduction in evaded 
income. Subsequently, Yitzhaki (1974) and Christiansen (1980) 
showed that if the surcharge rate is imposed on evaded tax, rather 
than on evaded income, (an Institutional feature which is common 
to many countries, including the USA, Israel and Italy), this 
ambiguity disappears. The substitution effect cancels out, and 
under DARA, the effect of an increase In the tax rate on evaded 
tax is certainly negative. 
Since the latter comparative static' result may not be 
immediately apparent and it Is quite central' to the ensuing 
discussion, let us illustrate it by means of a simple graphical 
argument, borrowed from by, Cowell (1985a). Let I, represent the 
pre-tax income of the representative taxpayer, t the proportional 
rate of tax, E the income undeclared and rz the surcharge rate on 
evaded tax. The consumption of the taxpayer in the favorable state 
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of the world, when he is not caught, is then C'=(I-t)I + tE and 
the consumption when he is caught is C"=(l-t)I - ntE The 
taxpayer's budget constraint is represented in fig. V. 1 by the 
segment AB, where point A is located on the certainty line (i. e. 
E=0) and the point B lies on the locus of points where the 
taxpayer evades the tax completely (i. e. E-I). Note that the slope 
of the budget line is simply -rz. Assuming an interior solution, 
the amount of evaded income will be determined by the point of 
tangency between an indifference curve and the budget line ; say, 
at point D in the picture. An increase in the tax rate from t to 
t', where t'>t, will then move the budget line parallel downward, 
say to A'B' in the picture, and the new point of tangency will be 
D'. As dräwn in'the picture, "-the-assumpti*on ofDARA implies that 
D' must lie to the left of D, and that further the distance 
between the two optimal points on the C' axis must be larger than 
the distance between the two optimal points on the C'' axis. This 
unambiguously implies a lower level of evaded tax (i. e. tE) 
corresponding to a higher rate of tax. 
This central prediction of the conventional model is not only 
counter-intuitive but it is also contradicted by both empirical 
(Clotfelter, 1983; Slemrod, 1985; Crane and Nourzad, 1986) and 
experimental evidence (Friedland et `al., 1978). It thus represents 
the most serious inconsistency between the conventional model and 
reality. Not surprisingly therefore, the subsequent literature has 
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dedicated a lot of effort In trying to overcome it. 
2 This is not 
Figure V. 1 - 
Lu 
(3-tiz 
Welt 
2Most 
work has moved in the direction of relaxing the assumptions 
imposed by AS in their original paper. Thus, Koskela (1983) 
considers a progressive tax system rather than a proportional one; 
Benjamini and Maltal (1985) study the case where individuals do 
not behave according to expected utility theory but are 
characterized by the errors in perception experimentally singled 
out by Tversky and Kahneman; Pencavel (1979), Watson (1985). and 
Cowell (1985b) introduce a labor-leisure choice in the model; 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) themselves and Russell and Rickard 
(1987. ) introduce an element of dynamics considering more periods 
and retroactive penalties; Sproule (1985) analyzes the case where 
individuals are characterized by imperfect information about the 
parameters of the fiscal system. In general the results of these 
papers are disappointing for the issue at hand. They show either 
the persistence of a negative relationship between the tax rate 
and the amount of evaded tax or, even worse, a complete ambiguity 
in the comparative static properties of the model. This is. for 
example, the case of introducing a labor supply choice in the 
model. For a more complete discussion of these issues see Cowell 
(1985a). 
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the place to review this ever-growing literature (see note 2) but 
it is fair to say that the attempts made so far to extend the AS 
framework have shown that the result above is surprisingly robust 
and that it survives in much more complex models than that 
considered-by AS. 
3 Below, we will comment in detail on one of the 
most serious attempts made in the literature to overcome it. For 
the time being, let us' note other inconsistencies of the 
conventional model. 
In particular, by modeling the decision to evade simply as 
the result of 'an 'individual calculus of' expected costs and 
benefits, conventional theory would predict that, if the expected 
. net'benefits from evading 
became positive and large enough people 
would certainly evade and presumably even large amounts of taxes. 
Yet, despite theory, this is not what seems to be happening in 
reality. For example, Hansson (1985: 286) notes that in Sweden, 
where pecuniary penalties for tax evasion amount to only 1% - 1.. 4% 
of estimated tax evasion (this is to be compared-with marginal tax 
rates in the range of 50% - 90%) "only the assumption of an 
extreme degree of risk aversion would keep tax evasion within the 
range of estimated tax evasion". In a similar vein are the results 
of'an experimental study by'Baldry (1986). The latter reports that 
3The 
robustness of"the result of a negative relationship between 
the tax rate and-the amount of evaded tax in analytic, models is 
such as to have convinced some economists that that relationship 
must represent a feature of reality rather that an insufficiency 
of theory: see Dubin et al. (1987). It is maybe superfluous to add 
that this is neither my conviction nor the conviction of most of 
the economists working in the field. 
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in a tax evasion experiment a substantial portion of the subjects 
simply refused to evade taxes, despite the fact that expected 
returns from evasion were largely positive. In contrast, and quite 
interestingly, in-a second experiment, formally equivalent to the 
tax evasion experiment, but presented to people as a gambling 
experiment, people did lay positive' bets whenever the expected 
returns from the bet were positive. As Baldry concludes: "whatever 
tax evasion is, it is not a gamble". 
Clearly, similar results suggest that other considerations, 
beyond the individualistic calculus of expected costs and 
benefits, are crucial to the decision to evade. In discussing the 
results of : -his-- experiment, Baldry suggests that moral 
considerations-are likely to play a role in determining people's 
tax behaviour. Other experimental and empirical evidence strongly 
supports-this conclusion. For example. Friedland et al. (1978). 
Spicer and Becker (1980). Spicer and Thomas (1982), all find that 
. the decision to evade is strongly influenced by the perception 
that people have of the tax burden facing them as being "fair" or 
"unfair". We will come back to this in, the next section. 
The two above mentioned features -- the wrong expected sign 
for tax changes on tax evasion and the inability of the model to 
take into account Baldry's type of evidence -- surely represent 
the most serious weaknesses of the conventional model. However 
there are'at least other two aspects of the phenomenon of tax 
evasion which are not adequately treated in'-the AS framework. 
The first concerns the interdependence among taxpayers. It is 
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commonly held, by practitioners in the field and economists alike, 
that people tend to evade more, the more they perceive other 
taxpayers to evade. Here, evidence is poor and contradictory 
(contrast Spicer and Lundstedt, 1976 with Spicer and Hero, 1985) 
but no serious research has been undertaken, on this issue, at 
least as far as I am aware of. Attempts. have been made to 
introduce this feature informal models (see Benjamins and Maital, 
1985-and Gordon, 1987a, 1987b). But this has been done, at least 
so far, by postulating ad hoc the existence of "social stigma" on 
tax evasion and by-making the latter negatively dependent on the 
amount of total tax evasion. Clearly, a better explanation of the 
existing-links between taxpayers would be welcome. 
A more serious criticism of models of the AS type concerns 
the so-called "public aspect" of tax evasion. - "Government not-only 
takes away but it also gives back", in form of goods and services. 
Unless it is believed that the utility function of- the taxpayers 
is separable in private goods and publicly provided- private and 
public goods, government expenditure would presumably exert an 
influence on the tax behaviour of the taxpayer. Curiously enough, 
although this public feature of-tax behaviour was noted relatively 
early in the-literature (Kolm, 1973) very little theoretical and 
empirical work has been done on it until very recently., Only 
Hansson (1985) and Cowell and Gordon (1988) -- henceforth CG -- 
deal explicitly with it on a theoretical ground. The latter paper 
in particular presents a number, of interesting characteristics. 
However, since I am going to use CG's model In' building my own 
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model in chapter VII, let me postpone the discussion of their 
paper to that chapter. Here, I want only to comment upon their 
main result. By introducing (endogenously 
4) 
public expenditure in 
a model of tax evasion CG manage to offer an explanation for the 
the observed positive relationship between tax evasion and the tax 
rate. In particular, by exploiting some parameterizations of the 
utility functions of taxpayers, CG show that the effect of a tax 
increase on evaded tax tends tobe positive if public goods are 
"scarce", -while it tends to be negative if public goods are 
"abundant". The rationale behind this result is as follows. If 
public goods are strongly underprovided (overprovided) an increase 
in the rate of tax and therefore In-. public goods supply. would tend 
to'make individuals better off (worse off) on- average in both 
states"of the world, thus triggering, under the hypothesis of 
DARA; an increase (decrease) in tax evasion. 
In a framework where selfishness is imposed from the outset, 
the logic of the result is 'indisputable. Indeed, as the sharp 
reader will surely have realized, it just=represents an extension 
to an uncertain world of the traditional free-rider argument (see 
chapters II), with the assumption of DARA which takes the place of 
the traditional income normality assumption on the demand for 
public goods. However, one can not, help feeling that there is 
something odd going on here. For, underprovision (overprovision) 
4With 
endogenous public expenditure, I just mean that government's 
budget always balances, so that once the rate of tax is determined 
so is public expenditure. See chapter VII. 
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of the public good implies that an individuals would be willing to 
pay a higher (lower) tax in exchange for a higher amount of public 
good. Yet, schizophrenically, the selfish individual in the CG 
model resists a tax increase, evading more --thus undermining the 
expected increase in public good supply---when he would welcome an 
increase in tax, while he reduces tax evasion--thus stimulating a 
further increase in public good supply--'when he would contrast an 
increase in tax. Not only this, 'but given " the positive 
relationship between the rate of tax and public expenditure --due 
to the assumption of a balanced government budget-- the above 
mentioned result would also imply that people tend to evade more 
in response to a tax increase if the initial rate of tax is low 
and to evade less in the opposite case. Or, to put it differently, 
a 1% tax increase from an initial rate of tax of, say, 1% should 
increase tax evasion, while the same, 1%, increase, in the tax rate 
from an original average tax rate of, say, 90% should reduce -tax 
evasion! Any non-economist --and a few economists for that 
matter-- would find the argument 'strange' indeed. 
6 Rather, 
intuition would suggest the opposite to' be more plausible. And 
indeed there is at least an experimental study (Friedland et al., 
In the CG model all individuals' are identical. See chapter VII, 
section VII. 2 for a proof and a discussion of the result referred 
to in the text. 
6In fairness, it must be said that CG have become aware of the 
counter-intuitiveness of their argument. In the paper published in 
the Journal of Public Economics. In contrast with the, original 
Working Paper, the emphasis on the result is much reduced: compare 
Cowell and Gordon, 1986 with Cowell and Gordon, '1988. 
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1978) which shows evaded tax to be an increasing convex function 
of the tax rate rather than a concave one as implied by the CG 
result. 
Hence, the introduction of public expenditure in a model of 
tax evasion, by itself does not seem to be able to remove the 
counter-intuitiveness of the results of the portfolio model. In 
contrast, as we. will show in the next chapters, the introduction 
of public expenditure coupled with fairness rules does indeed 
allow one to make some steps toward a better reconciliation of 
theoretical results with both reality and common sense. 
Finally, let me note a last feature of the AS type of model 
which requires further work. The-critical note by Kolm (1973) on 
the AS paper has generated a vast literature on the issue of 
"optimal" tax evasion: I. e. -the selection by government of optimal 
values for the penalty rates, the tax rate and the expenditure on 
detection. As is by now well known this problem has no easy 
solutions because the results turn out to be very sensitive to the 
assumption made about the maximand of government (for example. 
expected tax revenue versus expected utilitarian welfare function: 
see Benjamini and-Maltal. 1985 and Sandmo, 1981). Moreover, there 
are still unsolved logical and ethical problems which make the 
proposed solutions even , more questionable. 
7 However, there is 
7I 
am referring here to the issue on whether the utility functions 
of evaders should be considered in the welfare function of 
government. See the references quoted in the text and Cowell 
(1985a) for a discussion of this problem. 
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another-fundamental issue which has been so far overlooked in the 
literature. If, as I am going to argue in the next section and as 
our previous references-seem to suggest, the decision to evade is 
strongly influenced by fairness considerations, do we not run the 
risk; by assuming selfish- utility functions as in the AS 
framework, of producing policy suggestions which-are qualitatively 
wrong and perhaps counter-effective? To take an extreme example: 
suppose government intends to maximize an expected utilitarian 
welfare function. As is well known from the work of Stiglitz 
(1982) the solution to this problem can clash with some ethical 
principles of public finance, such as the principle of horizontal 
equity. -But, even-if we leave aside-the ethical problem, if people 
have a strong feeling for equal treatment of equals the perceived 
injustice of the fiscal system may actually trigger an explosion 
of anti-social behaviour of which tax evasion would be only an 
element. In this case, the cure could actually worsen the illness. 
It is therefore not surprising that, -in the best example so far 
advanced in the literature of optimal taxation with tax evasion 
(Sandmo, 1981), the author concludes by raising the question of an 
"appropriate treatment of notions of justice and morality". We 
will come back to this in chapter VII. - - 
Summing up, there seems`: to be a need for a-theory which, by 
integrating the' conventional portfolio choice model of income tax 
evasion, makes it able to explain, -or at least to be consistent 
with, the following four stylized facts: 
1), evaded tax is positively linked with tak changes, at least 
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over some ranges; 
2) a consistent fraction of taxpayers choose not to evade 
even when it would be in their selfish interest to do so; 
3) the behaviour of a taxpayer is influenced by the behaviour 
of other taxpayers in the same reference group; 
4) the behaviour of a taxpayer is influenced by government 
expenditure on goods and services. 
In the following chapters we will show how is possible. by 
exploiting the framework developed in the previous chapters on 
voluntary provision-of public goods, to build up such a theory. 
V. 2 A Fairness Approach to Income Tax Evasion: An Intuitive 
Explanation 
In the previous section we, saw that the conventional model of 
income tax evasion, based on the notion of rational egoism, meets 
serious problems in explaining the empirical facts known about the 
phenomenom. It seems then worth asking which consequences the 
adoption of a different approach, based on a notion of practical 
morality. would have for the analysis of the problem . at hand. 
First, it would suggest that one looked at the decision to evade 
by a single taxpayer- as the result of a process of social 
interactions rather than as the choice of an isolated individual. 
Second, it would require one to identify the "actors" involved in 
the process, and to establish the particular "rules of fairness" 
that these actors are supposed to follow. 
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Fortunately, there already exists a literature, founded on 
the psychological theory of social exchange, which has attempted 
to look at the phenomenon of tax evasion from this perspective 
(see especially Spicer and Lundstedt, 1976). In this approach the 
decision to evade by a single taxpayer can be understood as the 
result of a social process involving (at least) three different 
actors: the single taxpayer, the government, and the "other" 
taxpayers. Each of these actors is tied up to the others by a 
different channel of social, interactions. The relationship between 
the individual taxpayer and the government involves at least two 
elements. On the one hand, - there is certainly the element of 
coercion typically studied in the AS type of models. On the other 
hand, there is also an element of exchange. From the latter point 
of view, the taxpayer can be`seen as exchanging purchasing power 
in return for governmental goods and services. Here, the rule of 
fairness is also clear. For the consumer to be satisfied by this 
exchange, he must perceive the "terms of trade" --implicitly 
determined in the exchange with government-- as being "fair". That 
is, there has to be a link, perceived as fair, between the amount 
of purchasing power transferred to government and the quantity and 
quality of goods and services transferred back from government to 
the consumer8. It seems also reasonable to argue' that if the 
8The 
governmental goods. and services supplied to taxpayers, which 
I refer to in the text, must be interpreted in a wide sense. If 
taxpayers are altruistic, for example, and the welfare of the poor 
members of the society enters in their utility functions, an 
efficient redistribution policy by government may well be 
f 
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taxpayer perceives his terms of trade with government as being 
"unfair" he will try to adjust his behaviour so as to correct this 
perceived unjustice. As Spicer and Becker (1980: 173) put it "tax 
evasion may be seen partly as a means by which taxpayers attempt 
to restore equity in their terms of trade with the government". 
'Another feature of the same relationship involves the other 
taxpayers as well. Even if the taxpayer is satisfied, as a whole, 
by the terms of trade between private consumption of the 
collectivity and the amount of goods and services supplied by the 
state, he may still perceive an inequity between his -fiscal 
treatment and the tax treatment of'the other taxpayers. According 
to Homans (1961) perceived inequity in exchange relationships 
creates a sense of distress-1n the participants. And according to 
Adams (1965). this sense of distress may induce participants to 
reduce inequity by. adjusting their contributions to the exchange 
relationship. Again, tax evasion can be seen as'an attempt by the 
single taxpayer to restore fairness at the level of exchange with 
government: 
Finally, there is a third element which involves more 
directly-the relationship between the individual taxpayer and the 
"other" taxpayers. Even if'the individual taxpayer perceives the 
"institutionalized" terms of trade between the government and the 
collectivity of taxpayers, including himself, as being "fair" 
perceived by consumers-as part of the exchange. In the same 
direction moves Thurow's interpretation of income distribution as 
a publicly produced public good (Thurow, 1971). 
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--that is, if the taxpayer*considers the fiscal structure as being 
fair and the pattern of governmental expenditure on goods and 
services as being adequate-- what-really matters from the point of 
view of the individual taxpayer is the actual behaviour of the 
other taxpayers. If the latter evade -taxes, °-the individual 
taxpayer may still feel as "unfair" the tax burden lying on 
himself. 'This, even if the individual taxpayer would be willing to 
pay the taxes --i. e. he would be willing to accept the- terms of 
trade offered°by government-- provided that the other taxpayers 
did the same. Again, tax evasion can be seen as an 'attempt to 
restore "fairness",, this time in ' the. relationship with the, other 
taxpayers. 
Summing up, this approach seesýthe decision to evade by a 
single taxpayer as largely-determined by the perceived fairness of 
the existing relationships between him, the state and the "other" 
taxpayers. The coercive powers of the 'state represent just but 
one, and not necessarily the most important, of the determinants 
of tax evasion. If these are the ideas, intuitively quite 
satisfactory and with some experimental evidence to support them9, 
there remains the problem of how to formalize them. In order to 
understand the actual formalization attempted in the next chapter, 
consider for a moment a world where the state supplies public 
goods but it does not have coercive powers on individuals. Should 
9See the works by Spicer and his collaborators quoted above in the 
text. 
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we expect individuals to pay the taxes? As we know from chapter 
II, in a model where selfishness is assumed from the outset and 
where each taxpayer is too small to affect in any way the supply 
of public goods by government, the answer must necessarily be 
negative. Each individual would take a free-ride and if 
government's powers of coercion are nil each individual would 
evade completely the taxes. This is, of course, the conventional 
argument in support. of the view that government must have in the 
first place coercive powers. 
But suppose now,. following our previous, discussion, that 
individuals are ruled by considerations of fairness. Then, even in 
the absence, of coercion by, government, each individual would 
adjust his tax payment, so as to reach fair terms of trade with 
respect to the government and the other taxpayers. Let us call qi 
the amount of his income that an-individual i would perceive as 
fair to give to the state in exchange for the received goods. On 
the basis of our previous discussion q will -be. a function of 
several elements: -the amount of goods and services provided by the 
state, the tax structure, and the actual level of, tax evasion by 
the other taxpayers.. (For the sake of the presentation we assume 
here that all these elements are known and given to individual i: 
see next chapter, for a discussion on the informational 
requirements). Having established a value , for qt. individual i 
will instead be confronted by the state with an income demand of 
t IL, where tL is the average rate of ; tax that individual i is 
asked to pay on his-income and I, represents his given income. 
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Then, we can determine the desired level of tax evasion by 
individual i simply as the difference between the amount of taxes 
he is asked to pay and the amount of taxes that he would wish to 
pay: 
z 
tu 
t4 Ii ý Qg 
where zt As the desired level of evaded tax. Then. leaving 
aside the problem of corner solutions (see below), in a world 
where governments do not have coercive powers but individuals are 
ruled by norms of fairness each taxpayer 1 would evade exactly z.. 
But of course'in the real world governments do have coercive 
powers and they usually try to control tax evasion by imposing 
penalties and controls on tax declarations. Therefore, in such a 
world, even the fairness ruled taxpayer must realize that there is 
a risk involved in evading. Hence, even if his desired level of 
evasion is still z., the taxpayer may nevertheless decide to evade 
less than z11 if he perceives that doing otherwise he could put in 
danger the very goal that he is pursuing through tax evasion: the 
reestablishment of fair terms of trade. 'Therefore how'much of zi a 
taxpayer i will actually manage to realize in practice will depend 
on the usual parameters of`the portfolio choice model: individual 
i's attitude toward risk, the probability of being caught if 
evading and the penalty rate on evaded tax. 
Several elements of this model should be noted. First, note 
that we split the actual decision of evading by 'a single taxpayer 
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in'two parts. On the one hand, and previously on logical grounds, 
the individual taxpayer decides which part of his tax, if any, he 
wishes to evade. According to our fairness approach, this decision 
is taken on the basis of the perceived equity of the tax system in 
the three dimensions that we indicated previously. Subsequently, 
on the'basis of the parameters by which government controls tax 
evasion the individual decides how much of this desired tax 
evasion he can reach in practice. Morality, in other words, 
constrains tax behaviour in-advance of any other considerations on 
the riskiness to evade. This seems reasonable. Also, there is some 
experimental evidence which supports the view that the decision to 
evade can be'split"in"the two stages indicated above (Friedland, et 
al., 1978). 
Second, there Is no guarantee in this approach that 
ttIL.? z t 
? O., For example, zt >t. I, entails that an individual feels 
LL 
so disadvantaged by the fiscal system that he would -consider it 
fair not to pay a tax but to receive a subsidy from government. On 
the other hand, zL . <0 
implies that individual i would wish to pay a 
higher amount of taxes than he Is asked to pay. Since no 
individual can either evade a negative amount of income or force 
the state to pay him a subsidy, in the next chapter I will model 
these two cases as corner solutions. This does not mean however 
that I consider them as unrealistic or economically irrelevant: 
more simply, they are likely to affect other phenomena beyond tax 
evasion. For example, if a relevant share of the population feels 
so disadvantaged by the fiscal system" as to consider "fair" a 
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negative tax contribution we should expect as a consequence social 
conflict to arise elsewhere in the economy, for instance in the 
labor market'and\or in the political arena10. Similarly, if an 
individual would consider it fair to be taxed more heavily than he 
is, we may expect that he will try to reestablish a fair 
equilibrium by giving part of his extra income away, for example 
by contributing to, a charity. 
11 
10 The recent labor conflicts in Italy for a "just" fiscal system 
seem to represent a good example of this situation. 
liThis 
point deserves further attention since it could help to cast 
some light on the motivations for giving. At the very end, when an 
individual decides to donate one dollar to a charity, does not 
this mean that he would be willing to pay a'dollar more of taxes 
provided that he were sure that this extra dollar was spent on 
that charitable activity ? Note also that altruistic behaviour is 
not inconsistent with evading taxes; in terms of our approach this 
could be interpreted in the sense that the evader either does not 
trust the state as supplier of public goods or he does not agree 
with the way in which the state decides to spend the money 
collected through taxes (i. e. the composition of public 
expenditure). In other words, an evader may not necessarily object 
to the magnitude of his tax burden but he may object to the way in 
which his money is spent by the state. I think that at least in 
Italy --where we observe both a very high level of tax evasion and 
a large amount of voluntary provision to charities and where there 
is a widespread legitimate distrust among citizens In the ability 
of the state to spend efficiently tax. revenue-- this 
interpretation could have some appeal. 
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Finally, the equation, above allows us to appreciate the 
difference between my fairness approach and the portfolio choice 
model of income tax evasion. As should be clear, the latter 
represents but a special case-of the former, a , special case where 
qg is always identically equal to zero, for all individuals. In 
ti 
this case,. An fact, as in the AS type of model, each individual 
would wish to evade entirely the taxes and only the use of 
coercive powers by government could restrain him from doing so. In 
my approach, however. there may be cases where an individual is 
willing to pay, at least to some extent, the tax independently of 
any coercion by government; and in any case the maximum amount of 
evaded taxis bounded above by the desired level of tax- evasion. 
As ,I am going to show in the next two chapters, this difference is 
enough to introduce drastic changes in the comparative statics 
properties of the model. 
:, If the above discussion provides an intuitive explanation of 
the formalization of tax behaviour attempted in the next chapter, 
there still-remains the problem of, how to model satisfactorily the 
process-by which an individual comes to-select a value for qF ti . the 
fair tax. As anticipated above, I will make use here of my Kantian 
rules coupled with reciprocity considerations. The main idea is as 
follows. I will suppose that the typical taxpayer, faced with a 
given supply of public goods by the state, will first express a 
moral judgment of the Kantian type by asking himself "assuming 
that I can select a different tax payment for't' each individual 
composing the society, how much do I -think that'I and my fellow 
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taxpayers should pay for the public goods supplied by the state? ". 
In line with the analysis developed in chapters III and IV the 
answer to this question will be based on the idea that a Kantian 
individual would consider it fair to pay to the state, in exchange 
for the given supply ofýpublic goods, as. much as he would wish 
other individuals in similar conditions to pay. As a result of 
this ethical judgment, the typical taxpayer will then determine a 
vector of "just" taxes for himself and the other individuals 
composing the society; for obvious reasons, in the next chapter I 
will be calling this vector of taxes the "Kantian taxes". If the 
individual taxpayer acted according to the principle of 
unconditional commitment this would be the end of the story 
because he would then wish to pay his Kantian tax regardless of 
the tax behaviour of the other taxpayers. 
But in the context of tax compliance, it seems to be both 
more realistic and more in line with the literature quoted above, 
to assume that the typical taxpayer will also be influenced by 
considerations of reciprocity. That is, it seems more reasonable 
to suppose that the tax a taxpayer wishes to pay will also be 
influenced by the perceived tax behaviour of the other taxpayers. 
We will then model this feature by assuming that a taxpayer will 
wish to pay his Kantian tax if and only if he perceives that the 
other taxpayers do the same. If the other taxpayers do not "keep 
the deal" and pay to the state an amount which is different from 
what the Kantian individual would like them to pay he will also 
adjust his desired tax contribution by revising' upward or downward 
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his "Kantian tax". Therefore the "fair tax" that at the end of 
this process an individual desires to pay turns out to be a 
function of both his selected "Kantian tax" and the difference 
between how much he would wish the other taxpayers to pay and how 
much he perceives that they actually pay. 
Having introduced intuitively my fairness approach to income 
tax evasion let us now turn to the model itself. 
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Chapter VI: A Fairness Approach to Income Tax Evasion: 
the Model and the Analysis with Exogenous Public Expenditure 
Table VI. 1: List of the symbols used in Chapters VI and VII 
i-1,2 types of individuals 
h-1,.., N/2 number of individuals of each type 
Ctih- private consumption of an individual h belonging to group i 
G- public good 
U`- utility function of individuals of type i 
IL- lump sum income of individuals of type I 
q 
tih= 
tax payment of an individual h belonging to group i 
1/7p(N) = marginal rate of transformation between the private good 
and the public good 
1/W - N/p(N) average marginal rate of transformation of the private 
good in the public good for large, economies 
w'- Uö/Ut - the fair price of G for an individual of type i 
I average income 
q the Kantian contribution selected by an individual of type I 
for an individual of type j 
tj= q. /I, = the Kantian tax selected by an Individual of type i for 
an individual belonging to group j 
qr = the fair tax of an individual h belonging to group i 
th . 
average rate of tax imposed by the state on individual of 
type i 
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x. = average amount of evaded tax by individuals of type j 
x. -= average amount of evaded tax by individuals of type i except 
individual h belonging to group i 
ßi= reciprocity weight imposed by an individual of type i on the 
perceived average tax payment by individuals of the same type 
L reciprocity weight Imposed by an individual of type ype i on the 
perceived average tax payment by individuals of the other type 
zLh- desired level of evaded tax by an individual h belonging to 
group i 
xjh= fairness constraint (possible desired evaded tax) by an 
individual 'h belonging to group i 
pL. = probability of being detected if evading for an individual 
of type i 
rt surcharge rate imposed on detected evaded tax 
x. h= 
the expected utility choice of evaded tax for an individual h 
belonging to group i 
x 
ti. h= 
actual evaded tax for an individual h belonging to group i 
s. = (1-pi )-erp. =expected price on unit of evaded tax for an ti L 
individual of type 1 
& shorthand for ßz/(1-ßi) 
e -quantity elasticity of the fair price for an individual of 
type i 
ä =parameter which express government's beliefs about expected tax 
evasion 
k- IZ/I1= index of income Inequality 
D- shorthand for (s+t)/7z 
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VI. 1: -The Model: Preliminaries 
In order to keep the discussion as simple as possible I will 
consider an economy populated by only two types of identical 
individuals, individuals of type I and individuals of type 2, 
indexed by i-1,2. These two types should be . thought of as 
representing in the simplest possible way the different social 
groups in which a society can be meaningfully divided for our 
aims: employees versus professional workers, working class versus 
middle class, rentiers versus workers. From our point of view, the 
important feature which distinguishes these different social 
groups is that they are usually characterized by different income 
endowments and by different opportunities, for evading. This is due 
both to. -the different way in which these different . social groups 
raise their income and to, the fact that government expenditure for 
detecting tax evasion is usually different across these groups. 
The assumption of identity inside each group entails that each 
individual of a given type is characterized by the same 
preferences and endowed by the same income as any, other individual 
of the same type. This is equivalent to assuming, that differences 
in income, and opportunities for evading inside a social group are 
less relevant than differences across social groups. I take this 
as being quite reasonable. 
. In the paper I will also assume 
that there is the same number 
of individuals in each group: i. e.. I will postulate that there are 
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N/2 individuals in both group I and group 2. This is just to avoid 
having to distinguish In the paper between the different shares of- 
the two groups in the total population and in no way will affect 
the results. `When needed, I shall distinguish an individual from 
the group hebelongs to by adding a suffix h to the variable under 
consideration. For example, Ctih is the private consumption of an 
individual h belonging to group 1, where h=1.... N/2 and i=1,2. 
Each type's preferences can be represented by a strictly 
concave, 'twice differentiable utility function which obeys the 
axioms of expected utility theory. Such a utility function, 
denoted Ut(. ), 1=1.2, is defined on two types of goods, a pure 
private good (private consumption), C. 
h , and a public good G. 
This Is only for simplicity and the analysis could be easily 
extended to'many goods. We'can then write the utility function of 
arepresentative consumer h belonging to group i as: 
(1) U''-UL(Ctih, G) 1-1.2 , h-i.... N/2 
I will also assume that each type of -individual Is* endowed 
with an exogenously given lump-sum income that we indicate by I., 
ti 
i-1,2: This assumption implies that we are considering here an 
economy where the decision to- evade , and the fundamental 
leisure-work decision are completely separated 'choices. In this 
extreme form this assumption is surely unrealistic; but the price 
of adding a leisure-work choice to the model would be very high 
indeed. First, as I recalled In note 2 of the previous chapter, 
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tax evasion models with labor supply choice are usually 
characterized by a complete ambiguity in the signs of the 
comparative statics derivatives. Second, as: argued in chapters III 
and IV, my formalization of Kantian rules can be defended only in 
an economy where income is not earned. I am therefore obliged to 
impose such an assumption: it will be the task of further research 
to verify if the results go through even in an economy with labor 
supply decisions. 
I 
Turning now to the production function of the public good, we 
assume, for simplicity, that the supply of the public good is 
proportional to the amount of the private good used as input in 
its production. Letting qih represent '' individual h's 
"contribution" to the public good --i. e. qih is the amount of his 
private consumption which 1ndividual, 'h gives up for the production 
of the public good -- we write the production function-as: - 
(2) G-1/W(N) EtEhgih 
where vs(. ) represents the marginal rate of transformation 
(henceforth MRT). Note that in equation (2) we write the MRT as a 
function of the number of individuals composing the society and we 
further assume that dW(N)/dN >0. This can be thought of as a 
crowding assumption: the public good is not pure and some amount 
It should be noted that most of the literature on tax evasion is 
couched in terms of economies with lump sum incomes. This is so to 
avoid the ambiguity noted in the text. 
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of"rivalry is present in consumption. For the public goods that we 
will be"considering in-this paper this seems to be perfectly 
adequate (see below). Following Gordon and Cowell (1988) we 
further-assume the two following limiting assumptions on the 
productionýfunction-of the. public good: - 
(3) 
h 
lim-1/w(N) =0 
Nýý 
1im'N/ (N) 1/W >0 
N4CO 
These-assumptions imply that for large, economies, where N-*CD 
for each ,. 
individual h, dG/dgth=1/7p (N0 that is, for each 
individual hthe amount of public good supplied in the economy is 
fixed, and, -. cannot be modified by unilaterally changing his 
contribution. This assumption, in -addition of=-being entirely 
reasonable for the kind of problems that we address, -will allow us 
to-simplify greatly the analysis when we consider, the, case of 
endogenous public expenditure. In what follows, we will always 
assume an economy where N is "large". --- I 
VI. 2 The Fair Tax and the Desired Level of Tax Evasion- 
-.: As. anticipated in the previous chapter, in order to compute 
the fair-tax we have-first to determine. -the rate of tax that a 
typical individual-would wish to pay-when acting as a"Kantian. In 
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chapter III we saw that an individual behaving according to the 
second Kantian rule would select fair contributions to a public 
good-by following a , two-step process (see result 4, chapter III). 
First, he would select an optimal amount of public good supply and 
a unique level of private good consumption for all the members of 
the community as if he were endowed with average income and faced 
a price of the public good equal to the MRT divided by N. Second, 
he would distribute the burden of paying for the selected amount 
of public good among individuals so as to equalize private 
consumption. 
It then seems natural to assume that a Kantian, individual 
would follow exactly the same two-step process in deciding a fair 
contribution to the state when it is the latter which will supply 
the public good. In this case however it is not the fair quantity 
of public good supply which has to be chosen, since that is 
unilaterally set up by the state, but rather the fair price to be 
paid for the given amount of public good. We, will then -model the 
" 
process of reaching a Kantian contribution by assuming that first, 
a Kantian individual selects a fair price to pay for the given 
amount of public good supply as if he were endowed with average 
income and he had to pay a "price" for the given amount of public 
good equal to the MRT divided by N. By multiplying this fair price 
for the given amount of public good supplied we get the amount of 
income that, on average, the Kantian individual would wish that 
all the individuals composing the economy paid to the state. 
Finally, we redistribute this average amount across Individuals so 
190 
as to equalize private consumption. 
As for the fair price itself we assume that it is equal to 
the marginal evaluation or marginal willingness to pay --in terms 
of the numeraire, private consumption-- that a Kantian individual 
would impose on the the given amount of- public good supplied. 
Using equations (1) to (3) we then write the fair price w` for an 
individual belonging to group i as: 
(4) wt(G. I) Uä/Uý(G; I-WG) 
That is, the price that a Kantian individual belonging to 
group i would perceive as fair is equal to his marginal rate of 
substitution evaluated at the given amount of public good and at 
the level of private good which would result if the Kantian 
individual were endowed with average income (I) and he had to pay 
for the public good a "price" equal to the MRT divided by N. By 
multiplying this fair price for the given amount of public good 
supply and' by redistributing the resulting amount across 
individuals so as to equalize private', consumption, as indicated 
above, we get the amount of money that an individual belonging to 
group i would wish that individuals belonging to his group and to 
the other group paid to the state: 
qý- (Ij - I) + wt(G, I)G 
(5) 1-1.2 ; j-1,2 ; 1; dj 
qti. (IL - I) + wti(G, I)G 
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where q" is the Kantian contribution that an Individual 
belonging to group i would wish that an individual belonging to 
group j paid to the state --and similarly for qti. Equation (5) 
derives strictly'from the analysis of the second Kantian rule 
performed in chapter III. Note-however that in getting through to 
equation (5) we had implicitly to assume that individual I not 
only knows the distribution of income In the population --which in 
terms of large aggregates ' may' be not too unrealistic-- but he also 
has accurate estimates of the production function for the public 
good. This certainly requires much more information than that a 
taxpayer typically possesses. Note however that it would 
impossible to talk meaningfully of perceived fairness of the terms 
of trade between citizens and the state if we did not assume that 
taxpayers have at least a rough idea of the existing trade off 
between purchasing power (private consumption) and supply of 
public goods. And, as many, survey researches show (see for 
example, Likert, 1966) people -do make, judgments regarding the 
fairness of the relationship between what,. they pay_ to the, state 
and what they receive back2. Furthermore, most of the so-called 
public goods supplied by the state are really private goods with 
2As 
Spicer and Lundstedt (1976: 296) put it "[while] it can be 
argued that many taxpayers are not able to assess the exact value 
of what they pay or what they receive from government in 
return ... it seems reasonable to suggest that taxpayers have 
general impressions and attitudes concerning their and. other terms 
of trade with government" 
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-S - 
public good characteristics (for example. both education and 
health enter into this category). For this type of good our 
assumption above is not too unrealistic, because typically such 
goods-are'also"privately supplied. Then, simply by looking at the 
existing terms of trade in the private market. an individual is 
likely to obtain'a rough knowledge of the production function for 
these goods. 
3 0 
Turning again to equation"(5) it is now easy to obtain the 
Kantian taxes for each'type of individuals. We just define them as 
the average rates resulting by dividing q" for the income of the 
corresponding type of individual; that is: 0 
tý _ qt/I. 
(6)' 
t; 
t . t. 
s g. /I. 
1-1,2; j=1.2; IZJ 
tj (tb) is the Kantian rate of tax: that is. it is the 
average rate that a Kantian individual of type i would wish an 
individual of type j (i) to pay on his income. Note, from equation 
(5), that the Kantian tax is a function of the total provision of 
3In 
a previous version of this paper. I studied the case where 
individuals had only a probabilistic knowledge of the production 
function for the public good. However. In addition to complicating 
the model quite seriously, this hypothesis produced different 
results from the ones presented here only if it was assumed that 
the perception individuals had of the production function was 
seriously biased either in one direction or another. Since there 
is no reason to suppose that this occurs in the real world I 
decided to stick to the simpler version. 
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the public good by the state as well as of the income 
distribution. This is what one would have expected. 
Turning now to the fair tax. we argued in the previous 
chapter that this should be a function of both the Kantian tax 
selected by an individual and of his perception of the actual tax 
behaviour of, the other taxpayers. We assume here that each 
individual knows the average tax payment of each group composing 
the society. This does not sound too unrealistic., In fact, such a 
contribution is just given by the difference between the income 
tax raised on each individual of each group and the average level 
of tax evasion inside that group. At least for large aggregates it 
is plausible to suppose that an individual may come to get some 
idea about these two variables. For example, at least in Italy, 
both pieces of information are available in the press. 
4 Let us 
then write the fair tax as a function of the Kantian tax and of 
the average level of tax payment inside each group: 
(7,8) 4F tih =f 
(Q ZLt tLIti -x, tiIj- xi ) 
where t. (ti) is the average rate of tax imposed by the state 
4In Italy. in May, the Newspapers usually publish the main tables 
of the Annual Report of the Minister of Finance on tax collection. 
These tables contain the average income declared by each single 
category. Together with the new Coefficients Presuntivi di Reddito 
(Presumed Income Coefficients) these data would allow one to 
compute quite easily the estimated tax evasion for each single 
category. Some economic newspapers have already attempted this 
exercise: see for example Il Sole 24 Ore, 7\8\1989. 
194 
on the income of individuals of type i (j)5, x* is the average 
level of tax evaded by all the individuals in group I except h and 
x, 
1 
is the average level of tax evaded by all individuals belonging 
to group j (that is, x, =2Zxih/N and xL=21_hx. k/[N-2]). 
Even in 
this simpler formulation many specifications of eq. (7,8) would be 
still possible. Mainly- for simplicity we choose a linear 
approximation of-eq. (7.8), where the fair tax of an individual h 
belonging to group'i depends, in addition to the Kantian tax, on 
the difference between the tax that the individual would like the 
other taxpayers to pay and what they actually pay on average: 
(9) qgh = qt -P (tLIt- (tLIL - xi)) -'(32(týIj - (tI xi)) 
where 0: 5(3i<l , t-1'92 (3Y: S1, represent the reciprocity 
weights on the other contributions. Note that in line with our 
previous discussion, eq. (9) Implies that individual h would wish 
to pay exactly the chosen Kantian rate of tax if everybody else 
did the same and would revise upward or downward his wished 
contribution following other behaviour. From eq. (9), by 
subtracting qgh from tLI;, we can finally get the desired level of 
As yet, I have not really introduced a tax system in the model 
and the formulation adopted in the text is intended to maintain 
the maximum of generality. What I am implicitly assuming is that 
given a particular fiscal system (proportional or progressive) 
individuals are able to compute the average rate of tax on their 
and other type's income. However, in the-rest of the paper, as it 
is customary in most of the literature on tax evasion I will 
assume a proportional tax system. See chapter VII for some 
comments on this issue. 
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tax evasion; 'doing this and rearranging terms: 
(l0) '' zih, -' (1 - (31)Iti(tL'- tL) + (31x + 132t X. + (3ZIj(tý - tý) 
where as above' zih -represents the desired level of tax 
evasion. Eq. (10)-offers a nice decomposition of the desired level 
of tax evasion into-its-components. -As- argued in the previous 
chapter. the desired level of tax- evasion turns- out to, be a 
function of the amount of. public good supplied by the state 
(through the Kantian taxes), the fiscal= structure, (through the 
actual rates of-taxes), and the level of tax evasion by the other 
individuals composing the society. It does seem therefore that our 
formulation of the desired level of tax evasion is able to capture 
the essence of the fairness approach to income tax evasion 
outlined in the previous chapter. 
' The signs of the partial derivatives of zth. also-seem to be 
in line with both intuition and the sociological literature quoted 
above. Ceteris paribus, the desired level of tax evasion is in 
fact an increasing function of the difference between the actual 
tax that an individual is asked to pay and the Kantian tax; an 
increasing function of the level of perceived tax evasion by the 
other individuals in the society: and a decreasing function of the 
difference between the actual tax imposed on the individuals of 
the other type and the tax that individual h would wish them to 
pay. All. these comparative static results respect the flavour of 
the sociological literature quoted above. 
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Also note that the linear specification of the desired level 
of tax evasion obtained in eq. (10) offers a further advantage: 
depending on the-values attributed to the reciprocity weights, it 
allows one to get as special cases many important alternative 
models of tax evasion. For example. for t36-(3"-O, we return to the 
case of pure Kantian behaviour studied in the chapters III and IV; 
for ß1"=1 and 12=0 we get a pure reciprocity model; and so on. For 
future reference, note thatif we assume the limiting case that 
L+3t"1 the 'Kantian 'taxes disappear and we get a model of 
iz 
reciprocity among social groups corrected by differences in income 
distribution (this can be easily verified by substituting eq. (5) 
and (6) in eq. (10)). 
Finally note that there is no a-priori reason why ztih should 
lie inside the°'range of possible tax evasion. For the reasons 
stressed in the previous chapter we`avoid this. `problem by modeling 
the extreme cases as corner' solutions; that"iss we define a new 
variable xth such that: 
ih- 
(11)' Xth 
a Xi h 
z. if OSzL}: st1. IL 
0ifz. 
h<0 
t. 
16 
I. if z. >t. IL 
xLh could be termed the amount of feasible desired tax 
evasion. But, for reasons which will become immediately apparent 
and to avoid confusion with the desired level of tax evasion, I 
will instead call x. h the 
fairness constraint on income tax 
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evasion. 
VT. 3 The Tax Evasion Choice 
x. h 
then represents the (possible) amount of tax that an 
individual h, taking into account. the behaviour of the other 
individuals in the society and the amount of public good supplied 
by the state, would evade if he did not face any risk in doing so. 
But. as we argued in the previous chapter, there is usually a risk 
in evading and an individual must-take-It into account when 
deciding how much of his desired tax evasion he can achieve in 
practice. It then seems natural to model taxpayer behaviour as the 
result of a constrained maximization process, where the taxpayer 
maximizes an expected utility function --which takes into account 
the riskiness of evading-- subject to the constraint represented 
by the amount of possible desired tax, evasion --which takes into 
account the fairness of evading. Calling- p.. the probability of 
detection for an individual of type 1. and n (n)0) the penalty 
imposed on tax evaded6, both supposed', known and. given to the 
taxpayer, we can express the individual taxpayer's problem as 
follows: 
6Note that, for obvious reasons, while we distinguish between the 
probability of detection for two groups, we assume an unique 
penalty rate. 
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(12) Max (1-p, )Ui((1-t)Ii+x 
ih; 
G) + pUti((1-t)ICTrxLh; G) 
xih 
s. t. 0 xth S x. 
where in eq. (12) I have assumed, for simplicity, a 
proportional tax system (i. e. ti-`tz-t). Let x., be the amount of 
evaded tax'that the individual h would choose by maximization of 
the expected utility function in (12) if he were not subject to 
the fairness constraint. Then we can more easily express the 
solution to problem (12), let us call it as as x. h min(xh; x`h). 
It is easy to check that the last equation does indeed 
reflect the intuitive argument for a fairness approach to income 
tax evasion that we presented in' the previous chapter. Suppose 
first that xLh>xtih then selfishness --i. e. the ' individual 
calculus of expected costs and benefits-- dictates an higher level 
of tax evasion that the amount that the taxpayer would consider it 
fair to evade. But, according to our fairness approach, no 
individual would ever evade more than x`h, simply because he would 
consider it "unfair" to do so. Therefore, x`h=xih. Suppose next 
that x 
h<x. 
h. 
Then the individual would wish to evade up to xtih, 
but evading any amount above x. 
h could be self-defeating in terms 
of h's own perceptions of the risk involved, thus undermining the 
reestablishment of fair terms of trade that the individual is 
trying to achieve,, in the, first place, by evading. Then, xtih=x, 
h. 
As should also be clear, x, 
h represents the solution to the 
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problem of-income tax evasion. as presented in-the usual portfolio 
choice model. Not surprisingly therefore, the comparative statics 
derivatives of x. h are entirely in line with the results typically 
reached in this literature. In order to simplify the presentation, 
I will here'limit'myself to stating 'these. results, for future 
reference, without providing a formal proof7. The references given 
next to each result indicate to the interested reader where he can 
find the formal proofs. - 
The existence of an unique solution to the maximization of 
the expected utility function in (12) and the second order 
conditions are guaranteed by the assumption of strict concavity of 
the utility function that we imposed at the beginning of the paper 
and by the convexity of the constraint. - The assumption of 
concavity implies also risk-averse behaviour on the part of the 
typical taxpayer. -An interior solution for x, 
h (i. e. a solution 
0 
where OSx0: StI. ) is guaranteed by the following two conditions th 16 
(Allingham-and Sandmo, 1972): 
(1- p. ) - np. = S. >0 Lt ti 
(13) 
(1 - pti)Ut(IL; G) + pLUt((1 - Trt)Iti; G) <0 
where the suffix in the utility function indicates the 
7Most 
of these results are however proved. In passing, in chapter 
VII. 
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partial derivative with respect to private consumption. The first 
condition above has a ready interpretation. For the risk-averse 
taxpayer to evade, the expected gains from the evasion must be 
greater than the expected costs; or to put it differently, the 
expected "price" of tax evasion, s., must be positive. In what 
follows, unless otherwise stated, I will, always assume the 
conditions stated-in eq. (13) to hold. 
The assumption of risk-averse behaviour is enough to sign the 
partial derivatives of xh with respect to pt and n, which are 
both negative (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). The comparative 
statics derivatives with respect to the income and- the tax rate 
are instead in the general case ambiguous; however, as recalled in 
the previous chapter, the assumption of'DARA allows one to sign 
both of them as follows: ax. 
h/äI, >0 axh/at<O8 (see Yitzhaki. 
1974). The derivative with respect to G is. instead ambiguous even 
in this latter case; however Cowell and Gordon (1988) have shown 
that if"the demand for the public'"good"is"'characte'rized by zero 
income elasticity and assuming both risk aversion and DARA, then 
it follows that ax. h/aG>O (see chapter VII). 'Another case where 
the latter derivative can be'signed is given by separability of 
the utility function in private and public good. In this case 
trivially, ax, h/aG=O. I shall exploit both of these special cases 
in the next sections. 
It is perhaps worth remembering that the derivatives above 
8Indeed, 
as is easy to verify, dx' /d:, _ -dxo /dt[1- t]/I, . eh th ti, 
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are not the equilibrium derivatives. So far. neither have we taken 
in account the interdependence among the agents nor have we 
defined-government-behaviour. This will be our task in the next 
section. 
VI. 4 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics Properties with Exogenous 
Public Expenditure 
VI. 4.1 The Equilibrium 
Before analyzing the equilibrium in, my model we have first to 
discuss government behaviour. In fact, as I am going to show, the 
properties of the equilibrium turn out to be strictly dependent on 
the assumption made about the way in which government is supposed 
to finance public expenditure. If we adopt a short run perspective 
public expenditure and tax revenue are likely to be independent. 
In, the real world different governmental-. agencies are in, charge of 
decisions concerning taxation and expenditure; and the possible 
discrepancies between the two are covered by public budget surplus 
or deficit. In the short run, then. public expenditure can be 
considered "exogenous" in the sense that it can be determined, at 
least to an' extent, independently --of- revenue considerations. 
Therefore, in the short -run, we can think of,: government as 
disposing of two separate decision variables, the, tax structure 
and public expenditure. In the long run, on the contrary, the only 
appropriate, concept of equilibrium is one where'the public budget 
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is fully balanced, that is, where all public expenditure is 
covered by tax revenue. In this case, public expenditure becomes 
"endogenous" in the sense that once government has selected the 
rate of tax, tax revenue and therefore public expenditure is, 
given the tax behaviour of taxpayers, wholly determined. Hence in 
the long run, government can only control a choice' variable, the 
tax structure and it loses the control of total public expenditure 
(but not necessarily of its composition: see chapter VII, note 8). 
In the rest of this chapter we will analyze the extreme case 
of wholly exogenous public expenditure leaving the analysis of 
endogenous public expenditure to the next chapter. To put it a bit 
more formally, we assume that, in the short run, government can 
freely choose among the 'following ' set of parameters 
A"{pi, p2, t, Tz. G}. We can then state formally our definition of 
equilibrium as follows: 
Equilibrium "Given A. an equilibrium is a vector of evaded taxes, 
xyh, such that xth x. h 
Vi. dh. " 
That is. by recalling the definition of xth given in the 
previous section, an equilibrium is a vector of evaded taxes such 
that each individual, taking the behaviour of any other agent in 
the economy and the parameters set up by government as given, 
maximizes his (expected) selfish utility function subject to his 
fairness constraint. Note that, given A, our model represents just 
a simple example of a non-cooperative game under Nash behaviour, 
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where the players are the taxpayers and where the strategy set of 
each player is constrained by the amount of (possible) tax 
evasion. Then in order to prove the existence of an equilibrium in 
my model I will just need to use the standard-tools of game theory 
for this type of game. To this end note that with exogenous public 
expenditure an individual taxpayer's choice is influenced by the 
other taxpayers' choices only through the fairness constraint; we 
stress this fact by writing xth-min(x. h; xi. h(xi, -h) 
) xi, h(xi. -h) 
where 
xi-h indicates the vector of choices of tax evasion of all, the 
individuals composing the society except the individual h 
belonging to group I. Second. note that x (x. ) --the best reply th L-h 
function of individual h in. the terminology of game theory-- is a 
continuous function of xh.. We can then state: 
Prov, osition 1 "A Nash equilibrium exists" 
Proof "Let X-(x in RN: O: Sxtih<_tI. for 1-1.2 and h-1..., N/2} and 
www 
let F (X) - xii )..., x'' RiN/ 
Z 
(R 
1-N/ Z)' 
XZi (x2-1) '' RZN/ Z 
(RZ-N/ 
Z) 
} 
X is clearly a compact and convex set. From continuity of each 
individual best reply function, the function F(X) defines a 
continuous function from the set X in Itself. Hence, by Brouwer's 
Fixed Point Theorem it must exist a fixed point. That point is an 
Nash equilibrium in our game" 
Hence an equilibrium exists. But we can ' prove under 
reasonable assumptions a much stronger result: 
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Proposition'2 "Suppose (3i+(3i<1 1-1.2. Then equilibrium is 
unique" 
Proof "By using the definition of a contraction9, it is easy 
to verify that xtih-min(x, h'xih(xt-h)) xih(xt-h 
is a contraction 
if -both x; h -and x. 
(xL-h) are contractions in xL-h. But x°h is 
trivially a contraction and xth(xt-h) is a contraction if 0i+(32<1. 
Then, provided that the last condition holds for 1-1,2, each 
individual best reply function is a contraction which implies that 
F(X) is also a contraction: then equilibrium is unique. (See 
Friedman, 1986: 44). " 
The intuition behind this last result is pretty clear. As we 
noted at the end of section VI. 2 above, if 13i+(2- ui1 the Kantian 
taxes disappear from the computation of desired tax evasion and we 
are left with a simple model of reciprocity across social groups. 
It is then obvious that in such model we may have multiple 
equilibria. In what follows we will stick to the reasonable case 
where 1i+13Z< 1. This allows us to prove another important result: 
9Let f(x) be a function with domain'A c Rm and ranze 'B c Rn. If 
there is a positive scalar X <1 such that for any x and x'e A, 
d(f(x), f(x'))5 Xd(x. x'. ), where d(. ) indicates the distance between 
the two points, then f(x) is a contraction. If f(x) is a 
differentiable function, the definition above is equivalent to 
Z. Iafj/ax, I: SA for each component fj(x) of f(x)=(f I(x),..., 
fn(x)}. 
205 
Proposition 3 "If ß1. +13z<i. i=1.2 . equilibrium is symmetric: i. e. 
xth'x.. 1 
Yh, 1-1,2. " 
Proof "Suppose not. Then there exist at least two individuals 
A' and B belonging to the same group i such that x. A Fix x 03 
in 
equilibrium. But, by assumption of identical individuals inside 
each group, if xCA and xyH are, equilibrium choices it is possible 
to swap the choices between the two individuals still obtaining an 
equilibrium: that is, an allocation ' where A evades x. ,B evades 
xiA. and everybody else keeps his choice unchanged is still an 
equilibrium. But then we would have two equilibria, in 
contradiction with Proposition 2. above. Hence, x`Amxt8 for all A 
and B belonging to group i. " 
Then. In equilibrium, each individual of the same group must 
evade the same amount of tax. This will allow us in the next 
sub-section to consider the comparative static results of the 
model as resulting from. the interactions of only two individuals. 
Finally note that (3+13 z<1,1-1.2 also implies, under a simple 
adjustment mechanism, that the unique symmetric equilibrium is 
also locally stable (see Comes and Sandler, 1986: 92 and chapter 
VII, section VII. 1). 
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VI. 4.2 Comparative statics results 
Assuming %3i+(ii<l, 1-1.2 , equilibrium is then unique and 
symmetric. This implies that such equilibrium can only be 
characterized by one of the following four cases: 
(1) both social groups are constrained in their tax behaviour: 
I. e. xi-xi and xZ=xz 
(2) both social groups are unconstrained in their tax behaviour: 
i. e. xi-x and x2-xZ; 
(3)-(4) One social group is constrained and the other is 
unconstrained in their tax behaviour: i. e. xL-x and x, ax° 1-1,2 
j-1,2 
The next table summarizes the four possible cases: 
Table VI. 2: equilibria with exogenous public expenditure 
type 2 
constrained unconstrained 
I II 
constrained xi ; xZ Xi ; Xz 
type 1 
III IV 
unconstrained x1 ; XZ x1 ,; 
xi 
Without imposing additional structure on the model it is 
impossible to tell in which region the equilibrium lies (see 
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below). Note however that in line with Baldry's results we now 
have three regions (from I to III) where at least one group of 
individuals evades less than would be in its selfish interest to 
do. Also note'that, as we are about to show, the comparative 
statics results of the model will depend on the region where the 
equilibrium happens tolle. In the following exercises we will 
always assume interior solutions for both x0 and X. i-1,2 (i. e. 
O<x0<tI. ' and 0<x: =z <tI. ) . LLLLL 
VI. 4.2.1: Changes In t 
Let us start by considering a change'in the rate of tax. In 
region IV, 'under the assumption of exogenous public expenditure. 
the results will just replicate-those of the traditional portfolio 
model (see section VI. 3): both x0 and xa will fall as t increases. 
In region I, however, where both groups are constrained in their 
tax behaviour we obtain different results. By considering eq. (10) 
and using the fact that in the symmetric equilibrium x. -x. -x. LLL 
i-1,2 we can write the fairness constraint in equilibrium as: 
(14) xt- IL (t - tti) 
i=i. a J-1,2 1*J 
where 
i/(1 
- 13i). Then, by totally differentiating xl and 
xx, 
as expressed in (14), with respect to t and solving the system 
we get: 
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a; gat=i >o 
(15) 
axz/at-iZ>0 
that is, individuals of both types would resist an increase 
in the rate of tax by attempting to evade completely the augmented 
tax10. It is important to stress the intuition behind this result: 
at unchanged public good supply the taxpayers, who were already 
constrained in-their behaviour by considerations of fairness, 
perceive the increase in their tax rate as "unfair": thus, since 
an increased amount'of tax evasion pays off in terms of expected 
costs and benefits, they react by increasing tax evasion. To this 
author the above sounds a''"quite 'convincing explanation of the 
reason why taxpayers --or at least a reasonable amount of "honest" 
taxpayers-- should wish to increase their level of tax evasion 
10 Note however that tax revenue would in any case increase 
following the increase in the tax rate since part of the evaded 
taxes would be detected and taxed at the surcharge rate. To see 
this note that expected tax revenue (=actual tax revenue since in 
large economies the probability of being detected will coincide 
with the proportions of individuals actually detected) can be 
written as: 
R^'N/2(t[I1+I2 ]- sixi - sZx2 - 2c 
where c(. ) Is the average 
probabilities of detection piand 
equation above with respect to t we 
st<1 . 
(PI"P2)) 
cost needed to enforce the 
PZ. By differentiating the 
get dR/dt=N/2ZIL (1-s. )>O since 
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following an increase in the tax rate. 
The effect of an increase in the proportional rate of tax in 
regions II and III is illustrated by the following derivative: 
to 
(16) äx / t- I. +$ ax°/ät -$ 11"1,2 , J-1,2 , iýý %1 11 11 
As can be seen from eq. (16) there are two tendencies at work 
here. On one hand there is'the positive effect due to the increase 
of the tax rate above the Kantian rate of tax; this is captured by 
the first element in the equation above. On the other hand there 
are the two negative effects due to the increase in the tax rate 
faced by the Individuals-in the other group and by the decrease in 
the amount of tax evaded by the latter: these are captured by the 
third and the second element of eq. (16). The net effect is 
ambiguous: hence the question marks in table VI. 3. 
Table VI. 3: effects of changes In t 
type 2 
const 
I 
constrained axi/at 
axzlat 
type 1 
rained unconstrained 
- II 
>0 ax gat ? I 
>0 ax°/at <0 2 
III IV 
unconstrained axo/at <0 axa/at <0 ii 
ax2lat ? axi/at <0 
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VI. 4.2.2: Changes in G 
As we recalled. in section VI. 3 the effect of changes in 
public expenditure on evaded taxes is ambiguous in the standard 
portfolio choice model. So, in order to make our results 
comparable, we will consider in this section only the main special 
case where this ambiguity disappears: the case of, zero income 
effects on the demand for the public good. Going back to eq. (4), 
note that this assumption implies' that the marginal rate of 
substitution (i. e. the fair price) of the representative taxpayer 
depends only upon the given supply of the public good. 
Let us start with region I. Not surprisingly, since we 
modeled the fair price as a marginal rate of substitution, the 
effects of changes in G on tax evasion turn out to depend on a 
quantity elasticity. This can be seen by substituting 
'eq. 
(5) and 
eq. (6) in eq. (14) and totally differentiating with respect to G. 
Forming-the system and solving we get: 
(17) axL/ac= -1/V((1 -0 )w (s+1) +e (1 - )Wj (cj+1 
1-1.2 . j-1.2 . i4j 
where V-(1 - e)>0 by assumption and where sti-(w"G/wý). 
1-1.2 . is. the elasticity of the marginal willingness to pay with 
respect to changes in public good supply. Then dxi/dG<O ( >0) as 
both le 1<1 and IeZI<1 (Ic11>1 and IcZI>1) and similarly for 
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dxZ/dG. Different types of elasticities for the two types of 
individuals (i. e., for example. 'jc'j>1 and jczj<1) would then 
produce ambiguous results, while elasticities which are both 
greater or smaller than unity allow one to sign unambiguously the 
effects of a change. in public good supply on tax evasion. Also 
note that if we assume that the two types of individuals have 
identical preferences and identical reciprocity weights (i. e. if 
w' w-w and eq. (17) reduces to dxi /dG=dxz /dG=-w (C+l) . The 
two types of individuals would then react to the change- in G by 
shifting their evaded tax in the same direction and by the same 
amount. 
The rationale for the result above is straightforward. If the 
marginal willingness to pay is quantity inelastic (i. e. 1ct1<1 
1-1,2) a 1% increase in public good supply would reduce the price 
that an individual regards as fair to pay for the public good by 
less than 1% : then the total amount of income that the Individual 
considers fair to pay to the state in exchange for the public good 
supplied must increase following the increase in G and 
consequently tax evasion must fall. Vice versa for the opposite 
case of quantity elastic wt. 
The intermediate cases of regions II and III are less 
clear-cut. By differentiating eq. (14) with respect to G we get: 
(i s) axe ) wi (c +1) +$ ax/ac 
1-1.2 . j-1.2 . 1; dj 
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Since dx°/dG>O for a'public good with zero income effects J 
(see section VI. 3) the sign of dx. Ido is certainly positive for 
Ic"1 >1, while is ambiguous In the opposite case. Finally, under 
the assumption of exogenous public good supply, the signs of the 
derivatives in region IV are both positive (äx0.0/dG>O, i-1,2). The 
next table summarizes the results with respect to changes in G: 
Table VI. 4: effects of changes In G 
type 2 
constrained 
type 1 
constrained 
I 
Ox /aG >0 
s; I Ci (`1 
ft /aG <0 
unconstrained 
II 
symmetric 
to III 
III IV 
unconstrained axi/aG >0 0x/aG>0 
Ox z /OG? 
le 1<1 
2 0xZ/aG>o . 1>1 axi/aG>o 
VI. 4.3 A First Summing Up 
Summing up, the comparative statics results for the case of 
exogenously given public expenditure show that: 
(1) The signs of the comparative statics derivatives depend on the 
region where the equilibrium lies; 
(2) In some regions individuals evade less than would be suggested 
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by a pure calculus of expected costs and benefits; 
(3) At least In some regions, individual and total tax evasion 
turn out to be a positive function of the tax rate; 
(4)'Public expenditure is not neutral to the decision to evade by 
individuals and its effects on tax evasion are determined (in the 
constrained regions) by the quantity elasticity of the "fair 
price". 
As argued in chapter VI, results (1) to (4) are more In line 
with both intuition and empirical evidence than the traditional 
results of the portfolio choice approach to tax evasion. The main 
limit. of the approach, illustrated in the previous sections is 
that, at the level of, extreme generality that we considered above, 
we were unable to predict where the equilibrium tends to lie with 
respect to different values of the parameters selected by 
government. In order to solve some of these ambiguities and to 
address some other important questions we will consider In the 
next section a simple example of the model outlined above. Here we 
limit ourselves to stating the following result: 
Proposition 4 "Suppose that (1) individual preferences and 
reciprocity weights are the same across social groups (i. e U1-U2-U 
and $1=0z(2) the expected price for evaded tax is the same 
across social 'groups (si=s2ms>O): then, under DARR, a regime where 
rich people are unconstrained and poor people are constrained by 
fairness considerations is impossible. That is, either region II 
or region III must disappear. " 
214 
Proof "Without loss of generality let Iz>I1. Note from eq. (4) that 
U1=UZ implies t"=t" , 
i-1.2 , 
j-1,2 . 
i; dj. Suppose that x -s° and 
j I. 2z 
xi=xi is an equilibrium. Then, from DARA and assumptions (1) and 
-oa, - o (2) above, in equilibrium x22: x2" , where x1>0 by assumption 
(2),. Substituting from eq. (10) and eq. (ll) in the inequalities 
above and solving for xi in equilibrium we get: 
(19) zz-I(t - tz) + $(max(O, zi)- I1(t - ti))? x? x 
(20) xi>x max(O, zi=I1 (t - tt) + $(xi - IZ (t - tZ) ) 
Suppose first that zi>0. Then, by substituting for zi in 
eq. (19) and by solving both eq. (19) and eq. (20) for xi we get: 
(21/2) IZ (t - ti) > I1 (t - ti) 
By substituting from eq. (5) and eq. (6) in tti, 1-1,2, the 
inequality in (21/2) requires Iz<I1 which is Impossible by 
assumption. Next. suppose zISO : then substituting in eq. (19) and 
(20) and repeating the steps above we get: 
(23/4) IZ (t - tz )> I1 (t - ti) [i +- &2] >I (t - ti) 
since -8<1 by assumption. This is again impossible; we then 
conclude that xz-xi and xi-xi cannot be an equilibrium. QED" 
Hence, if differences in. preferences and in opportunities 
for evading across social groups are not relevant, poor people can 
never be constrained if rich people are not constrained by 
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fairness- considerations. This sounds reasonable enough. 
Proposition 4 then suggests that, if differences in preferences 
and in opportunities for evading are small, equilibrium will shift 
from one region to another,, following a change in the rate of tax 
and/or in public good supply, without ever entering region II (for 
1, >I-)-., The example discussed in the next section confirms this 
conjecture. 
Section VI. 5 An Example: Cobb-Douglas Utility Functions 
As we saw -in the previous section, it is in general 
impossible to establish which particular regime will prevail in 
equilibrium. This is of course not surprising. In the- general 
case, the two types of individuals differ both'in terms of their 
personal characteristics and in terms of the probability of 
detection that they face. We are therefore unable to decide, for 
example, who, between poor or rich people, will tend to evade more 
in equilibrium. This substantial ambiguity of the general model, 
if expected, is however unfortunate. for two basic reasons. First, 
because as we saw above, the results of the model depend upon the 
region where the equilibrium lies. Second, because-, it does not 
allow one-to address some of the most interesting questions which 
could be, asked in the model, For example, in which -region the 
equilibrium tends to lie for different values of the tax, rate.: or 
the effects of public. expenditure on tax evasion. In -particular, 
one would wish to, investigate not only the 'effects of total 
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expenditure on tax evasion --i. e. the issue of over/under 
provision -of public' goods-- but also the effects that the 
composition of public expenditure --i. e. its being more or less in 
favor of poor versus rich people-- may'have on tax evasion. 
In order to gain some insights on the issues above it is then 
necessary to lose some generality by'reducing our general model to 
simpler and more tractable terms. We choose to do so by imposing a 
simple parameterization on the preferences of individuals and by 
introducing other-simplifying assumptions. In the following we 
will indicate which assumptions are crucial and which assumptions 
could be eliminated without harm. 
Let, us start by assuming that both types of individuals are 
characterized by the same type of preferences, representable by a 
Cobb Douglas utility function in logarithmic form: 
(25) Uti' logCth + at, logG h-1..... N/2; 1-1,2 
The parameters aL , O<at<1 . capture in a very simple way the 
differences, in preferences for the public good across social 
groups. Note that the parameterization in eq. (25), implies 
separability of preferences In public and, private, good. This is 
crucial because, as explained in section VI. 3, separability 
. entails that the, unconstrained solution x° is independent of 
public good supply. In the present context this is acceptable 
because we are here mainly interested In the effects, of. government 
expenditure on the perceived fairness of the terms of trade and 
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the latter affects only x.. ti 
We also assume that the two types of individuals face the 
same probability of being caught if evading, p, which implies 
si=si=s. This assumption,. together with the utility specification 
in (25), implies that, if unconstrained by fairness 
considerations, rich people will evade in,. absolute terms more than 
poor people (that is, x°)xz as I1>IZ This sounds intuitively 
realistic. Thus, the assumption above on p, if clearly not 
necessary, represents a simple way to introduce this feature of 
the real world in our model. 
Going back to eq. (12), we can then write the unconstrained 
solutions to eq. (12) for the two types of individuals as: 
0 (26) x°. [sI. (1-t)j/n 1-1.2 
where, in line with eq. (13), 0<x0<tI; ifs>O. and t>s/(s+n), 
i-1,2. In the following we assume both these conditions to hold. 
Note that x0 is a decreasing, function of t, with xo-0 for t-1. 
Turning now to the fairness constraint we assume, first, for 
simplicity, that the- reciprocity weights- are the same across 
social groups (i. e. (3 
1=0ä=(36. 
s=1.2 which implies 
Second, following the analysis of the previous section, we impose 
the condition that f31+ (3Z<1 so- as to guarantee us an unique 
symmetric equilibrium. Using eq. (25) and-eq. (4), the price that an 
individual, h belonging to group i would consider fair to pay to 
the state can then be readily calculated as: 
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(27) wt(I, G): Lati(I-ýG)]/G i-1,2 
where as above I is average income and 'P is the marginal rate 
of transformation for large economies. Then, by using eq. (10), 
eq. (ll). eq. (12), eq. (26), eq. (27) and the symmetry of equilibrium 
we can express the individual choice as: 
(28) x, mmin[s(1-t)Iti/n; 
max(0; (1-t) (OIi- I. )+ (1-ý') ((1-a. 
ti 
)I+a, IVG) + ex. ) ] 
ýýý 
for 1-1,2 and i0j. In order to close the model and to make 
the individual choice dependent only on the rate of tax selected 
by government we need a further step. We need some way of linking, 
even with. exogenous 'public expenditure, - revenue to public 
expenditure. We do this, by assuming that government, selects the 
rate of tax according to the 
rule t=ö, PG/I', where 15651/(1-s). G is 
the amount of public good that government decides, ex-ante, to 
provide and 6'is a parameter which express government's beliefs 
about expected tax evasion. If 6-1. government expects everybody 
to pay the tax and therefore the rate of tax is selected so as to 
enforce a balanced budget if everybody does turn out to pay all 
the tax. If government expects some tax evasion, 6 will, be raised 
proportionally and finally if government expects everybody to 
evade completely the taxes 6-1f(1-s) so as to enforce even in this 
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case a balanced budget. 
11 
In passing, it should be noted that this 
process-is likely to be, in the short run, closer to actual 
government. behaviour -than assuming always a balanced public 
budget. 
Without loss of generality, let IZ? I1 and let us simplify the 
notation by writing I1=I and IZ=kI, with k2: 1. Then by substituting 
for G=It/6W in eq. (28) above and using eq. -(26), we can write the 
choices of the two types of individuals as: 
(29) 
x1«Imin [s(1-t)/n; max{0; (1-t)(ßk-1)+(1-ß)(1-ai(1-t/6))(1+k)/2+ßxZ)] 
xZ. 'Imin[ s(1-t)k/n; max {0; (1-t)($-k)+(1-8) (1-az (1-t/6))(1+k)/2+&x1)] 
In this simplified version of the model the decision to evade 
by the two types of individual can then be seen to depend on four 
parameters in addition to s: the tax rate (t), the distribution of 
preferences for the public good (aa2), the. income distribution 
(k) and the reciprocity weights (f). By working out the conditions 
11 In the te; tt we are assuming for simplicity that the cost to 
enforce the probability of detection p is negligible with 
. 
respect 
to the entire tax revenue and it therefore does not appear in the 
public budget. Also note that, assuming rational expectations on 
the part of government, ä would be implicitly determined by the 
equation: 
6-11(1 - s/, 2[xI(6WG/. I) + x2(6LWG/I)]) 
where x, (. ) indicates that x. is a function. of 6WG/I. 
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which establish an equilibrium in the different regions we can get 
a glimpse of the influence of the different parameters on tax 
evasion. Thus, ' suppose that the equilibrium lies in the 
unconstrained region IV; for this to be the case the two following 
inequalities must hold: - 
(30a) (1-0)(1-ai(1-t/6))(1+k)/2 ? (1-t)(1-k6)D 
(30b) (1-$)(1-a2(1-t/6))(1+k)/2 ? (1-t)(k-e)D 
where D=(s+n)/n. Note that the RHS of eq. (30b) is larger, for 
k>1. than the RHS pof eq. (30a): thus, if (30a) -holds as an 
equality, (30b) cannot hold unless aZ>ai: that is°. unless public 
expenditure is "regressive". -Also note that while the LHS of (30a) 
is certainly positive, the RHS of the same equation is likely to 
become negative for large amounts of inequality' in income 
distribution: Thus, irrespective of the characteristics of public 
expenditure, poor people are likely to be unconstrained if rich 
people are unconstrained by fairness considerations. Finally 'note 
that the LHS, of both eq. (30a) and eq. (30b) are increasing in t 
while the RHSof both equations are decreasing in t: this suggests 
that the unconstrained equilibrium can only be reached at 
relatively- high rates of tax. And in fact by summing the 
corresponding sides of eq. (30a) and eq. (30b) and solving for t, we 
can-. get, as a necessary but not sufficient condition, the minimum 
value of t needed to enforce an, equilibrium in the unconstrained 
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region: 
(31) t? 6(D-1+a)/(D6+a) 
where a-(ai+az)/2. Note that t in eq. (31) is increasing in 
the average preferences for the public good ((x); that is, the more 
individuals prefer on average the public good the higher must be 
the rate of tax faced by individuals for them to become 
unconstrained in their tax behaviour. 
The analysis of the conditions which would enforce a 
constrained equilibrium (i. e. xti -c., i-1,2) shows that this 
requires. in contrast to the previous case, a relatively low rate 
of tax., and in particular, symmetrically to the case above, a tax 
rate less than the RHS of eq. (31). The intuition behind this 
result is clear: as we saw in the previous section evaded tax is 
increasing in the tax rate in the- constrained region and is 
decreasing in the unconstrained region. Thus, at low levels of the 
rate of tax (i. e for t=0) the fairness constraint is likely to be 
much lower than the amount of evaded tax suggested by the expected 
utility calculus and individuals will tend to be constrained in 
their tax behaviour.. By increasing the tax rate the fairness 
constraint will tend to increase continuously while the selfish 
amount of evaded tax will fall continuously. Thus, there has to be 
a level of the rate of tax where selfishness dictates a higher 
level of tax evasion than that desired by individuals. From that 
rate of tax onwards the taxpayers will start to be unconstrained 
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in`their tax behaviour. This suggests that we should observe 
constrained tax behaviour at low levels of the tax rate and 
unconstrained behaviour at high level of the tax rate. The special 
case considered below confirms this conjecture. 
Turning''now to the intermediate cases of regions II and III, 
using-eq. (29). one immediately gets the conditions which would 
enforce an equilibrium where poor people are unconstrained and 
rich people are constrained in their tax behaviour (i. e. x1-xi and 
xZxz) : 
(32) (k-$)(1-ai(1-t/ö)) ? (1-kß)(1-c* 
For k>1 this condition is likely to hold while if k-1 it can 
only hold for ci>a2. The condition for the reverse case of xi-x 
and xZ=xz is of course identical to eq. (32) with the reverse sign. 
It is then clear that if there is a strong inequality in income 
distribution the latter equilibrium cannot exist even if public 
expenditure is strongly progressive (i. e. ai>QZ). This is of 
course in line with proposition 4 above. 
Summing up, for each level of t, it will be the more likely 
that rich individuals are constrained in their tax behaviour and 
the poor unconstrained the higher is income inequality and the 
higher are the preferences of rich people for the public good 
relative to the preferences of poor people. Furthermore, keeping 
everything else constant, individuals of both types will tend to 
be. constrained at low tax rates and unconstrained at high tax 
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rates. 
The effect of the reciprocity weights on the equilibria is 
more ambiguous because they tend to keep the behaviour of the two 
types of individuals closely related. In order to cast further 
light on characteristics of the model let us then consider two 
extreme values for the reciprocity weights: &=0 (i. e. (=0 1-1,2) 
and G-1 (i. e. 13 
11 +P'-1 1-1.2). The former case refers to a 
situation where reciprocity effects across social groups are 
absent or very small; the latter to a situation where the Kantlan 
taxes (and therefore public expenditure) do not play any role in 
determining individual behaviour. Beginning with the former case 
and substituting for 0*0 in eq. (29) we get: 
(33) xi=min[s(1-t)I/n; max{0; (-(1-t) + (1-ai(1-t/6))(1+k)/2)I)] 
xzsmin[s(1-t)Ik/n; max{o; (-(1-t)k ± (1-a2(1-t/6))(I+k)/2)I)] 
First note that in eq. (33) zz<z if 
(34) a1<az+2(k-1)(1-t)/[(i+k)(1-t/6)] 
Condition (34) must hold if k? 1+(2(6-t)/(6+t(1-26)). Thus for 
example, if 6-1, k-3 is enough to guarantee condition (34) to hold 
for any admissible value of al and a Second note that, as is easy 
to verify, for taO and k>1, z<0 (i. e. x-0) while zi can be still 
positive if ai<(k-l)/(k+1); that is. for large amounts of 
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inequality in income distribution individuals of type 1 may still 
wish to "evade" --i. e. to receive a subsidy-- even if the tax rate 
1szero. On the other hand, for t*1, both z1 and zz are positive. 
By comparing these results with the values of x° in eq. (26) for 
the extreme values of t, it is clear that at low levels of t 
individuals will be constrained and at high levels of t 
unconstrained. We can check this by computing the value of t which 
makes zv. just equal to zero and by computing next the value of t 
which sets zy equal to x°. Doing this for the two types we get: 
(35) t2 -1- FZ/(2kö + (x 2(1+k)) 
tZ -1- FZ/(2kcD + aZ(1+k)) 
ti -1- F1/(2ä + a1(1+k)) 
tip- 1- Fi/(26D + ai(1+k) ) 
where t is the rate of tax which makes z. 0, t is the rate 
of tax such that z. -x° and F. -(1+k)[a. (1-6)+d]. Note that ti- ti ti t 
0<t*<tZ <1 certainly and O<ti<t1 <1 if ct>(k-1)/(k+1). It is also 
clear that if preferences for the public good across social groups 
do--not 'differ too much t*>ti and ti >ti . In any case, even if 2 
public expenditure-is strongly in favor of poor people it can be 
shown that, for 6 1. condition (34) is enough to guarantee tZ>ti 
and tz*>ti*. The sign of (ti*-t*) is instead uncertain: however, 
for identical preferences k2: 2 is enough to guarantee ti <tZ and 
for 6 *1 the same inequality can be obtained for k2: 3. For high 
values of 6 (tim -tz) becomes ambiguous and we can even get an 
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inequality of the opposite sign. 
The next picture summarizes the results reached so far for 
selected values of the parameters k, at, 6 and D12. 
Figure VI. 1 
Tr 
-boll 
i 
As figure VI. 1 shows, at very low, levels of the tax rate 
there is no tax evasion; at higher levels of the rate of tax poor 
individuals start evading --and their evaded tax is an increasing 
function of the tax rate-- while rich individuals evaded, tax 
presents a flat range. By increasing further the rate of tax poor 
people's evaded tax becomes negatively sloped in the tax rate 
12In 
the picture we assume 6s1. k? 3 and a >(D-2/(1+k)). As is easy 
to verify these assumptions imply t >t*>t**>t*>s/(s+rz). For 
ZZii 
different sets of 'assumptions seethe next pictures. 
i 
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while'rich people's tax evasion is positive and increasing in the 
tax rate. Finally, only at relatively high levels of the tax rate 
does tax evasion present the traditional downward-sloping feature 
of the portfolio-choice model. Note that at low levels of the tax 
rate --or public good supply since for fixed 6 the two variables 
are linked by a constant-- the tax evasion of the poor is greater 
than the tax evasion of the rich while the opposite holds at high 
levels of the tax rate. Also note that in figure VI. 1 there is 
never a case where the poor are constrained and the rich are not. 
Using figure VI. 1, we can easily illustrate the effects of 
changes in income-inequality and in the progressiveness of public 
expenditure on the tax behaviour of the two types of individuals. 
A reduction in k, for example, would reduce xi, increase x2 and 
reduce xi for any level of t. while x1 would remain unchanged. 
Similarly, an increase in the "progressiveness" of public 
expenditure (maybe a change in the composition of public 
expenditure so as to make it more attractive to the poor rather 
than the rich) would increase x2 and decrease xi for any level of 
t. 
13 The next figures illustrate. 
In figure VI. 3 we have imagined a sufficiently big change in 
the composition of public expenditure as to make t>t (i. e. 
condition (34) does not hold). Note that in this case, with public 
expenditure strongly progressive and limited inequality in income 
13These 
results are in line with the empirical evidence on this 
issue: see Becker et al. (1987). 
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distribution. the rich evade more than the poor for any level of 
the tax rate. 
Figure VI. 2: effects of a decrease In Income inequality 
V 
* 
Figure VI. 3: effects of an increase in the progressiveness of 
public. expenditure 
tt 
4 
h 
228 
Summing up, the most interesting -feature of the exercise 
attempted in this section is that it seems to predict a zero or 
very low level of tax evasion for low levels of the tax rate: an 
intermediate range of values for the tax rate where tax evasion is 
roughly increasing in the tax rate, and a final -range for high 
levels of the tax rate where tax evasion is decreasing in the tax 
rate --if such levels would ever be reached. If not entirely 
satisfactory. such results are undoubtedly more in line with 
observed facts than the results of the traditional portfolio 
choice model of tax evasion. Furthermore the effects of changes in 
income-inequality and in the progressiveness of public expenditure 
on tax evasion are also intuitively appealing and in line with 
experimental evidence (see Becker et al..,, 1987). 
Let us then consider the opposite case of $-1. As we recalled 
above, In this case public expenditure --and therefore differences 
in preferences for the public good across social groups-- does not 
play any role in determining the position of the fairness 
constraints. This is a general result (see eq. (10)) but in the 
present framework this can be very easily verified by substituting 
for 0=1 in eq. (29). In contrast, x would be still influenced by 
public expenditure and it is only the particular parameterization 
chosen in this section --i. e. the separability of preferences in 
public and private good-- which makes x0 unaffected by G. 
Having made this point clear, let me remind the reader that 
In section VI. 4.2 the assumption 0<1 was used to prove uniqueness 
of equilibrium. However, that condition was only a sufficient but 
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not necessary condition for uniqueness of equilibrium, as the next 
proposition illustrates: 
Proposition 5 "Suppose 9-1. Then, if k>D, the only symmetric 
equilibrium for any t such that 0<_t<_l is one where x-x0 and 
x -x -0". 2z 
Proof "Substituting for O=1 in eq. (29) above we get: 
(36a) zi=(1-t)(k-1)I + xz 
(36b) zz=-(l-t)(k-1)I + xt 
By definition of xti and from eq. (36b) it follows that: 
(37) z2 (xi-xi): s z2 (xi-xi)-I[s(1-t)/rr - (1-t)(k-1)] 
Differentiating zZ(xi) with respect to t: 
(38) az2(xi)/dt= I(k-D) 
Then, I f k>D, zZ(xa) is everywhere an increasing function of 
t., Hence it must 'reach a constrained maximum at the highest 
admissible value for t, t=1. At t-1. zZ(xi)-0. Hence, z2(xi)_O for 
O: St51. Then, for all 0<_t: Sl, x2-x2-O. Back substituting in 
eq. (35a). we then get that x =x° if z (x =0)? x° ; that is x -x° if ii1Z111 
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(39) z1 (xz=0)-x1 =(1-t)I(k-D)2: 0 
which certainly holds for k>D. QED" 
Note that the condition k>D is a very'mild condition indeed. 
In"Pact, since s<1 and 77 'Is in general larger than 114, D is 
smaller than 2 and for reasonable values-of s and it, D is quite 
likely to approach unity. Then if $*1 a very small amount of 
income inequality should be enough to enfoice'an equilibrium where 
rich people never evade and poor people are'never 'constrained in 
their tax behaviour. Note however that in proving proposition 5 we 
assumed a symmetric equilibrium: proposition S. in other words, 
does not rule out the possibility'that, even with k>D, there may 
be multiple asymmetrical equilibria'. For 1<k<D and OSt<1 we obtain 
multiple symmetric equilibria; an equilibrium where x=x° and 
2 =x2-0 
is still possible but we can also obtain equilibria for 
any value of 0<_x. <x° , i=1.2. An equilibrium in the unconstrained 
region with x =x° and x -xO is instead impossible. Finally, for sizz 
1+ w 
t-1 and k<D there is an unique equilibrium for x1-0 and xz-o. 
The analysis of the case for -1 then illustrates the role 
played by the Kantian tax in my model: it is as if the Kantian tax 
14 On logical grounds, for the surcharge rate tobe a penalty. It 
would be enough that n>O. On the other hand, in most countries, n 
is larger than one. For example in Italy, Tr is approximately 3.. 
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selected a particular equilibrium among the many offered by a pure 
reciprocity model. 
VIAConclusions 
In this chapter we set up the basic structure of our model 
and analyzed it in the case of fully exogenous public expenditure. 
A number of interesting results were obtained. The behaviour of 
the taxpayers turned out to depend on the region where the 
equilibrium lies. There are regions where individuals are 
constrained in their tax behaviour and therefore evade less than 
predicted by selfishness and other regions where they behave as 
predicted by the traditional portfolio choice model. In the 
constrained regions tax evasion tends to be an increasing function 
of the tax rate. Also, our parameterization of the model in 
section 5 suggests that constrained tax behaviour tends to occur 
at low levels of the tax rate and unconstrained behaviour at high 
levels of the rate of tax. Thus, we should observe a zero or very 
low level of tax evasion associated with very low tax rates and 
positive tax evasion increasing in the tax rate associated with 
higher rates of tax. The portfolio choice effect of decreasing tax 
evasion in the tax rate can be obtained only for relatively high 
rates of tax and, consequently, it can also never be observed if 
the-tax rate is below a given threshold. 
In the chapter we also analyzed the effects of public 
expenditure, income inequality, and the reciprocity weights on the 
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tax behaviour of the different social groups. Public expenditure 
was shown to affect tax -evasion'"in the-. constrained region 
according to a quantity elasticity, while the distribution of 
preferences for the public good across social groups affects the 
tax behaviour of the different groups of individuals in the 
expected direction. The analysis of the effects of changing the 
level of inequality in income. distribution on the-. equilibrium also 
produces intuitive results. Finally, we considered, in, the example 
of, section 5. two extreme values-for the reciprocity weights. The 
results showed the crucial role played by the Kantian tax in 
selecting an equilibrium among the many made possible by a'. simple 
reciprocity model. Let us then turn to the case of fully 
endogenous public expenditure. 
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Chapter VII: A Fairness Approach-to Income Tax Evasion: 
the Analysis with Endogenous Public Expenditure 
VII. 1 The equilibrium 
As argued in the previous chapter. in the long run, the only 
appropriate concept ofýequilibrium is one where the public budget 
always balances; that is, where public expenditure is endogenously 
determined by tax revenue. We have then. to reformulate the model 
presented' in, the. previous chapter so as. to allow for endogenous 
public expenditure. This can be easily done as follows. 
I 
Let R be the total tax revenue collected by government. In 
order to get an expression for R, recall that in our model each 
individual h belonging to group i knows the total amount of tax 
evaded by the other individuals in the two groups. Let us then 
call Rti_h the-total expected, revenue that government would collect 
if individual h belonging to group i fully paid his tax. We can 
express RL_h as follows: 
(1) Ri. 
-h 
'N/2[t(I1+IZ)-2c(piop2)I-Z E(xtk)-ZhE(xjh) k; dh 
1In this section I follow strictly the analysis of Cowell and 
Gordon (1988). See their paper for a more extended discussion of 
the model and for the analysis of a number of cases which are not 
considered here. 
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where E(. ) is the expected value operator and c(. ) is the 
average cost needed to enforce probabilities of detection p_ and I 
pZ 
ý 
Of course, R-R. 
-h 
-E(x 
ti. h 
). Using eq(2) of the previous 
chapter, we can then express the total supply of the public good 
as: 
(2) G-N/W(N)[1/2(t(II+Iz)-2c(P1. P2 )I 
-1/w(N)I2: kPdhE(xik)+ZhE(xjh)1-1/W(N)[E(Xth)I 
Taking the limit of 
imposed in the previous 
public good and the fact 
the probability of being 
coincide with the actual 
then rewrite eq. (2) as 
eq(2) for Naas, using the assumptions 
chapter on the production function of the 
that for a large number of individuals 
detected in each group will tend to 
share of taxpayers caught evading2 we'can 
(g) G-(tI-c(pI . pz )-1/2(stx. -sjx 
where R is just a shorthand for the expression in parentheses 
above and the other symbols have the meaning specified in the 
previous chapter. Note that R is the expected average tax revenue 
for a large economy. Eq. (3) then implies that for each individual 
2That is. for Nwo. E E(xik)=((N/2)-1)sLx =(N/2)s. xi and kpeh 
ZhE(xih)=(N/2)sjxj. 
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h the amount of public good supplied is a known, given amount. 
Using eq(3) above and the analysis developed in the previous 
chapter we can express the individual optimizing problem in the 
case of endogenous-public expenditure as: 
(4) Max (1-p. )UL((i-t)Ii+xi. 
h'R/t) `+ ptUt((1-t)it-rrxtih, VIP) 
xih 
, 
s. t. O xth_x; 
As in the previous chapter, let us express the individual 
choice in eq(4) as xth, = min(x, 
h; xth) , , where' xth is the solution 
to problem (4) without considering the fairness constraint. Note 
that for given R the"first and second -order°`"conditions for the 
unconstrained solution of eq. (4) are the same-conditions analyzed 
for exogenous public expenditure. 
While the above follows strictly the analysis of the previous 
chapter, note however that there are now two important 
differences. First, unless each type's preferences are separable 
in public and private good, the unconstrained solution x0 is now 
a function of other individual behaviour as well. This is so 
because the choices of the other- individuals in terms of tax 
evasion affect total tax revenue and therefore, through eq(3), 
public expenditure. Second, the fairness constraint is now a 
function of other individuals' behaviour through a double channel. 
On the one hand there is still the direct or reciprocity effect. 
which we studied previously. On the other hand, there is now an 
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indirect effect which operates through the effect of other people 
choices on public good supply and therefore on the marginal 
willingness to pay and the Kantian taxes. 
in spite-of these differences it is still very easy to prove 
thatran equilibrium exists in my model. Again, as in the previous 
chapter, let us define an equilibrium as a vector of evaded taxes 
, x. fi such that xýh=xti'h 
for di and dh. Without repeating all the 
steps, followed-in, the previous chapter. section VI. '4.1, to prove 
the existence of an equilibrium, simply note'that even in the-case 
of endogenous public expenditure- the individual best reply 
= 
°function 
x. min(xth; x, h) 
is still a continuous function of xL_h. 
This is so because the utility function is assumed to be 
differentiable in G and this guarantees that both xh(. ) and 
xth(. ) (for' interior 'solutions) are differentiable in xti-h3 
3To be more precise, if we assume the conditions expressed In 
eq. (13) of the previous chapter to hold, 0<xLh<t. I.. Then, xth is 
certainly continuous In-'i t-h' 
due to the 'fact that the utility 
function is assumed to be differentiable in G and that G(. ) is 
differentiable in xti-h from eq. (3) of the previous chapter. Hence 
x. 
h is differentiable in x. ' and therefore it must also be 
continuous in it. Similarly, xyh is also-continuous in xIn 
fact, if O<zth<tti IL . xLh-ztih "and xih is certainly continuous in 
xti-h because the marginal willingness to pay is differentiable in 
xti_h'and therefore xýh is differentiable in xt-h; if either zLh40 
or ztih? t. I.. x. h 
is trivially continuous in xt-h because it does 
not depend on it. Therefore both x. 
h 
and xh -are continuous 
functions of xt-h* 
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Therefore they must be continuous function of xL_h which in turn 
implies that xtih(. ) is also continuous in xTherefore, as in 
the-previous chapter, we obtain individual best reply functions 
which are continuous functions of other behaviour and the proof of 
the existence of equilibrium follows naturally. 
Hence, at least an equilibrium exists. Unfortunately, while 
it-is not difficult to find sufficient conditions which would 
ensure a unique equilibrium even in the case of endogenous public 
expenditure4, such conditions are not as easily interpretable as 
in the case of exogenous public expenditure. In particular, there 
seems to be no reason why they should hold in the general case. We 
then conclude that with endogenous public expenditure multiple 
equilibria cannot be ruled out. Unfortunately, this also implies 
that we cannot rule out the possibility that some of the resulting 
equilibria may be asymmetric: that is, that identical individuals 
may be characterized by different choices in an equilibrium. In 
4Sufficient 
conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium can be easily 
found by determining the conditions which would guarantee both 
xtih(. and x`h(. ) to be contractions in xIn fact. - as it can 
be easily shown, if both x. h(. 
) and x. h(. 
) are contractions in 
xti_h , x. h(. 
)-min(xtih, x. h) must also 
be a contraction in xL_h. We 
did this, but as stated in the text, the derived conditions did 
not allow for a clear interpretation and therefore they have not 
been reported here. 
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the following we will concentrate only upon symmetrical 
equilibria, that is, equilibria where xth=x.. Vh, 1-1,2 , and we 
further impose a condition which would guarantee such equilibria 
to be locally stable. The idea is that asymmetrical equilibria. 
even if they can still exist, may be unstable and therefore they 
would tend' to' disappear in the long run. Following Cornes and 
Sandler'(1986: 92), under a simple adjustment mechanism, local 
stability'of"a 'symmetric Nash equilibrium with two types of 
Individuals-is ensured by the following conditions: 
(5) (axi/axe) (axz/ax1)<l 
where the derivatives in eq. (5) are evaluated at the 
equilibrium choices for x 1-1,2. As we will see in the next 
5In 
order to get eq. (5) we postulate an adjustment mechanism of 
the following type: 
dx. /dT - vL{xt(xj)-x1[r]} i-1,2 j-1,2 i; dj 16 
where v. is a positive constant, x[z] is the actual value of X. Lw 
at time T and x. (x. ) is the optimal value of evaded tax, according 
to, eq. (4) above. That is. each individual adjusts to his optimal 
value with some delay. Linearizing the equation above around the 
equilibrium and computing the conditions for local, stability we 
obtain eq. (5) in the text. Note that in the equation above we are 
assuming that identical individuals will tend to deviate from the 
equilibrium simultaneously, in the same direction and by the same 
amount (see Seade, 1980 for a discussion of the validity of this 
hypothesis in Cournot equilibria). Also note that in the case of 
corner solutions (i. e. x°-x. ) the derivatives above must be 
LL 
interpreted as directional derivatives. For a more satisfactory 
discussion of the stability conditions in the case of an income 
tax evasion model with endogenous public expenditure see Cowell 
and Gordon (1988). 
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sections condition (5) is also helpful to sign the comparative 
static derivatives. 
VII. 2 Comparative static analysis 
Unfortunately, differently from the case studied in the 
previous chapter, the comparative statics analysis with endogenous 
public-expenditure turns out to be characterized by a much larger 
amount of ambiguity. Practically, where there are two types of 
individuals differing both in terms of personal characteristics 
and in terms of opportunities for evading, the effect of a change 
in the tax rate on evaded tax can not be signed in any region 
where an equilibrium may lie. It is then worthless to concentrate 
on the general case and it is instead convenient to focus on some 
particular, cases where we can get at least a feeling for the 
effects of changes in the parameters on equilibria. 
Let us then introduce some simplifications in the general 
model above. In the following we will always assume: 1) the demand 
for the public good is characterized by zero income effects; 2) 
the probability of detection is the same for each type, (i. e 
si-sz-s). The first condition is crucial since it allows us to 
sign the effects of a change in the tax rate on x0 ; the second is 
ti 
not strictly speaking necessary but it allows one to simplify 
considerably the treatment and it seems quite innocuous. As we are 
going to show, the two assumptions above are not enough to allow 
one to sign the comparative statics derivatives'in the different 
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regions and extra assumptions will have to be imposed. 
Let us then start by supposing that the equilibrium under 
consideration lies in the unconstrained region IV; that is, x, -x° 
1-1,2. Assuming an interior solution (1. e the conditions expressed 
in eq. (13) of the previous chapter hold), we can analyze the 
effects of changes in the rate of tax by differentiating the first 
order conditions and by invoking the implicit function theorem. 
The first order conditions for the unconstrained solution to 
problem (4) can be written as: 
(6) (1-p)Uc(CLh. G(x*. xj)) - npUt (Cih'G(x*. xj)) -0 1, J-1.2 iPdj 
where CL (1-t) IL+X0 Cif (1-t) IL-T x0 and G has been 
written as above to remind the reader that G is now, through 
eq(3), a function of the behaviour of other individuals. Assuming 
a symmetric equilibrium in region IV, we get x. h-x; -x0 and xj-x0 
By differentiating (6) with respect to t: 
(7) 
dxi/ät=1/DET{ [GZ-swZrz/zvi (r-i (iiiwi/, y) ]+(swir1izý] [rZ( iZ-IwZir) 
axZ/at-1/DET([ei-swiri/aw} [rz(iZ-iwZ, w) ]+(sw2r2/aw} [ri(I _Iwi/ln }1 
where aL=(1-p)Ucc(CL 'G+n2pUcc(Cz. G)<0 by concavity of the 
utility function, r(1-p)Ucc(CLG)-rrpUcc(Ci, G)>0 by assumption of 
DARA, wt_Ut/Ut(G) is what we called in the previous chapter the 
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r 
fair price and DET-AY_s(w1r*12+WzrZAt)/2W >0 by condition (5) 
aboves. 'As, 'stated eq. (7) is difficult to interpret; but note that 
if we assume identical incomes and identical preferences across 
social groups eq. (7) reduces to: 
(s) aX°/at-1/DET(A[rI(1-w/W)]) 
It can now be seen that the sign of eq. (8) depends on the 
sign of (1-w/W). To interpret this expression, note that w-W 
identifies a Pareto-optimal level of public good supply. In fact, 
by eq. (3) of the previous chapter t=W(N)/N; therefore w-W can be 
rewritten as NwzW(N), which is the Samuelson condition for 
efficiency in public good provision. Eq. (8) then shows that, with 
identical individuals, evaded tax is increasing (decreasing) in 
the tax rate if public good is underprovided (overprovided), that 
6Recall that we are assuming zero income effects on the demand for 
the public good. This assumption implies that Ua/UC(. ) does not 
depend on C. Therefore, UCa=(Ua/UC)UCC' By differentiating eq. (6) 
we get an expression in Ucc which, using the above, can be written 
as 
(1-p)U (CG)-npU (CZ. G)-(Ut/U")((l-p)U (CG)-npU' (Cz, G)] 
CC) t CO aC cc t cc t 
wtrt 
using the shorthand introduced in the text and the fact that 
the fair price, with zero income effects on the demand of the 
public good, depends only upon G (see eq(4) of the previous 
chapter). Finally, note that dx 
/dIL. 
--(1-t, Therefore, if 
L 
following the hypothesis of DARA we assume dx? /8Iti>O, Tt>0 
certainly. For further details, see Cowell and Gordon (1988). 
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is if w>W (if w<I ). This is of course the Cowell and Gordon 
result reported earlier; but note now that eq. (7) shows that this 
result is not very robust. In particular, even if we assumed 
identical-preferences across social groups, the sign of the 
derivatives in eq. (7) would still be totally ambiguous. We have 
better luck if -we assume identical incomes and different 
preferences across social groups. In this case, as is easy to 
verify, w`<W<w implies exa/ät<O and dx°/ät>0,1, j-1,2 i#j. 
However this condition has nothing to do with the issue of 
over/under provision of the public good and the nice link derived 
by Cowell and""Gordon between tax behaviour and over/under 
provision of the public good is lost in an economy with different 
agents. 
Also note that the counter-intuitive results of the portfolio 
choice model survive even in our extension of the model to 
different agents: in eq. (7) above, in the special cases derived 
for egalitarian income distribution, the individuals who have to 
gain (to lose), in'expected terms, from the increase in the tax 
rate increase (decrease) their evaded tax following an increase in 
the tax rate. The driving force behind -these results is of course, 
as explained in chapter VI, the assumption of DARA. 
Let us then consider the opposite case of an equilibrium 
lying in region I. where both types of individuals are constrained 
in their tax behaviour. Assuming an interior solution for xt, (i. e. 
0<zL<tIt) and a symmetric equilibrium we can write xti as: 
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(9) .. x. - Iti[t-tti(xt. x)] + ax+ 01ý [t(j , 
_x, )-. t] 
where I have already substituted for the symmetric 
equilibrium and where the Kantian tax has been written as a 
function of the amount of evaded taxes in order to remind the 
reader of the indirect influence that now other individual 
behaviour exerts, through eq. (3), on the fairness constraint. 
Unfortunately, comparative statics analysis with the general 
formulation in eq. (10) above produces ambiguous results. Let us 
then simplify greatly eq. (10) by assuming identical preferences 
and identical reciprocity weights (Ui-UZ=U and Si-OZ=9). Then. by 
differentiating eq. (10) with respect to t we get: 
(10) äx/t- Iý'- T[(1-s)I]/(1-sT) 1-1,2 
where T=w(. C+1)/W . and where. as in the previous chapter, c 
indicates the quantity elasticity of the marginal willingness to 
pay. To sign (10) note first that the stability condition (5) 
requires 1/s>T7: therefore the denominator of the second term in 
equation (10) is certainly positive. Hence If JCI>1 . T<0 and both 
individuals will certainly increase their evaded tax following an 
increase in the rate of tax. If IEI<1 we get ambiguous signs and 
7With identical preferences and reciprocity weights condition (5) 
2 
reduces to (1-0)(1-sT)>0; hence, for 0<1, it requires 1is>T. 
I 
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ax. /dt may turn out to be negative. Note however that if I. -I I. L 
(identical incomes), di/ät<0 would require II <(w-w)/w; this can 
only be possible if the public good is strongly underprovided. 
Thus, in an economy where -income differences are limited. tax 
evasion in the-constrained-region can become decreasing in the tax 
rate only if the public good is strongly underprovided and the 
fair price is inelastic in the public good. 
The intuition-behind these results is quite straightforward. 
With endogenous public expenditure an increase in the tax rate has 
two-effects: a direct one through the tax rate and an indirect one 
through the effect of the change of the tax rate on public good 
supply. By comparing eq. (10) above with eq. (15) and eq. (17) of the 
previous chapter, it is clear that the first element in eq. (10) 
captures the direct effect and the second element the indirect 
one. Thus, if the fair price is elastic in public good supply the 
two effects act in the same direction (see chapter VI, section 
VI. 2). and we get unambiguous results, while if the fair price is 
inelastic the two effects affect the fairness constraint in 
opposite directions thus producing ambiguous results. Also note 
that in performing the exercise above we assumed zL>O; but, as the 
case analyzed in the next section illustrates, this cannot be the 
case if individuals are identical and G is underprovided. 
Therefore, at least for the case of identical individuals, x, is 
positively sloped in the tax rate for all the range where x. >O. 
Finally, let us consider the mixed regions II and III. Here 
ambiguity is even larger than in the two previous cases. In order 
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to, make some progress let, us then assume identical preferences, 
identical reciprocity weights and, without loss of generality, 
Iz >I 
I. 
Then,, from proposition 4 of the previous chapter, if an 
equilibrium lies in the mixed regions, it must be in region III, 
that-is where x =xc and x =x . Assuming a symmetric equilibrium 11zz 
and-differentiating with respect to t: 
(h a) axI/öt'h/H{ri[a+(iw/W-i1)]} 
(lib) axe/at=1/H(-rd[A+(Iw/T-I1)]-G[I2-&Ii+(1-&)IT]) 
A-s/2[(&II2)w/T+I1(1--&)T] H-[srl(1+$)/2w-Gi(1-s(1-o)T/2]. 
Needless to say the sign of (11) is in general ambiguous. Note 
however that if Ist>1 (i. e T<O ). H>O and A<O. Then, If inequality 
in income distribution is not too large and/or the public good is 
o- 
overprovided (i. e if Iw/W<I ax/ät<O and axz/at is ambiguous, 
while if the public good is strongly underprovided but inequality 
in income distribution is limited (i. e if Iw/W>II but the second 
term in (lib) is positive) 0 x°/at is ambiguous and axZ/at>0. 
Roughly speaking, these results are in line with the analysis 
performed above for the more clear-cut cases of region I and IV. 
Summing up, comparative statics analysis with endogenous 
public expenditure shows a much greater amount of ambiguity than 
$ 
8In 
a previous version of the paper I attempted a comparative 
statics exercise with respect to changes in the composition of 
public expenditure. The simultaneity problem that arises with 
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the analysis with exogenous public expenditure. However, when they 
can be signed, the comparative static results are roughly in line 
with the analysis of the previous chapter. Tax evasion is likely 
to be increasing in the constrained region and it was shown that 
the key parameter in this region is represented by the quantity 
elasticity of the fair' price. Tax evasion may instead be 
increasing or decreasing in the unconstrained region depending on 
over/under provision of the public good. In the mixed regions 
results are even more ambiguous but the key parameters are still 
the ones indicated above. The analysis above also indicates that 
clear-cut results with endogenous public expenditure can only be 
reached by assuming identical individuals. In order to get a more 
precise understanding of the implications of the model and to 
address some other important questions. it is then worthwhile to 
endogenous public expenditure, can be easily solved by assuming 
that government decides, ex-ante, to devote a share of total tax 
revenue to a particular public good. For example. if there are two 
public goods GI'and GZ, government may decide ex-ante to spend . 
of total tax revenue on public good Gi and (1-K) on public good 
Gz. where 05A: S1. Thus, eq. (3) above could be written as G-%R/ti 
and z 
and eq. (4) and the equations for the fair price 
could be similarly changed. The goal of the exercise was to 
investigate the effects that changes in the composition of public 
expenditure (i. e. Shifts in %) may have on tax evasion in the 
different regions and to relate these effects to some 
characteristics of the public goods. Unfortunately, the results 
did not repay the analytic effort and for this reason they have 
not been presented in the text. The results turn out to be 
ambiguous in all regions and I only get the weak result that in 
the constrained region I, with identical preferences, 
complementary public goods implies äx/c7. JX-Q<0., 
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consider the case of identical individuals in somewhat more 
detail. ` 
VII. 3 Identical Individuals and Government X-Inefficiency 
In the previous chapter and in section VII. 2 above, we 
considered cases where the decision to evade by a single taxpayer 
was motivated by a perception of inequity in his fiscal treatment, 
both'in relationship with other taxpayers and in relationship with 
the given supply of public goods by government. However, these are 
not the only cases where an individual may perceive himself to be 
involved in an "unfair" deal with government. Another case which 
is often quoted in the press as a major determinant of tax 
evasion, at least in Italy, is that where fairness is violated by 
the state itself through "inefficiency" in the production of 
public goods. The basic argument is that government is, unable to 
spend taxpayers' money efficiently and' that, ' consequently, ' the 
quantity-and quality of public goods supplied is not adequate with 
respect to total tax revenue collected. 
In this section we study the implications of this argument, 
being mainly interested in the effects that shifts in the 
efficiency of the state as a producer of public goods-may have on 
income tax evasion and on the relationship between the tax rate 
and evaded tax; -Since we are not interested in this section in 
motivations for evading arising from perceived inequity in the tax 
treatment of the different types of taxpayers, - -we simplify the 
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problem, byý, -assuming' identical individuals. Moreover, for the 
reasons stressed above we simplify further the problem by assuming 
zero -income, effects on the demand for the public 
the-case, studied, in this section will also allow 
precise understanding of the implications of th 
relationship between the tax rate and evaded tax 
identical individuals. 
Let us. then start by assuming that, in, line 
analysis, the "true" production function for the 
large economy, is given by;, ,. 
ý12ý. G-R/T 
good. Implicitly, 
us to get a more 
e model for the 
in the case of 
with our previous 
public good, in a 
We assume that individuals know the "true" production 
function. of. the public good. -and. that their computation of the fair 
tax is based on this. production function. We can then introduce 
government. X-inefficiency by assuming that the latter produces the 
public good according to the formula: 
(13) G=c&R/W 
where O<a<1. is our "efficiency" index of public good 
production.,, If a-1. governmental production is X-efficient, while 
if a<1 governmental production Is X-inefficient in the sense that 
a higher amount of the public good could be produced with the same 
revenue. Eq. (13) is probably the simplest 'possible way of 
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capturing analytically the complex issue of the low quality of 
government supply. From eq. (3) above, in an economy with identical 
individuals, average expected revenue for an individual h can be 
simply written as: 
(14) R tI - sx*- C(p) 
where as above x*_ik; dhxk/(N-1). 
In the following, we will 
assume that the average cost for enforcing probability of 
detection p is negligible with respect to average revenue and we 
will therefore set c(p)-O in eq. (14). This is just a 
simplification-which will make the graphical illustration of the 
results-of the model easier. We will indicate however where it is 
likely to be of some importance. 
In an economy with identical individuals, the desired level 
of tax evasion (see eq. (10), eq. (5) and eq. (6) of chapter VI) can 
be simply expressed as: 
(15) 2ha [1ý(3J(tIýw(G)Gý + f, x* 
Let us consider first the constrained region I. Assuming a 
symmetric equilibrium. in this region (i. e. x*-x), substituting in 
(15) and recalling our definition of x in chapter VI, we can 
write: 
(16) x(t, a) ? [tI - w(G)G] 
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Clearly, (16) will hold as an equality if the RHS of (16) is 
positive or equal, to zero (i. e. If tI>zh=z? O) and as an inequality 
if the RHS of (16) is negative (i. e. If zhwz<O). In the latter 
case x=0. Note that in (16) we wrote x as a function of t and, 
through (14), of a. Let us assume first that the RHS of (16) is 
greater than zero; then (16) holds as an equality and x>0. By 
substituting for x=x in eq. (14) and in eq. (13):. 
(17) G(t. a) - a[tI - sx]/W 
Eq. (16) and eq. (17) form a system of simultaneous equations 
in a and t; solving the system and differentiating respectively 
fora and t. we get: 
(18a) äGlät = aI[1-s]/(1-asT]W 
(18b) ac/aa a [tI-sx]/[1-asT]W 
(19a) Ox/at - I[1-aTj/[1-«sT] 
(19b) Ox/da =. -T[tI-sx]/[1-asT] 
where. as in the previous section, T-w[c+1]/W. The stability 
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condition (5) above9 imposes [1-asT]>0; therefore dG/Ot>O and 
dG/da>0 certainly, while dx/äa>0 [<0] as 
IEI>1 [1EI<1]. The sign 
of äx/dt is instead less certain; as we saw in the previous 
section, 'it is certainly positive if 
IEj>1 but It may become 
negative if IEI<1. Note however, as in eq. (10) above, that dx/dt<0 
would require ]sj<[aw-W]/aw. Let us then call G that level of G 
such that w(G*), W and that level of G such that w(G**)-T/a. 
Inspection of eq. (12) shows that G is the Pareto optimal level of 
public good supply with respect to the "true" production function. 
Also note that G*? G** for a<l. It is then clear that for G2: G** 
dx/ät>0 certainly. This will turn out to be useful below. The 
comparative statics results of eq. (18) and eq. 
(19) above are of 
course in line with our previous analysis and 
do not require 
further comments10. 
In the exercise above we assumed z-x>0: It is'now'time to'ask 
at which level of G this 
is possible. To see this. ' fix G at G, 
assume that x>0, solve-(16) 
for w(G)G, and subtract (17)-from the 
expression thus obtained. - Elementary algebra then shows: 
9Since in this section we consider only identical individuals, we 
change slightly the adjustment mechanism by assuming now a small 
deviation from the symmetric equilibrium of all individuals 
simultaneously. As can- be easily verified, for x>O, " local 
stability imposes [1-NJ<asT<1. See Cornes and Sandler (1986: 93-4) 
for further details. 
10Simply 
note that with a<1, it is-as, if, public expenditure were 
"exogenous", In the sense that by shifting a we can change G 
without having to change public revenue. It is then clear why our 
results for d; /da are exactly the same as the results achieved in 
the previous chapter for changes in G: see chapter VI. 'section 
VI. 4.2. 
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(20) G[w(G)-ý]ý_ [1-a]tI - [1-as]x " 
Next suppose that'a-1 and'G<_G that 'is, assume that the 
public good is underprovided. Then', 'w(G)? WY certainly and the LHS 
of (20) is greater than or equal to zero. 'In contrast, if a-1, the 
RHS of (20) is certainly negative for x>0. ' Therefore eq. (20) 
cannot hold' as an equality. "We then' conclude that ý for GSG and 
a-1, x-0 and (16) holds as an inequality. We have` established: 
Proposition I "If government is an efficient- producer of the 
public good, individuals will never'evade-for G less than or equal 
to the optimal level" 
The intuition is of course straightforward: if GSG' the fair 
price that an Individual'is ready to pay'for'the given supply of 
the public good is larger than the cost of providing that amount 
of public good; therefore if government simply sets tI-TG 
individuals would never evade. This result may look very strong, 
but it should be noted that we have assumed away here any problem 
concerning the distribution of the tax burden across social 
groups. Therefore taxpayers actually act as Kantians. Moreover, as 
can be easily verified, if we introduce back in eq. (14) the cost 
of enforcing a given probability of detection, tax evasion turns 
out to be positive, if small, at G-G for a-1. 
Going back to eq. (19a)"above, we now see that the ambiguity 
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about the sign of dx/dt disappears: whenever x>0. for a-1, the 
fairness constraint is certainly increasing in the tax rate. In 
order to get a complete picture of individual behaviour let us 
finally consider the unconstrained solution x°. By invoking 
eq. (8), we can immediately establish that the unconstrained 
solution x0 is. for a=1, a concave function of the tax rate with 
an unique maximum- associated with G-G Putting together the two 
pieces of analysis, it is then clear that, in an economy with 
identical individuals and an efficient government, tax evasion is 
zero for all G_G*, is positive and increasing in t for a range of 
values of t such that G>Ge. and might become positive and 
decreasing in the tax rate for high values of t. if such high 
values of t were ever to be reached. Figure VII. 1 Illustrates: 
Figure VII. 1 
Tax evasion with identical individuals and an efficient government 
RI 
i 
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If still not entirely satisfactory, because we cannot rule 
out the possibility that-at high tax rates evaded tax may become a 
decreasing function of the rate of tax, it is clear that the 
relationship between tax evasion and the tax rate presented in the 
picture above is far more in agreement with intuition and observed 
behaviour than the implications of the traditional portfolio model 
of income tax evasion. It is maybe worthwhile to stress again the 
intuition behind the picture above: for G<_G an increase In the 
tax rate would increase the welfare of the taxpayers: therefore, 
the latter do not resist the increase in the tax rate and they 
keep evaded tax at zero. If G ?G an increase in the tax rate would 
instead reduce individual welfare and therefore individuals 
attempt to resist this increase by increasing tax evasion. With 
all the caveats that the analysis still presents (see next 
section) the above seems to the present author a much more 
reasonable explanation of individual behaviour than that offered 
by the conventional models of income tax evasion. 
Let us now turn to the case where a<1. In order to identify 
the range of values of G such that x(t, c)>o, assume x). o . fix G G, 
and let t adjust so as to keep G=G when varying a. Solving eq. (17) 
for tsat G=G. and substituting in eq.. (16). we get: 
(21) x(t. a) - G[W-aw(G)]/[1-s]a 
where t is the rate of tax needed to keep G-G at any level of 
255 
a. Clearly, x>0 for G>G** and X-0 for GAG**. Going back to 
eq. (19a), `this implies that whenever x>O . the fairness constraint 
is an increasing function of the tax rate. This of course simply 
repeats our previous argument. Note however than now x>0 for G-G 
that is, individuals wish to evade at the Pareto optimal level of 
public good supply. 
In order to see the effect of changes in a on tax evasion let 
us first, ask how the rate of tax would change so as to keep G-G 
following a change in a. Assuming xx>O (i. e. G>G**), 
differentiating totally eq. (16) and eq. (17) at G-G and solving for 
dt/da-we get: 
(22) dt/dalG=D_ -[tI-sx]/[1-s]aI 
which is unambiguously negative. Since this holds for any G 
it must'"also hold for G=G ; that is, a fall in efficiency by 
government increases the rate of tax needed to enforce the Pareto 
optimal level of public good supply. Also note that from eq. (22) 
and eq. (16) dx/daja_o <0; that is, a fall in a must unambiguously 
increase the fairness constraint for any level of G. To get a 
complete picture of individual behaviour let us finally examine 
the effects of changes in a in the unconstrained solution x°. By 
substituting for G from eq. (13) in eq. (6) above and by 
differentiating with respect to t and a we get: 
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(23) ax°/at - rI[1-aw/W]/DE 
(24) öx0/Ba - -[wRr/W]/DE 
where DE=[G-sawn/W].. DE<O and therefore 0 x0/äa>011 and 
ax°/at >0 as W< aw. These are of course the results already 
o 
reached above: but note that now at" G=G ax /at<0 for a<l. 
Putting together these results with the ones reached before, it is 
easy to characterize the effects of a 
fall in government 
efficiency on tax evasion. Let us start 
from a=1 and consider a 
small fall in a: then, from eq. 
(19a) and eq. (24) above, if I, rI<1 
(jt >1) x will increase (decrease) and x0 decrease for any level 
of t. Furthermore, following the 
decrease in a, the level of t 
needed to enforce the Pareto optimal 
level of public good supply 
[t*=t(G*, a)] must increase (eq. (22)), the fairness constraint at 
t* must be positive (eq. 
(21)), and ax0/at must be negative at t. t* 
(eq. (24)). Figure VII. 2 illustrates for the two cases of ICI<1 
and 1eI>1. 
As the figure indicates, for jEj<1, a fall in a increases 
evaded tax for any level of t up to the point where x0(a)=x(1), 
and it reduces it afterwards. In contrast, if 
jkj>1, the fall in a 
reduces evaded tax for any level of t. Hence, depending on the 
11For the reason explained above, dx°/da has of' course the same 
sign as dx'o/dG in the case of exogenous public expenditure. 
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Figure VII. 2 
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value of jcj an increase in government efficiency may actually 
increase tax evasion. This conclusion runs against the very 
argument which stimulated the present analysis. It should be noted 
however that in the picture above we plotted tax evasion against 
the rate of'tax. If we repeated the same exercise by keeping G 
constant the results would change: as we noted above, in the 
region where x-x>o, tax evasion would certainly increase, for any 
level-of G. as a decreases. 
Finally, note that we kept a constant for all the exercise. 
But it is often suggested that the public sector tends to be less 
efficient the larger it is 
(because of increasing bureaucracy, 
more complex management problems, increasing administrative'costs, 
etc. ). In our simple model this could be captured by assuming that 
a is a decreasing function of t. since 
the latter variable 
represents a proxy for the amount of resources allocated to the 
public sector. Assuming x-; >o and 
jk1<1 it is then easy to 
establish from eq. (16) and eq. 
(17) above that if 
1ata/tl>tI(1-s), /GTs total revenue will fall as t increases. That 
is. if individuals are ruled by notions of fairness we may obtain 
a Laffer curve even in an economy without labor supply. 
VII. 4 Conclusions 
In this chapter we extended the analysis to the -case of 
endogenous public expenditure (balanced public budget). In section 
VII. 1 we modified the model so as to allow for endogenous public 
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expenditure, in section VII. 2 we repeated the comparative statics 
exercises of the previous chapter and in section VII. 3 we analyzed 
the model in the case of identical individuals. In the latter 
section we also investigated the effects of government 
X-inefficiency on tax evasion. The comparative statics results are 
in general ambiguous and can be signed only in some special cases. 
However, when they can be signed, they are roughly in line with 
the results achieved in the previous chapter. Evaded tax turns out 
to be increasing in the tax rate in the constrained region and 
increasing or decreasing in the unconstrained region according to 
the over/under supply of the public good. A special case where 
ambiguity disappears completely. Is the case of identical 
individuals and zero income effects on the demand for the public 
good. Accordingly, we studied this case in detail in section 
VII. 3. It was shown that in this case tax evasion is zero for low 
levels of the tax rate (up to the point where public good supply 
is Pareto optimal if the administrative costs for detecting tax 
evasion are small), is increasing in the tax rate for higher rates 
of tax and may decrease In the tax rate at very high rates of tax, 
if such levels would ever be reached. This of course confirms our 
results of the previous chapter and the comments advanced there 
apply here as well. Finally, we investigated the effects of shifts 
in government efficiency as a producer of public goods on tax 
evasion. In contrast to what one could have expected, an increase 
in government X-efficiency can increase or decrease tax evasion 
for any level of the tax rate depending on the quantity elasticity 
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of the fair price. However, at least in the constrained region, 
tax evasion would certainly fall for any level of public good 
supply following an increase in government X-efficiency. 
'Let me, now end up-this section with some general remarks on 
the analysis developed in this and in the previous chapter. The 
model presented-, in chapters VI and VII is surely primitive. The 
informational requirements needed by taxpayers to compute the fair 
tax are likely, to be too strong to be realistic and we limited the 
analysis'to'an economy without a labor choice decision. These 
caveats 'of the model indicate that the latter must be taken simply 
as a first attempt to consider in a formal analysis the complex 
Issue of the fairness of the relationship between taxpayers and 
the state. In the present context I wish only to stress that, in 
spite of its limitations, the model presented in the chapters 
above represents an improvement upon the traditional model of 
income tax,, evasion. The theoretical foundations of the model are 
deeply rooted in a sociological literature which is supported by a 
substantial'amount of empirical evidence. The results of the 
analysis are far more in line with intuition and the empirical 
evidence than the results of the portfolio-choice -model. Going 
back'to section V. I. we managed to achieve all the targets that we 
imposed-on our research agenda. Tax evasion was shown to be zero 
at low levels of the tax rate and increasing in the tax rate for 
at least some range of the rates of tax; there are equilibria 
where individuals choose not to evade even If It would be in their 
selfish interest to do so; and public expenditure affects tax 
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behaviour without producing counter-intuitive results. We further 
showed in the previous chapter that income distribution and the 
distributional characteristics of public expenditure are also 
Important factors in determining an individual's attitude toward 
tax evasion. Needless to say, all these predictions could be 
tested against empirical and experimental evidence. 
Also note that a'number of extensions of the analysis could 
be easily performed. For example, in the previous chapter we set 
up the model so as to allow for a general fiscal structure but we 
subsequently performed, the, analysis only for a proportional tax 
system. It would be interesting to enlarge the model to consider a 
progressive tax system; given the strong egalitarian bias of the 
Kantian individuals, a reasonable conjecture would suggest that 
evaded tax in the constrained region should fall for poor and rise 
for rich individuals. Similarly, we did not consider in the model 
that tax revenue is in part spent on redistributive transfers to 
the private sector. It might be worthwhile to try to introduce 
this feature in the model as well: again, intuition would suggest 
that desired tax evasion should increase for rich and fall for 
poor people. but this should be verified. Also in the model we 
assumed that everybody is ruled by fairness considerations: but it 
may be more realistic to Imagine that there is a proportion of 
taxpayers who are completely selfish. Given the reciprocity 
weights and the indirect effects on public expenditure it is 
likely that even a small share of taxpayers who are completely 
selfish could raise tax evasion considerably. But again this needs 
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to be verified more carefully in a dynamic model. Finally, maybe 
the most important problem which could be addressed in the model 
above concerns the issue of the selection of optimal rates of tax, 
penalty rates and expenditure on detection by government in an 
economy where individuals are ruled by fairness considerations. I 
reported in section VI. 1 on the difficulties within the 
traditional model'of addressing these questions; and my feeling is 
that the results of an optimal tax evasion exercise in my model 
could be very different from the traditional ones. Indeed, if 
there is a-policy suggestion which could be drawn by the present 
analysis it is that the reestablishment of "fairness" in the 
relationship between taxpayers and the state might be a more 
effective tool for reducing tax evasion than Increasing the 
coercion on taxpayers. 
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Chapter VIII: Conclusions 
VIII. 1 Concluding Remarks 
In the first part of this work we justified and formalized 
the notion of Kantian behaviour in a model of private supply of a 
public good. In the second part of this work we applied the same 
approach'tolincome tax evasion, seen as an example of voluntary 
(non) provision of public goods. We argued that this approach is 
able to offer interesting insights for the analysis of the 
phenomena' at' hand and some results were reached which seem to 
support our claim. In the concluding section of each of the two 
parts we discussed the caveats of the analysis performed in that 
part and we also offered some suggestions for further research in 
the two fields considered. Rather than repeating again the 
arguments discussed at the end of each section, let me instead 
conclude this work by pointing out a general caveat pertaining' to 
the approach followed in the previous chapters and by indicating 
some other economic fields where the adoption of an ethical 
approach-to human behaviour may turn out to be fruitful. 
Beginning with the former. I believe that the foundations of 
Kantian morality would repay a more detailed analysis than that 
performed in this work. In modeling Kantlan behaviour we basically 
followed the literature on this issue and argued that in the 
context of the simple economy that we were considering, a timeless 
economy where income is not earned, that way of formalizing 
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Kantian behaviour could"-be considered adequate. In the final 
section of-chapter-IV'we also offered some suggestions on how the 
notion of Kantian behaviour could or should be reformulated in the 
context'of more complex economies. However, the same notion of 
Kantian behaviour was introduced' simply on the basis of a verbal 
argument and some extra work on this issue would be highly 
desirable. 
In particular, it might be of interest to determine whether 
Kantian behaviour can be derived formally from a set of axioms 
reflecting more fundamental-ethical principles, such as the notion 
of symmetry of' treatment'among agents. This would allow one to 
clarify the structure of Kantian behaviour, thus making it easier 
to extend the notion to'different contexts, and would also allow 
one to understand' better the links between Kantian morality and 
the alternative interpretations of fairness which have been 
proposed in the literature in different contexts --such as the 
notion of fair allocations popularized by Varian (1974) and Baumol 
(1986), the fair distribution in terms of needs and deserts 
discussed by Sen (1984) in several works, and the many notions of 
fair behaviour' which' are commonly used in labour economics (see, 
for example, the the work of Akerlof, 1984 and Frank, 1985). This 
enterprise, if successful, might also allow one to use the notion 
of Kantian morality as a different way to assess the desirability 
of economic processes and results, together with, or alternative 
to, the many tools that economists already employ to this end. 
While the above shows that much work on Kantian morality has 
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still to be done and that our formalization represents only a 
first attempt to address this issue. I would nevertheless like to 
argue that, -in spite of their limitations, the models introduced 
in chapter III might be used, upon reformulation, to cast light on 
several economic phenomena. A first field where they could be 
applied is labour economics. I am referring here not only to the 
many examples of collective action which characterize this field 
--as for example joining a union, worker participation in a strike 
and so on-- but also to more substantial issues such as the 
determination of wages in collective bargaining and the issue of 
why firms pay wages above the market-clearing level. 
For example, the literature on efficiency wages (Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1986) is based on the hypothesis that workers reduce their 
labor effort if their real wage Is cut, so that it can be optimal 
for a firm'to pay a wage which is higher than the market clearing 
wage. In this literature however it has never been explained 
clearly why workers' effort should be positively correlated with 
the real wage. In order to solve this problem, In a recent paper 
Akerlof and Yellen (1988) suggest that the effort produced by a 
worker should be modeled as an increasing function of the wage 
paid by the firm less a subjectively determined "fair" wage. 
However, this fair wage is not explained in the theory and it is 
introduced ad hoc as the wage of some reference group or a 
weighted average of the wages paid In the relevant industry. One 
could perhaps attempt to use our Kantian rules weakened by 
reciprocity considerations to model the process'by which a worker 
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comes, to-select the wage that he would consider it fair to receive 
in exchange for the effort produced. Again, as in our model on 
Income tax evasion, reduction of effort by the worker could then 
be-,. interpreted asýan example of (non) voluntary contribution. It 
might also be interesting to see if this approach is able to offer 
a'rationale for some empirical-, regularities in the wage setting 
behaviour of firms (see Akerlof: and Yellen, 1988: 44) which the 
efficiency wage literature fails to explain. 
Another important field where the model above could be 
applied is in the case, of cooperative enterprises. Since the 
seminal paper by Sen (1966) a growing 
literature has developed 
discussing the way in which labour-managed firms select the output 
to produce and how the resulting profits are 
distributed among 
workers. This is clearly an 
issue where our formalization of 
Kantian behaviour weakened by reciprocity considerations might 
offer some insights. Here again, as 
in the original Sugden paper 
(Sugden, 1984), the voluntary contribution of an individual should 
be modeled in terms of the work effort employed 
in the *production 
of the output of the labour-managed 
firm. The problem for the 
labour-managed firm would then become that of determining 
simultaneously the output of the firm and the allocative rule 
which would maximize the welfare of its members. It could be 
interesting to check if this approach would be able either to 
solve or to offer an alternative rationale for some of the most 
striking results of this literature. such as the negatively sloped 
supply function of the labour-managed firm. 
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It would be very easy to offer many other examples of 
economic fields where the models discussed in the previous 
chapters might be applied, upon reformulation. It of course 
remains to be seen whether their application in the indicated 
fields would turn out to be useful, in the double sense of 
offering interesting insights and producing analytic results in 
line with observation. It Is hoped however that the indications 
offered above are enough to suggest that the approach followed in 
the previous chapters is rich in potential applications. The 
writer's hope is that it will also turn out to be fruitful. 
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